BACK TO BLACK:
RACIAL RECLASSIFICATION AND POLITICAL IDENTITY FORMATION IN BRAZIL

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BACK TO BLACK:
RACIAL RECLASSIFICATION AND POLITICAL IDENTITY FORMATION IN BRAZIL

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This dissertation leverages a phenomenon of racial reclassification in Brazil to shed new light on the processes of identity politicization. Conventional wisdom tells us that the history of race mixture, fluid racial boundaries, and stigmatized blackness lead Brazilians to capitalize on racial fluidity and change their racial identifications—to reclassify—toward whiteness. In more recent years, however, Brazilians have demonstrated a marked and newfound tendency to reclassify towards *blackness*. I argue that this sudden reversal is the unintended consequence of expanded access to secondary and university education in recent decades, which has led many to develop a racialized political consciousness, what I refer to as political identity. State-led efforts to better include lower-class sectors of the citizenry through educational expansion have increased formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens' *exposure* to information, social networks, and the labor market, while also endowing them with greater internal *efficacy*. Greater exposure and efficacy, in turn, have led many to challenge commonsense racial hierarchies and the national myth of racial unity as they have come face-to-face with racialized inequalities in their quests for upward mobility. Reclassification toward blackness, then, is an articulation of these newfound and racialized political identities.

This theory is informed and developed through in-depth interviews with reclassifiers collected during more than 15 months of field research in two Brazilian

cities. These insights are empirically and systematically tested with longitudinal cohort analysis of annual household data from the census bureau. Additionally, drawing on original survey experiments and an original panel dataset of public university students, I test and find inconsistent support for a rival instrumental hypothesis based on the implementation of race-targeted affirmative action, as well as the hypothesis that racial identification has been shaped by the state's changing discourse toward race and the national myth of racial unity. Finally, analyzing an originally designed survey, I explore the consequences of these racialized political identities for political engagement and the exercise of citizenship.

Ultimately, this dissertation contributes a novel account of identity politicization at the individual level and emphasizes the interaction between social structure and citizenship institutions in these processes.

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Merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards emancipation, you have committed yourself to a fight against all forces that seek to use your blackness as a stamp that marks you out as a subservient being.
—Steve Biko, "The Definition of Black Consciousness"

A casa-grande surta quando a senzala aprende a ler.
The masters lose their minds when the slaves learn to read.
—Brazilian aphorism

Voice is political action par excellence.
—Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

That's when I was like "I'm black," you know?

These are the words of Jorge, a university student in his mid-30s living in Recife, a coastal city in northeastern Brazil. On a sunny and breezy morning in 2017, Jorge invited me to his parents' home in a middle-class neighborhood in the center of the city, where he recounted for me the details of his personal transformation. Jorge, like many others I came to meet in Brazil, is classified as white on his birth certificate—the work of his parents, he reports. Today, however, he self-identifies as black. Reflecting on his experience growing up in the middle class in Recife, Jorge says that at the time he never thought much about race or his racial identity, per se, but that today he sees many of his past experiences as deeply racialized. This changed for Jorge at university, where he enrolled in a sociology course on black feminism. There, he gained exposure to new information and perspectives, and he found himself relating to the personal anecdotes and examples of racism suffered and shared by his classmates. It was this experience, Jorge tells me, that led him to "discover [him]self" as black.

Tiago, an economics student in his mid-20s who also studied at a university in Recife, tells a similar story. Like Jorge, Tiago tells me that he is classified as white on his birth certificate, that today he identifies as black, and that while growing up he never gave much thought to his racial identity. When I ask Tiago what, then, prompted such a stark shift in his racial identification, he tells me that one day he was hanging out with friends from university who brought him to an event organized by the black movement. There, Tiago heard the anecdotes and stories of personal struggle and everyday racism that the activists were sharing. He tells me that these stories resonated with him in ways

he was not expecting because he had not realized he endured racism—that is, because he did not consider himself black. But upon hearing about experiences so similar to his own, Tiago asked himself, "how had I not realized this before?" He tells me, "I looked back and said 'jeez, that all happened to me because I was black. Because I am black.' It was really just like that. It was a discovery."

The personal and racial trajectories of Jorge and Tiago are as unremarkable as they are remarkable in Brazil. They are unremarkable because their stories are functions of the fluidity and ambiguity of racial boundaries that have long earned Brazil special status as the world's foremost "racial democracy," a racially united nation born from the mixture of European, African, and indigenous peoples. Without rigid racial boundaries such as those found in the United States or South Africa, such boundary-crossing was not only acceptable, but commonplace. Yet it is the very history of boundary-crossing in Brazil that also makes these trajectories remarkable. For while Brazil is known—and lauded by some—for its particular form of raceless nationalism, below the surface of the country's national myth have long lain rampant racism, deep inequalities, and the everyday practice of *whitening*, in which Brazilians would



Figure 1.1 Brazil's Racial Composition, 1992-2014. Source: Brazilian census bureau (IBGE), census and annual household surveys (PNAD).

capitalize on the fluidity of racial boundaries to change their racial identifications—to reclassify—and place themselves in *lighter* racial categories, when possible.

Not so since the early 2000s. In more recent years, many Brazilians like Jorge and Tiago have demonstrated a marked and newfound tendency to reclassify not toward whiteness, but instead toward *blackness*. Figure 1 shows the racial composition of Brazil from 1992 to 2014, as determined by the Brazilian census bureau. Between the 2000 and 2010 censuses, the Brazilian population unexpectedly turned from majority to minority-white—a sudden structural shift that, as we will see, is left unexplained by demographic trends or changes in census enumeration practices. Instead, what has become clear is that Brazilians are increasingly assuming the stigmatized labels of blackness.

This dissertation analyzes these patterns of racial reclassification as a springboard for shedding new light on the processes of identity change and politicization. Specifically, this project aims to understand why Brazilians are choosing to reclassify toward *blackness*, that is, social categories that are associated with stigma and that are often the target of discrimination. In seeking to account for these patterns, it also aims to explain why this could happen so suddenly; why ostensibly at the beginning of the 2000s; and why increasingly over time. In so doing, this project provides a novel theoretical account of the individual-level processes of political identity formation. Those familiar with Brazil will be quick to attribute such change to new material incentives created by the implementation of race-targeted affirmative action policies. As we will see in the chapters that follow, however, this parsimonious explanation finds inconsistent empirical support and struggles to account for long-term identity change in this context of racial fluidity and stigmatized blackness. Instead, I develop and test the argument that these patterns are best understood as the unintended consequence of recent efforts at educational expansion, which has altered many

Brazilians' racial self-understandings, led them to cross previously recognized racial boundaries, and imbued newfound racial identities with political meaning.

The Brazilian case is particularly well positioned to offer insights into the processes of political identity formation. To the extent that Brazil has appeared in the literature on ethnic and racial politics, scholars have noted the weak politicization of racial differences (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Hanchard 1994; also see Yashar 2005). Indeed, Brazil is typically analyzed as a "negative" case demanding explanation or one that offers crucial variation on the (in)dependent variable (Lieberman 2003, 2009; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000). Scholars agree that race has been politically relevant only insofar as elites have largely disarticulated racial differences by constructing a racially inclusive nation that whitewashes Brazil's history as the single largest and longest-running participant in the slave trade, as well as slavery's persistent role in shaping present-day inequalities (Andrews 1991, 2004; Loveman 2014; Schwarcz 1993; Skidmore 1974; Stepan 1991). Thus with little prior expectation for racial categories to crystallize as political identities, I aim to leverage Brazil's "exceptionalism" (Pepinsky 2017) in this regard as a rare opportunity to study political identity formation where such identity change is not only possible, but possible to empirically and systematically detect.

The Argument

I argue that this sudden reversal in patterns of reclassification is the unintended consequence of expanded access to secondary and university education in recent decades, which has led many newly mobile citizens to develop a racialized political consciousness—what I refer to as political identity. Beginning in the 1990s, state-led efforts to incorporate marginal sectors of the citizenry through social policy expansion granted the lower classes—many of whom are racially ambiguous and susceptible to ideologies of white superiority—unprecedented access to the benefits of social

citizenship. Expanded access to education, in particular, increased marginal citizens' *exposure* to new information, social networks, and labor market experiences, and increased their sense of internal political *efficacy*. This increased exposure and efficacy, in turn, have led many of these formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens to confront and challenge Brazil's national myth of racial unity and commonsense racial hierarchies as they have come face-to-face with racialized inequalities in their quests for upward mobility. Reclassification toward blackness, then, can be understood as an articulation of these newfound and racialized political identities – the development of which is due in part to Brazil's structural conditions of extreme inequality and racial stratification, as well as access to the benefits of social citizenship.

In historical perspective, what sets this recent era of social incorporation apart, and what explains the sudden timing of these patterns, is state-level changes in the coverage and nature of social benefits allocated to citizens by the state. In decades past, literacy requirements excluded large segments of the poor from the franchise, and social benefits were accessible only by formal labor sectors, and were allocated in service of the state's goals of modernization and development (Collier and Collier 2002; Fischer 2008; Loveman 2014). As the third wave of democratization reached Brazil by the 1980s, a new and progressive constitution not only codified universal rights of social citizenship for all Brazilians, but lifted literacy requirements for political citizenship (Garay 2016). In this altered political arena, left- and right-of-center governments, suddenly competing for the political support of the masses, had great incentive to reform and fund social policy institutions to improve access to and the quality of social benefits. Specifically, reforms in basic education included increased spending at all levels, altered spending formulas, and restructured incentives and resource delivery to circumvent political patronage and clientelism. At the university level, reforms included the expansion of and creation of new and free public universities, race- and means-targeted

affirmative action programs, and greater ease of access via reforms to the entrance exam, new scholarship programs, and federally funded financial aid. The result has been remarkable improvements in quality and access to secondary and university education at all levels of Brazil's income structure. The ultimate consequence of educational expansion for many citizens, I argue, however, has been the new kinds of personal experiences that upward mobility entails and that can shape racial subjectivity and political consciousness.

In broader theoretical terms, this dissertation establishes that individuals might claim and articulate identities that are associated with stigma and discrimination, rather than distance themselves from them, when these self-understandings constitute a *political identity.* By political identity, I mean those categories of social membership that shape individuals' perceptions and understandings of power relationships, broadly defined. Thus whereas previously individuals self-whitened in response to the myriad incentives for whiteness that permeated society, recent generations of lower class and upwardly mobile citizens (who are darker-skinned, on average, but who have options in terms of their racial self-identifications) are increasingly coming to understand their relative positions in society in racial terms. For many of these individuals, the development of racialized political identities is not determined simply by one's physical appearance, nor by one's objective location in the social structure. Instead, it rests on one's subjective judgments and interpretations of *power asymmetries* between groups, interpretations which are influenced by their access to a key benefit of social citizenship. By (in)directly altering personal experiences through exposure and empowering them with greater internal efficacy, greater education has encouraged citizens to question commonsense social hierarchies, demand equality of opportunity, and articulate identities and pursue interests in diverse political arenas.

On the one hand, then, reclassification and political identity formation are consequences of the expansion of social citizenship. On the other, they are indicative of a new era of democratic politics in which formerly marginal citizens have been empowered to exercise, and thereby deepen, democratic citizenship itself.

Contributions

A Novel Account of Identity Politicization

This dissertation contributes to theoretical debates on when, why, and how identities become politicized. Near-consensus has emerged in the comparative politics literature on the central role of incentives and institutions in shaping these outcomes. David Laitin (1986), for example, argues that colonial institutions can carry long-term legacies for shaping the commonsense of which identities structure local politics, and that individuals' identity choices reflect prospective calculations of material payoffs (Laitin 1998). In more recent scholarship, Posner (2005) and Huber (2017) argue that identities and cleavages are mobilized electorally from above in elites' attempts to maximize their own payoffs. Voters, in turn, similarly support such electoral strategies, which promise a more favorable distribution of state resources (Chandra 2004).

By contrast, the argument I develop and substantiate in the chapters that follow emphasizes that identities can become politicized in the absence of mobilization from above, and in the absence of clear material incentives to do so. In my analyses I probe extensively for evidence to support the notion that reclassification toward blackness is the product of recent affirmative action policies incentivizing blackness, but this hypothesis falls short. Not only does it struggle to account for long-term identity change, but Brazilians appear to have begun reclassifying toward blackness in advance of major affirmative action policies, and even do so after they qualify for such benefits. Moreover, this crude instrumentalist hypothesis struggles to account for the fact that

claiming and articulating black identities would run counter to one's material interests—that is, they are articulating identities at the potential risk of inviting greater racialized discrimination.

In light of this, my account shifts attention away from institutions that shape incentives and toward institutions of social citizenship, which can empower citizens to assume these identities and articulate them in various political arenas. I argue that citizenship can matter in these processes partly because "[e]ducation is a necessary prerequisite," in T.H. Marshall's words, of "the right to defend and assert all one's rights on terms of equality with others" (Marshall 1950, 10–11, 26). Insofar as education encourages the articulation of identity-based interests and grievances, then access to social citizenship, and the exercise of civil and political citizenship, is central to these processes. But citizenship institutions matter, too, I argue, because these rights are not uniformly accessible to all sectors of society. As we will see, the punctuated extension of (social) citizenship rights to *de facto* excluded sectors of the citizenry can produce sudden and unexpected political consequences. This analysis thus highlights the ways in which social structure and citizenship institutions can interact to create conditions under which political identities come into formation: structural conditions of extreme inequality and color-based stratification may legitimate identity-based claims and grievances; but it is when the individuals suffering from these inequalities are also endowed with the tools and capacities of citizenship that they are most likely to develop political identities on these bases and articulate these identities in the political arena.

An Empirical Analysis of the "Identity-to-Politics Link"

This dissertation also contributes to a broader research agenda in the interdisciplinary study of identity politics that has urged studying identity politicization as a set of processes. In particular, this analysis takes up recent calls to study more

precisely how social categories come to inspire group consciousness and how members of these categories cohere politically, what political scientists typically consider political "cleavages" (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Rogers Brubaker and colleagues have provided some of the most pointed critiques of this literature, above all for abusing the logic of constructivism and for conflating categories and groups (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Instead, scholars should seek to better understand "the ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 1).

Taeku Lee (2008) echoes these calls and suggests that scholars focus greater attention on the "identity-to-politics link," the set of processes that lead from social categories, to group consciousness, to political coherence and mobilization. Despite widespread recognition of these gaps in the literature, we possess relatively few empirical studies of the *processes* of identity politicization. This dissertation is thus an advancement in our theoretical and empirical understanding. In particular, it contributes to this agenda by leveraging these patterns of racial reclassification not simply as a fascinating case of identity change that merits explanation, but also as a rare opportunity to study the ways in which social categories come to inspire political consciousness at the individual level. Chapter 2 elaborates these conceptual and theoretical considerations in greater detail and situates the individual-level processes of political identity formation within the broader identity-to-politics link.

An Update on Racial Consciousness in Brazil

In addition to contributing to the literatures on identity politicization, this study contributes to the comparative study of racial politics. In particular, this study serves to document these stark patterns of reclassification as an update to the conventional wisdom on patterns of racial identification in Brazil. A long line of research in

anthropology and sociology, in particular, have established the nature of Brazilian racial subjectivity and racial hierarchies. Of particular relevance is the idea that "money whitens:" whiteness, in other words, is associated with upper-class status, and blackness lower-class status (Cardoso and Ianni 1960; Degler 1971; Harris 1952; N. do V. Silva 1994; Wagley 1965). Many of the foremost analyses establishing these patterns systematically (Bailey 2009; N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998) and ethnographically/interpretively (Hanchard 1994; Hordge-Freeman 2015; Sheriff 2001; Twine 1998) were conducted with data from single survey rounds or with limited temporal scope. Moreover, almost all of these oft-referenced studies rely on data collected before these more recent patterns of reclassification became apparent.

Methodologically, recent years have seen great advances in the survey methods used to understand patterns of racial identification (E. E. Telles 2014; E. E. Telles and Paschel 2014), but this study is the first to place these patterns in longitudinal perspective and to provide a theoretically developed, historically situated, and systematically tested account of longitudinal variation in patterns of racial identification. In particular, one of the key findings of my analysis in this regard is that upward mobility does not inevitably lead to whitening, as prior research would suggest. Instead, individuals' socioeconomic backgrounds interact with their personal experiences of upward mobility to shape their racial subjectivity and political consciousness. I argue that this recent era signals a certain degree of social and political flux in the Brazilian case that not only renews attention to the subjective and constructed nature of racial boundaries, but that also ought to encourage scholars to think twice before taking for-granted Brazil's infamous status as the perennial paradox in the comparative study of racial politics.

Implications for the Exercise of Citizenship

Finally, this study considers not only the causes and mechanisms of political identity formation, but it also explores the consequences of this change for political engagement. In particular, this study makes use of an originally designed survey instrument that incorporates modern survey methods for measuring and analyzing racial identification (E. E. Telles 2014), as well as the operationalization of an original index to directly measure political consciousness as distinct from racial identification. This survey employs these new empirical tools to test more precisely and directly the hypothesized causal mechanisms, and the consequences of political identity formation for various forms of civic participation and engagement, social movement participation, political interest, and internal and external political efficacy. Ultimately, these novel data show that politically conscious members are also more politically engaged.

By exploring these consequences, this study casts these patterns of political identity formation as a kind of policy feedback effect. Specifically, the analysis documents the relationship between educational expansion, political identity formation, and political engagement, and shows how the expansion of social citizenship benefits can not only shape political identities, but that these political identities in turn can shape how citizens exercise their civic and political citizenship rights. Since the third wave of democratization swept Latin America in the 1980s, states have struggled to guarantee full rights of democratic citizenship for all of their citizens, leading scholars to bemoan the state of "low-intensity citizenship" in the region (O'Donnell 1993). I suggest that these patterns and their consequences for political engagement paint a somewhat optimistic picture for the state of citizenship in the region. For not only have states begun to actively pursue policies addressing the region's stark inequalities, but these policies have also increased the likelihood the citizens will articulate identities in the political arena that coincide with the structural disadvantage they face in society, and thereby

demand further redress for the inequalities that have so weakened democratic citizenship.

Chapter Overview

The chapters that follow provide a theoretical and empirical account of the processes of identity formation and politicization. Chapter 2 elaborates the argument introduced here. I emphasize the contribution to the literature on ethnic and identity politics by focusing on the consequences of expansionary social policy for understanding the adoption of stigmatized identities and the mechanisms of consciousness formation. I also discuss competing hypotheses drawn from conventional wisdom that identity-driven political behavior is shaped by material incentives, or that discursive and symbolic shifts at the level of the Brazilian state can explain these recent patterns of reclassification. Finally, I situate this novel theoretical account in the literature by distinguishing the individual-level account from processes of *cleavage* politicization that predominate in the literature, typically through top-down strategic mobilization or bottom-up movement mobilization.

Chapter 3 presents historical background and context for these recent patterns of reclassification, as well as for the extension and accessibility of social citizenship benefits in Brazil. I focus in this chapter on the recent era of social inclusion and social policy expansion, commonly thought of as the "second incorporation" following the incorporation of urban working classes under populist leader Getúlio Vargas in the mid-twentieth century. I emphasize that the recent era extended educational access to citizens occupying informal social and economic sectors of society.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present empirical analyses of the causal propositions elaborated in Chapter 2, as well as the consequences of political identity for political engagement and the exercise of citizenship. Chapter 4 presents analysis of in-depth

interview data collected with reclassifiers and stable identifiers, and seeks to elaborate the causal pathways that link education with reclassification and political consciousness. This chapter leverages the richness of qualitative data to gain insights into the personal experiences and processes that lead individuals to develop political consciousness. In particular, the chapter focuses on the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy and illustrates how education alters individuals' personal experiences, which lead them to challenge commonsense racial boundaries, the national myth of racial democracy, and their understandings of power more broadly in Brazilian society.

Chapter 5 presents a series of systematic and quantitative tests of the observable implications of the argument, as well as tests of the rival hypotheses. This chapter draws on a longitudinal analysis of birth cohorts constructed from annual household surveys from the Brazilian census bureau; original survey experiments testing rival hypotheses; and an original panel analysis of Brazilian university students, constructed from an originally constructed database drawn from protected data held by the Brazilian Ministry of Education. This series of quantitative tests provides support for the political identity hypothesis—showing that better educated individuals, in particular those from lower class backgrounds, are the most likely to adopt nonwhite identities over time—and finds little evidence in favor the rival hypotheses as sufficient explanations for the apparent patterns of reclassification.

Chapter 6 draws on original survey data to link political consciousness to these patterns of reclassification, and to explore the consequences of this consciousness for forms of political engagement, showing that individuals with higher levels of racial consciousness are not only more likely to claim and articulate black identities, but they are more active, engaged, participatory, and efficacious than their less-conscious counterparts.

The final, concluding chapter reflects back upon the theoretical issues this dissertation engages and situates these findings within the ethnic and identity politics literature and the broader literature on comparative race. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for our understanding of citizenship in contemporary democratic politics.

Notes on Terminology

Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying the racial terminology employed throughout this dissertation. Those familiar with Brazil and other countries in Latin America know that racial terminology cannot be employed with the same taken for-granted clarity or precision as in other contexts (Harris et al. 1993; N. do V. Silva 1996; E. E. Telles 2004). This is increasingly the case since recent patterns of reclassification have only diversified the logics of racial subjectivity. Because my study focuses on patterns of reclassification using the official census categories, I often refer to the racial categories white (*branco)*, brown or mixed-race (*pardo*), and black (*preto*). In addition to these official categories, two additional words are commonly used in Brazil with some degree of ambiguity. The first is the infamous *moreno*, which translates to English roughly as "dark," and which studies have shown can be used in place of any other racial category (N. do V. Silva 1996; E. E. Telles 2004). For many, the prevalence and use of the word *moreno* to describe oneself in racial terms is evidence of the Brazilian idea of race mixture and unity; others understand it as a euphemism to avoid associating oneself with blackness (Hanchard 1994; Hordge-Freeman 2015; Twine 1998). In addition, an increasingly common form of identification is the word *negro,* promoted by the black movement, which is commonly understood to mean Afro-descendant. The Brazilian census bureau (IBGE) occasionally employs this category in its analyses of census data by collapsing black and brown categories together. While the black movement promotes

the use of the word *negro* to promote racial unity (Nobles 2000; Paschel 2016), studies have shown that not all individuals who identify as mixed-race would consider themselves *negro* (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012).

Throughout this dissertation, when I use white, brown, or black to refer to racial classifications, I refer specifically to the official census categories. Rather than the word *negro*, I use the term nonwhite to refer to black and brown classified individuals together, excluding indigenous and Asian classified individuals (who also appear on the census). When translating from Portuguese, I often translate both *preto* and *negro* to English as black, though if this translation (or the translation of other euphemisms) obscures some context or connotation, I also note the Portuguese usage parenthetically. Finally, throughout this dissertation I employ various terms to make references to individuals' identities and identifications. First, I distinguish between identity, the individual's sincere self-understanding, and identification, which entails affiliation or classification of some kind. Thus one might *identify* as *preto* on the census, even if one understands herself to be *negra*. Moreover, one's identity may not be influenced at all by one's "race," even if they are aware of how they self-classify in racial terms. As I elaborate in Chapter 2, I further distinguish between identity and its subtype *political* identity. Whereas one's identity may be informed by a wide array of attributes or social membership, when I reserve the term *political identity* for those self-understandings that shape individuals' understandings of power.

CHAPTER TWO

RACIAL RECLASSIFICATION AS POLITICAL IDENTITY FORMATION

This dissertation aims to explain shifting patterns of racial identification in Brazil, namely the newfound tendency among Brazilians to capitalize on the fluidity of racial boundaries to reclassify toward blackness. In accounting for this ostensibly sudden reversal in the tendency to reclassify toward whiteness, it also aims to provide a theoretical account of the processes through which social categories come to constitute individuals' political consciousness, and how and why individuals choose to articulate these identities in the political arena. Unlike prior scholarship which has cast Brazil as an exception in the comparative study of racial politics, this dissertation leverages Brazil's exceptionalism and this empirical puzzle to provide a new and coherent account of the causes of political consciousness, the mechanisms of its formation, and its consequences for democratic citizenship.

I argue that reclassification toward blackness has been driven by the formation of racialized political identities, spurred by expanded access to formal education in recent decades. Education has increased formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens exposure to racialized inequalities and their internal political efficacy. As a result, these upwardly mobile citizens have come to challenge Brazil's national myth of racial unity and commonsense racial hierarchies as they come face-to-face with racialized inequalities in their struggles for upward mobility. Racial reclassification, then, is an articulation of this new and racialized political consciousness, the development of which is due in part to structural conditions of extreme inequality and racial stratification, as well as access to the benefits of social citizenship.

In addition to elaborating on and discussing this argument, the rival hypotheses, and other alternative explanations, this chapter also establishes and motivates the

empirical puzzle at the heart of this analysis. I lay to rest simple explanations based on demography or enumeration practices and emphasize that conventional wisdom would expect reclassification toward whiteness, not blackness. Central to understanding these patterns, I argue, is the notion of "political identity." I begin with a definition of this concept.

Conceptualizing Political Identity

"Political identity" is a commonly employed but rarely defined concept in political science scholarship. This has led to a proliferation of differing and at times contradictory (if seemingly commonsensical) usages in the literature, typically as partisanship, citizenship, or simply as applications of social identity.[1] When I employ the term, however, I am referring to *categories of social membership that inspire group consciousness and that shape individuals' understandings of power relationships, broadly defined*.[2] More specifically, this conceptualization can be unpacked into three components:

1. Political identities are assumed at the individual, rather than group level. A particular social membership may not constitute a political identity for all members of a group/category. Instead, the relevant question is whether a particular membership or group attachment indeed constitutes a political identity for any one member.
2. Political identities entail group consciousness, that is, they entail more than a simple awareness of one's membership in a category or the act of categorization; they entail affirmed identification with the group and other members.

[1] For a fuller treatment of this conceptualization and of other usages, see De Micheli (2018).
[2] This conceptualization is inspired by Cramer's (2016) conceptualization of rural consciousness. Also see Jung (2000) for a similar conceptualization.

3. What makes this consciousness *political* is that it shapes the way individuals interpret and make sense of power relationships between groups. This component broadens the typical view of group consciousness,[3] which focuses more narrowly on stratification beliefs and relative deprivation.

In addition to avoiding the analytical pitfalls of "groupism" (Brubaker 2004), the focus on the individual in this conceptualization also provides an analytical flexibility that helps to situate the individual-level process of the formation of political consciousness within the broader processes through which social categories are translated into group-level politics, what Taeku Lee (2008) calls the "identity-to-politics link." Lee is particularly concerned with understanding how, given the individual's repertoire of identities, any one category might become politicized and group members might cohere politically to mobilize or engage in politics collectively.[4] This conceptualization of political identity not only provides theoretical leverage in the present analysis, but can also serve this broader research agenda by situating the phenomenon whereby social categories crystallize politically for *individuals* within the broader set of processes through which *group* politics emerges.

Finally, it is worth taking a moment to distinguish this conceptualization from the related concepts of social identity and political cleavages. First, whereas social identity entails identification, or "knowledge of [one's] membership in a social group" (Tajfel 1981, 255),[5] political identity implies consciousness, "a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of this awareness of similarity" (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980, 30). Thus social identity theory hypothesizes that identity shapes behavior simply through the act of identification, where as a consciousness-based perspective

[3] For classic conceptualizations, see Gurin, Miller, and Gurin (1980) and Miller et al. (1981).
[4] Also see Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 5) on confusing "categories of analysis" and "categories of practice."
[5] This is can also be understood as categorization, in Turner et al.'s (1987) terms.

might expect within-group heterogeneity. Second, the focus on *micro*-level identities distinguishes political identities from political cleavages, which might be viewed as the macro-level manifestation of micro-level political identities. In other words, whereas political cleavages entail a shared *collective* identity (Bartolini and Mair 1990, chap. 9), political identity refers only to the attributes of any one individual's identity.[6] It is thus the level of analysis that distinguishes these two concepts: if a social membership inspires political identities for enough group members, then one might say that these identities have cohered politically and scaled up to form a cleavage.

The Puzzle of Racial Reclassification

Census Enumeration and Demographic Trends

The formation of racialized political identities, I will argue, is central to understanding racial reclassification. But this cannot be taken for granted without assessing simple explanations for these patterns. To be sure, such apparent and swift change might be an artifact of census enumeration practices or intergroup differences in



Figure 2.1 Racial Composition of Brazil, 1992-2014. Source: PNAD, IBGE

[6] One might say that political cleavages imply micro-level political identities, but that political identities do not imply political cleavages. In this sense, political identities and the group memberships they are based on can be thought of not as objectively and empirically identifiable, but as cognitive entities: "not things in the world but ways of seeing the world" (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004, 47).

demographic trends. Indeed, in the Brazilian context, where racial boundaries are fluid and weakly institutionalized (Lieberman 2009), ostensible shifts in racial composition may simply be the product of changing classification schemes employed to measure "race." Several studies have in fact shown that estimates of Brazil's racial composition are sensitive to the classification scheme employed (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012; Monk 2016), as well as to whether respondents are classified by themselves or enumerators (N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998). These concerns can be allayed by the simple fact that over the period in question, the classification scheme employed by the census bureau has remained unchanged, and the bureau has consistently relied on respondents' self-declarations for classification (IBGE 2003, 2016). These shifts, therefore, cannot be dismissed as artifacts of enumeration practices.[7]

Shifts in racial composition are also due in part to intergroup differences in demographic trends, though longitudinal patterns also fail to account for the observed shifts.[8] Since 1991, international migration has accounted for less than 1 percent of Brazil's resident population, and this figure has been on the decline.[9] Mortality statistics show that the mortality rates of nonwhite Brazilians are generally similar to or greatly exceed those of whites. Fertility statistics, on the other hand, offer *prima facie* evidence in favor of a demographic explanation: statistics suggest that generally nonwhite women have more children than white women; but a longitudinal view shows that the racial gap in fertility has been steadily declining, suggesting that, relative to whites, the growth of nonwhites ought be slowing over time.

[7] See Appendix A for more on census practices.
[8] See tables and figures in Appendix A for more on demographic trends.
[9] For the historical role of immigration in altering Brazil's racial composition, see Skidmore (1974) and Levy (1974).



Figure 2.2 Change in the Size of Racial Categories between 2000 and 2010 census within Birth Cohorts. Source: IBGE. Each cluster of bars (1940s, 1950s, etc.) represents one cohort based on decade of birth. Each bar represents the percentage change in the size of each racial category between the 2000 and 2010 censuses, as determined by individuals' self-classifications.

To see this more clearly, consider Figure 2.2, which presents a simple analysis of birth cohorts between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. Each cluster of bars represents a birth cohort (based on decade of birth), and each bar shows the percentage change in the size of each racial group between the 2000 and 2010 censuses within each birth cohort. By excluding from these figures anyone born after the 2000 census, this simple analysis controls for any inter-group differences in fertility rates. If there were reclassification occurring, we would expect to see negative growth rates for all categories, as with time cohort members can only exit through death. First, and notably, there are sizable and negative rates for self-identified whites in all cohorts. The decline in the white population is not reducible to exceedingly high mortality rates among elderly whites. Instead, the size of the white group appears to be declining at similar rates regardless of age – a finding that does not comport with mortality statistics, which show that the elderly die at much greater rates (Appendix Table A3). Second, there are positive and large growth rates among self-identified blacks and browns, with the largest growth rates among younger cohorts and blacks, the most stigmatized racial group in

	2000	2010 (aged 10+)		Change due to	% Change due to
Category	Enumerated	Projected	Enumerated	Reclassification	Reclassification
White	92.0	88.1	77.8	-10.3	-12
Brown	65.8	62.6	68.8	6.2	10
Black	10.6	9.9	13.0	3.1	31

Table 2.1 Estimates of Inter-Census Racial Reclassification, 2000-10. Source: Miranda (2015).

Brazil. These patterns suggest that a considerable amount of reclassification took place between the 2000 and 2010 censuses.

Table 1 presents estimates from a cohort component analysis, a demographic method of computing projections for the 2010 population based on demographic trends observed in the 2000 census, and comparing these estimates to the statistics observed in the real census.[10] This more rigorous analysis bears out the same pattern as the simple cohort analysis above, showing the white population to be smaller and black and brown populations larger than expected. Specifically, this analysis estimates that roughly 10 percent of self-identified browns and 31 percent of self-identified blacks are comprised of reclassifiers. What these simple analyses make clear, then, is that the apparent patterns of reclassification cannot be dismissed as artifacts of census practices or demographic trends.

The Status Quo: Stigma, "Social Race," and Whitening

This puzzle is further sharpened by the fact that reclassification itself is not a new phenomenon in Brazil or Latin America (Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade 2004; Loveman and Muniz 2007; Wood and Carvalho 1994).[11] High rates of miscegenation and the absence of racial group membership rules have produced a fluid system of classification in which Brazilians self-identify according to flexible phenotypic criteria rather than rigid descent rules (A. S. A. Guimarães 1999; Harris 1964b; Nogueira 1998;

[10] This table is reproduced from Miranda's (2015) cohort component analysis. Also see Soares (2008) for documentation of reclassification patterns.
[11] For analogous patterns in the United States, see Waters (2002) and Davenport (2018).

E. E. Telles 2004; Wade 1997). Brazilians possess rich lexicons to describe racial (or "color") differences, including terms that deviate from census categories (Harris 1970; Harris et al. 1993; N. do V. Silva 1996; E. E. Telles 2004). Moreover, the subjective understanding of race is intertwined with notions of class, what scholars refer to as "social race" (Degler 1971; Harris 1964a; Wagley 1965). As sociologist Nelson do Valle Silva describes, "given some phenotypic combination, the higher the socioeconomic position of the individual at the moment of classification, she will be classified that much closer to white" (N. do V. Silva 1994, 70). This complexity and ambiguity, therefore, allows individuals to place themselves in categories different from those ascribed to them, as well as to reclassify themselves over time.

But to the extent that reclassification occurred in the past, it has traditionally reflected a practice known as "whitening." Conventional wisdom holds, and microlevel analyses have shown, that Brazilians have historically capitalized on racial fluidity to reclassify themselves in *lighter* racial categories (Azevedo 1955; Osorio 2004; Pierson 1942; N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998). This trend has also borne out at the macro level: demographic studies of the period between 1950 and 1990 reveal that significant proportions of black identifiers reclassified as mixed-race during a period of middle-class growth, in keeping with the social race hypothesis (Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade 2004; Lovell 1999; Wood and Carvalho 1994). Anthropology and sociology, moreover, are replete with examples documenting the phenomenon, from the common adage that "money whitens" to the assertion that whitening "is a 'universal' aspiration. Blacks, dark mulattoes, and many light mulattoes—all want to whiten" (Cardoso and Ianni 1960, 183).

Empirically oriented scholars problematize the ambiguity of racial identification to different degrees. Some see it as measurement error, complicating efforts to measure "race" and its related outcomes (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; A. Guimarães

2001; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998), whereas others see attempts to simplify racial classification as inherently problematic (Harris et al. 1993). Yet another interpretation is illuminated in Marvin Harris's ethnography conducted in rural Brazil:

> The Negro in Minas Velhas attempts to 'pass' not by posing as white but by posing as anything but a Negro—as a dark *moreno*, or *chulo*, or *caboclo*, etc. If these categories do not suffice he is liable to invent new ones. For example, a Negro storekeeper named Antonio who is well-educated by local standards, fairly prosperous and active politically, never refers to himself as *preto* [black], though physically he has every reason to do so. He prefers rather the original—and euphemistic—term *roxinho* (a little purple) and alludes to his son as 'that slightly purple fellow over there'. Each individual twists as well as he can away from complete identification with the lowest echelon of the social order. The Negro has the opportunity of saying first, 'My hair is not that kinky', or 'My lips are not that big', or 'My colour is not that black'; and second, 'I may look like that picture but I am not as poor, or as illiterate, as he probably is. Therefore, I am not like him'. (Harris 1952, 60)

This passage captures how declarations of racial identification, including euphemisms and census categories, may not reflect one's sincere self-conception, but rather a strategy of avoiding the stigma associated with blackness (Burdick 1998b; Sheriff 2001).[12] Racially ambiguous Brazilians can thus try to minimize stigma by "whitening," inevitably participating in the reproduction of racial hierarchies by implying with their behavior that whiteness is preferred.

This interpretation is not a consensus view, but the idea that racial identification reflects a stigma-minimizing strategy finds broad support. Carl Degler (1971), for example, famously describes this as the "mulatto escape-hatch;" Hanchard (1994) and Twine (1998) describe the ways in which Brazilians participate in the reproduction of racial hierarchies by failing to confront racism; Sheriff (2001) documents in her ethnography that Brazilians often avoid describing friends and neighbors as black as a form of "politeness;"[13] and Hordge-Freeman (2015) documents how families socialize

[12] In her ethnography of race and racism in a low-income community in Rio de Janeiro, Sheriff (2001, 31) describes a "yearning to escape all that is negatively associated with blackness."
[13] Also see Nogueira (1998).

		Self-Classification				
		White	Brown	Black	Total (%)	*N*
Respondent as classified by interviewer	White	87.34	12.45	0.21	100	474
	Brown	23.62	64.47	11.91	100	470
	Black	9.76	31.71	58.94	100	123
	Total (*N*)	537	401	129	-	1,067

Table 2.2 Comparing Self-Classification with Ascribed Classification. Source: Pesquisa Social Brasileira, 2002. $\chi 2$ (df = 4) = 681.91, p < .001.

Brazilians to internalize racial hierarchies. "Afro-Brazilians," she writes, "engage in racial bargains, compromises that are often made ambivalently, in which [they] may comply with racial hierarchies in exchange for perceived payoffs that may be political, economic, psychological, or even affective" (Hordge-Freeman 2015, 6). Moreover, not only have scholars documented rampant discrimination against the darker-skinned for decades,[14] but recent analyses reveal that Brazilian parents are more likely to invest in education for their lighter-skinned children (Rangel 2015), and that Brazilians earn higher wages when their employers perceive them as lighter-skinned (Cornwell, Rivera, and Schmutte 2014). Thus racial hierarchies are reproduced not only through discriminatory policies or macro-structural forces, but also by ostensibly nonwhite Brazilians themselves who seek to approximate whiteness for perceived payoffs in varied forms.

How these myriad incentives shaped patterns of racial identification are clear in Table 2.2, which cross-tabulates respondents' self-classifications in the official census categories with how they were classified by survey interviewers. The likelihood of category mismatch increases monotonically as one moves from white to black; among those classified as brown, mismatched respondents are twice as likely to opt for a lighter, rather than darker category; and nearly 10 percent of those classified as black self-

[14] For seminal analyses, see Hasenbalg (1979) and Telles (2004). Also see Silva (1985, 2000), Andrews (1991, 2014), Lovell (1999, 2006), Lovell and Wood (1998), Monk (2016) and Telles (2014).

classify as white, compared to almost none of those classified as white self-classifying as black.[15]

It is clear that whitening was the dominant trend. But it is also clear that racially ambiguous Brazilians have options, that is, they can choose "exit" or "voice" (Hirschman 1970). An individual can exit by self-whitening, thereby complying with racial hierarchies to "defend his welfare or to improve his position" (Hirschman 1970, 15); or the individual can exercise voice, "political action par excellence" (Hirschman 1970, 16), by choosing blackness and defying commonsense logics that valorize whiteness. Conventional wisdom in social identity theory, too, would predict exit from those social categories that do not contribute positively to the individual's concept of self (Tajfel 1981). Without this "positive group distinctiveness," individuals ought to tend toward leaving the group, when possible (Tajfel 1974, 69). Recent patterns of reclassification toward blackness, then, present a puzzle that conventional wisdom did not anticipate and cannot explain: in this context of racial fluidity and stigmatized blackness, individuals are seemingly pursuing voice over exit.

The Political Identity Hypothesis: Exposure, Efficacy, and Consciousness

The ostensibly sudden reversal in patterns of reclassification, I argue, is the unintended consequence of expanded access to secondary and university education in recent decades, which has led many newly mobile citizens to develop racialized political identities. Beginning in the 1990s, state-led efforts to incorporate marginal sectors of the citizenry through social policy expansion granted lower class sectors—many of whom are racially ambiguous and susceptible to ideologies of white superiority—unprecedented access to the benefits of social citizenship. Expanded access to

[15] For detailed discussion of classification mismatch, see Telles 2004, chap. 4. Also, Silva 1994; Bailey 2009; Telles and Lim 1998.

education, in particular, increased marginal citizens' exposure to new information, social networks, and labor market experiences, and increased their sense of internal political efficacy. Increased exposure and efficacy, in turn, have led many of these formerly marginal and newly mobile citizens to confront and challenge Brazil's national myth of racial unity and commonsense racial hierarchies as they have come face-to-face with racialized inequalities in their quests for upward mobility. Reclassification toward blackness, then, can be understood as an articulation of these newfound and racialized political identities, which have altered individuals' subjective understandings of race, imbued their racial self-understandings with political meaning, and led them to cross previously recognized racial boundaries.

Macro-Level Mechanism: State-Led Educational Expansion

That such dramatic shifts in Brazil's racial composition could unfold so suddenly is a testament to the state's efforts to expand access to the benefits of social citizenship in recent decades. The Brazilian state played an important, if indirect and unintentional, role in inducing these patterns of reclassification through unprecedented efforts to include "outsider" citizens through social policy expansion. As Candelaria Garay (2016) argues, the lifting of literacy requirements in Brazil's 1988 constitution, along with the codification of universal social rights, increased political competition for poor voters who were previously excluded from the franchise. With remarkable continuity across right- and left-leaning governments (Garay 2016; Melo 2008), politicians suddenly had great incentive to reform and create a host of public policies and programs that unleashed an impressive wave of upward mobility for these lower class sectors. In the educational domain alone, the state greatly increased investments and sought to improve educational access and quality (INEP 2016b; World Bank 2002). In the 1990s, reforms included a new national education plan, mandated state-

government spending floors, federal funds for under-resourced municipalities, new resource allocation formulas incentivizing student enrollments, and new delivery channels to circumvent political bargaining between local and state governments (Melo 2017). In the 2000s, education spending reached OECD levels, and the state created new public universities, expanded university slots, created federal scholarship and financial aid programs, centralized the university entrance exam, and sought to explicitly make higher education more inclusive through means- and race-targeted affirmative action policies (Heringer 2015; Heringer and Ferreira 2009; Melo 2017; L. T. Soares 2013).

The consequence of this era of state-led social policy expansion is unmistakable: it is estimated that more than 9 million households (33 million individuals) were lifted out poverty since the 1990s, creating a so-called "new middle class" (Klein, Mitchell, and Junge 2018; Neri 2011). Of course, educational reform and expansion alone are not responsible for this wave of upward mobility. But I argue that greater access to education, in particular, is what has led to altered racial self-understandings, political consciousness, and, ultimately, reclassification toward blackness at the individual level, in particular among lower-class sectors, for whom this educational access is unprecedented.

Micro-Level Mechanisms: Exposure and Efficacy

The idea that education increases political participation and engagement has featured as a central finding in decades of political science scholarship (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959, 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Yet unlike studies that link education and political behavior or attitudes towards democracy, I emphasize that education can also play a role in reshaping the nature of racial identities by increasing individuals' *exposure* and *efficacy*.

Specifically I argue that education increases individuals' exposure to new information, social movements and networks, and experiences in the labor market, all of which shape individuals' personal experiences and their interpretations of those experiences. At the same time, education endows individuals with a greater sense of internal political efficacy, that is, a greater sense one's own political competence, or self-esteem. Exposure alters the experiences and interpretations that shape one's racial self-understanding, and internal efficacy empowers individuals to confront the stigma traditionally associated with blackness. Whereas in the past individuals may have found themselves complying with commonsense racial hierarchies and whitening, better-educated and upwardly Brazilians (who are of lower class backgrounds and darker-skinned, on average) are increasingly articulating these political identities and crossing previously adhered-to racial boundaries based on new and political understandings of race.

The argument that education and upward mobility can shape political identities and racial understandings builds on foundational studies of racial consciousness in the United States. Following the civil rights movement, scholars found that upward mobility did not weaken racial consciousness among African Americans, as was expected (Frazier 1957), but rather *deepened* it. Indeed, it was the growth of the black middle class that gave rise to Dawson's (1995) seminal theory of the black utility heuristic, or racial "linked fate." Similarly, Hochschild (1995) finds that middle-class blacks are more pessimistic than their lower-class counterparts about the reality of the American dream, despite having supposedly fulfilled its promises (also see Tate [1994]). These studies share the insight that the nature of racial identities and consciousness are profoundly shaped by class experiences.

Black Americans are, of course, emblematic of group consciousness (Shingles 1981; Verba and Nie 1972). But while conventional wisdom emphasizes that "money

whitens" in Brazil, more recent scholarship has begun to uncover correlations that lend support to this argument. In his seminal text on racial identity and inequality in Brazil, Edward Telles (2004, 98-99) finds that higher levels of educated are correlated with black self-identification, even if not always in the official census category of *preto*. In another study, Bailey and Telles (2006) find that better-educated Brazilians are most likely to adopt the black label *negro*, rather than a mixed-race label.[16] In their analyses of oversamples of Afro-Brazilians, Mitchell-Walthour and Darity (2014) and Mitchell-Walthour (2018) similarly provide evidence that black identification (as *negro* or *preto*) is associated with greater education. Finally, drawing on a novel survey instrument that includes measures of skin tone and hair texture,[17] Telles and Paschel (2014) similarly find that education correlates with black identification.

There are relatively few longitudinal analyses of racial identification in Brazil,[18] though those that exist also lend credence to a reversal in the relationship between education and racial reclassification. Schwartzman (2007) and Marteleto (2012) study how parents classify their children, and find that better-educated parents were more likely to classify their children as white in the 1980s and 1990s, but that this tendency reversed itself by the 2000s. Similarly, in a rare panel study of racial identification, Francis-tan and Tannuri-Pianto (2015) find that students at one federal university were more likely to adopt black identities following matriculation, in particular students admitted via affirmative action policies.

Thus despite the conventional wisdom that "money whitens," recent studies provide considerable support for the idea that upward mobility via education can also

[16] Also see Bailey (2009) and Telles (2004).
[17] Telles (2004) has shown that these two physical attributes are most often cited as what constitutes individuals' understandings of racial classifications in Brazil.
[18] Exceptions include macro-level studies, which do not cover the relevant time period (Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade 2004; Wood and Carvalho 1994), and one that does (Miranda 2015). Vitor Miranda's (2014) doctoral dissertation and Soares (2008) include micro-level analyses, though without theoretical explanation for the identified patterns of reclassification.

lead individuals to self-darken or reclassify toward blackness. This discussion, however, highlights two gaps in this literature. First is the relative scarcity of longitudinal analyses of individuals' self-identifications that help us understand how/why patterns of reclassification appear to have shifted over time.[19] Second is the absence of fully developed and systematically tested theoretical explanations to link education to black identification or reclassification, despite the mounting evidence to substantiate this relationship. This study aims to fill these gaps by specifying and documenting how education can shape racial identification through the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy.

Exposure

First, with education comes exposure to information, which can contribute to racial consciousness by raising awareness of racialized inequalities, the importance of race in history, and by introducing individuals to alternative perspectives and discourses. In her study of black public opinion in the United States, Tate suggests that greater racial consciousness among better-educated blacks is due to their greater awareness of racialized inequalities (Tate 1994, 28). In the Brazilian case, critical ethnographies and interpretive studies argue that the country's national myth whitewashes and conceals the country's past history of slavery and inhibits interpretations of discrimination and inequalities as racialized (Hanchard 1994; Twine 1998).[20] More broadly, education is associated with political knowledge and awareness

[19] Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2012, 2013) and Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto (2015) are notable and illuminating exceptions, though these rigorous panel analyses are limited in temporal scope and focus on students at one federal university.

[20] In her ethnographic study of a favela in Rio de Janeiro, Sheriff (2001) argues against the idea that individuals accept the myth of racial democracy wholesale, documenting beliefs of understandings of racism and a general view that Brazil is less racially ambiguous than it is often described. Bailey (2009) similarly explores views regarding racial democracy representative survey data and finds little support for these arguments.

(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987).[21] Revised modernization theories also posit that education and information are mechanisms by which individuals develop "emancipative values," greater autonomy, and self-expression, which promote democratic values and support for gender equality (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2003). Thus by increasing access to information, education can put individuals in touch with untold truths in Brazilian history and make them more aware of present-day racial inequalities.[22]

Second, attending schools and universities broadens social networks by putting individuals in contact with other students from more or less different backgrounds. In his seminal analysis of the civil rights movement, McAdam (1982) describes movement mobilization as a process of "cognitive liberation."[23] Other scholars of social movements similarly see social movement participation and mobilization as sites where collective identities are forged (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Klandermans 1992). Hanchard (1994) suggests that the black movement in Brazil has by and large been unsuccessful at raising consciousness among the Brazilian masses, but Paschel's (2016) updated analysis documents the movement's great success at effecting discursive change within the Brazilian state. In any case, for students whose lives have by and large remained in local (and even peripheral neighborhoods), attending a high quality school in a distant neighborhood or frequenting a university campus inserts one into new spaces, composed potentially of students of different socioeconomic backgrounds (and

[21] Most famously, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) argue that education is the primary factor that separates the politically knowledgeable from the unknowledgeable. According to these authors, education provides cognitive skills, facts of the social and political world, opportunities to learn, and generates interest in politics. Their understanding of "political knowledge" is more narrow than my understanding of information, but the broader point is that education likely increases exposure to all kinds of information.
[22] For an analysis of how access to information reshapes racial identities among Afro-Latinxs in the United States, see Hordge-Freeman and Veras's (2019) forthcoming study.
[23] Also see Lee (2002) on how social movements can change public opinion and attitudes in a broader publics.

skin colors) from one's own (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; Kruks-Wisner 2018).[24] Moreover, university campuses in particular are common sites of organization for student groups, civic associations, and social movement and civil society networks. Ziad Munson's (2010) fascinating study of the making of pro-life activists in the United States reveals that individuals often join movements not because of pre-formed political or ideological beliefs, but through their social contacts; after developing movement ties, individuals are then more likely to absorb and articulate the worldviews and opinions espoused by social movements. Thus insofar as greater education expands one's social networks and increases social contact, then education will likely introduce individuals to civic and associational spaces then provide new and alternative political worldviews.[25]

Finally, education is likely to change one's set of personal experiences by altering one's insertion into the labor market. Indeed, many in Brazil (and beyond) pursue education simply as a pathway of upward mobility and in the hopes of landing better paying jobs. Thus education can put individuals on new pathways in which they are competing for higher status jobs and a) landing those jobs and potentially be thrust into elite, heavily white environments, or b) they may not land well paying jobs or may be disappointed in the labor market more generally. Studies of labor market discrimination in Brazil have long demonstrated that darker-skinned Brazilians suffer the greatest wage penalties in high-status jobs (Campante, Crespo, and Leite 2004; Lovell 1999; Lovell and Wood 1998; S. S. D. Soares 2000). As one ascends socially, moreover, it becomes increasingly difficult to attribute perceived discrimination of any

[24] Kruks-Wisner (2018) is not concerned with education or universities, per se, but describes processes where spatial and social mobility increase exposure to the "haves," which can make one aware of one's own status as a "have-not." This parallels the experience of arriving to a university as a lower-class student coming in contact with upper-class students.

[25] John Burdick (1998a, 2005) also argues that religious groups and organizations are important sites for black empowerment in Brazil. Moreover, Collier and Handlin (2009) suggest that in recent decades in Latin America civic arenas of political participation are becoming increasingly diverse, and that likelihood of participation in these arenas increases with social class/status.

kind to social class or status (Souza 1983, 77). Indeed, in interviews with black professionals in Rio de Janeiro, Silva and Reis (2011) find that incidents of perceived racial discrimination generate the greatest sense of injustice.[26] Thus for racially ambiguous individuals who come from lower-class backgrounds, greater education may not bring economic success and lead to disenchantment; but even those who experience economic success may also be subject to greater racialized discrimination in the workplace. In either case, the result can be a generated sense of racialized grievance. Education, the promised pathway of upward mobility, therefore, can have the effect of racializing one's worldview by altering one's expectations and experiences in the labor market.

Efficacy

If exposure increases interpretations of one's personal experiences as racialized, then efficacy also enables confrontation of those racial hierarchies and the social forces that allow the perpetuation of racism. Education fosters this by increasing individuals' internal political efficacy—an individual's evaluation of her own self-competence. A number of previous studies have identified correlations between education and internal efficacy (Shingles 1981; Verba and Nie 1972). In their classic comparative study of civic participation, for example, Almond and Verba (1963) argue that education endows individuals with their own sense of "subjective competence;" In their study of democratic citizenship in the United States, Nie and colleagues (1996) find that education improves cognitive proficiency and political sophistication; and in an analysis of political behavior in Latin America, Borowski et al. (2011) similarly find that education is by far the strongest predictor of citizens' sense of their political competence. Notably, Bleck finds in her study of Mali that the expansion of education

[26] Also see Lamont et al. (2016).

led to "empowered democratic agents" who were "knowledgeable about the political system, the range of potential political choice, and the avenues for expression in democratic institutions" (Bleck 2015, 6). Specifically, Bleck finds that higher educated and French-literate Malians have a greater sense of internal efficacy, which in turn increases their ability to engage in the difficult task of navigating the country's "flawed political system" (Bleck 2015, 100). Scholars have predominantly focused on the effects of efficacy on political engagement and participation, but the basic idea is that efficacious citizens are more likely to recognize and confront racism and discrimination when they encounter it because they are less susceptible to the internalization of racial hierarchies (Hordge-Freeman 2015; Twine 1998). In other words, education empowers citizens to exercise voice and to challenge racial hierarchies, rather than comply with them.

Summary and Observable Implications

The thrust of the argument advanced here, then, is that greater access to education plays an important role in shaping the personal experiences that inform racial self-understandings and identifications in this context. This argument accords with other studies in the comparative race literature, which similarly emphasize experiences with racism as a determinant of racial consciousness (Caldwell 2007; Hanchard 1994; Mitchell-Walthour 2018; Sheriff 2001). Unlike previous studies, however, I link these experiences to the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy, which themselves are tied to education. In this sense, I offer a more developed and theoretical account of the processes of political identity formation. To be sure, the processes sketched here are complex, heterogeneous, and unfold over varying lengths of time across individuals. Nonetheless, the key observable implication of the political identity hypothesis is that

better educated citizens, in particular those with lower-class backgrounds, ought to be the most likely to reclassify toward blackness.

Alternative Hypotheses: Affirmative Action as Incentive and Discourse

The Instrumental Hypothesis: Affirmative Action as Incentive

Skeptics will quickly point out that over this period Brazil began experimenting with race-targeted affirmative action, an institutional change that generated material incentives for blackness. In 2001, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso broke with the state's decades-long posture of colorblindness when he explicitly endorsed affirmative action for Afro-descendants (Htun 2004; Paschel 2016). Federal legislation was not passed until 2012, though states began implementing racial quotas in state universities as early as 2001.[27] These policies targeted the absence of nonwhites and the lower classes in free public universities, which had remained the near-exclusive domain of white elites (Artes and Ricoldi 2015). University quotas remain the dominant form of affirmative action policy in Brazil, though in reality the majority of these policies are means-tested, and most policies target race only in conjunction with socioeconomic criteria (L. F. Schwartzman and Paiva 2014).

Nonetheless, affirmative action policies comport with dominant explanations in political science that attribute identity change and salience to material incentives generated by social structure or institutions (Chandra 2004; Huber 2017; Laitin 1986, 1998; Posner 2005). Indeed, "institutions that structure incentives" is one prototype of identity change outlined by Chandra (2012). In this view, the (high or low) salience of identities is the product of means-ends calculations by voters and elites alike in contexts

[27] Rio de Janeiro was the first state to implement university quotas for Afro-descendants (though not exclusively), first in select universities in 2001 (law 3.708/2001), then in all state universities in 2003 (law 4.151/2003).

of resource scarcity.[28] Affirmative action has featured explicitly in this literature. Nagel (1986), for examples, argues that affirmative action incentivized Native American identification in the United States, and Chandra argues that in India these policies created incentives for ethnic groups to mobilize and demand inclusion as policy targets (Chandra 2005).[29]

Instrumental explanations are attractive for their parsimony, though they struggle to explain the enduring identity change evident in the census. First, census respondents do not stand to gain benefits from their responses to census interviewers, which are anonymous by law. Additionally, the adoption of affirmative action has not eliminated the status quo incentives for whiteness that are reproduced through informal institutional racism. Fluid boundaries and reliance on racial self-declaration allow savvy opportunists who wish to take advantage of these policies to manipulate their declared race when and where necessary while otherwise pursuing the benefits of whiteness. Moreover, the misuse of affirmative action carries real risks. Implementing these policies in a context of such ambiguity has led to serious discussions of where to draw "the color line" (Bailey 2008; Fry and Maggie 2004; L. F. Schwartzman 2008). Some universities have created councils to determine the eligibility of those applicants tentatively admitted via racial quotas (T. Oliveira 2016; Sperb 2017; Unesp 2017). But even in universities without such councils, students deemed guilty of fraud can be expelled (e.g., Martins 2018).

There is empirical support for these misgivings. In panel studies of university students before and after the implementation of quotas, Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2012, 2013) find evidence that applicants manipulate their identifications for admission, but that students are likely to revert to lighter identification after

[28] See Yashar (2005) for an incentive-driven, but not materialist, argument.
[29] See French (2009) for an institutionalist and social constructionist view on how laws and institutions can reshape cultural identities.

matriculation.[30] These studies also reveal that darker-skinned students in particular are more likely to reclassify toward blackness *after* matriculation, and that they were likely to adopt the label *negro* within five years of completing university, suggesting motivations beyond instrumentality (Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto 2015).[31]

Despite these misgivings, the instrumental hypothesis nonetheless merits consideration. Indeed, in analyses of a survey experiment that primes individuals to think about affirmative action, Bailey (2008, 2009) finds evidence that this increases the likelihood Brazilians identify as *negro* in their open-ended responses, though the proportions remains small and differences were not subject to statistical test. Of course, the instrumental and political identity hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; individuals may behave similarly for different reasons. The empirical analysis will attempt to adjudicate between these hypotheses as plausible explanations for shifting patterns of identification in the context of the census, rather than instrumental behavior writ large.

The Recognition Hypothesis: Affirmative Action as Racial Discourse

A final alternative hypothesis is that affirmative action is emblematic of a new era of racial discourse in Brazil that shapes individuals' worldviews and racial understandings, potentially leading them to embrace blackness. In this view, "race is not something that language simply describes, it is something that is created through language and institutional practices" (Nobles 2000, 12). In particular scholars have paid close attention to censuses as state institutions that play key roles in the shaping of

[30] Senkevics (2017) also finds that repeat-enrollers in the university entrance exam alter their identifications. The dominant trend is toward blackness, but a sizable proportion also whitens as well.
[31] Also see Schwartzman and Silva (2012) on administrators' goals of racial consciousness-raising through affirmative action policies and ambiguities in students' interpretations of these policies.

"political realities" and "ways of thinking and seeing" (Nobles 2004, 66).[32] In the Brazilian case, scholars argue that the official ethno-racial classification scheme has served to uphold the myth of racial democracy by shaping racial subjectivity and commonsense (Hanchard 1994; Loveman 2014; Nobles 2000).

Though scholars pay particular attention to the census, the state can also shape discourse more directly through explicit policies. In her updated account of black movements in Latin America, Tianna Paschel (2016) argues that black movement activism applied considerable pressure to the Brazilian state, which resulted in a significant shift in the state's posture toward the racial question. The most striking change came during the center-right presidency of Cardoso, who was not only sympathetic to issues of racial inequality and discrimination, but also responsible for the state's endorsement of such policies. This recognition of racial difference and the endorsement of public policies to combat racial inequalities marked the Brazilian state's shift from colorblind to color-conscious.

Considering the weight given to discourse in shaping racial subjectivity and commonsense, then, one alternative explanation for patterns of reclassification is that the growing tendency to self-identify as nonwhite is the product of this discursive change. As the state has come to recognize racial differences within its population and sought to counter stigma and discrimination through race-targeted public policies, then individuals might have adopted new "ways of thinking and seeing" (Nobles 2004, 66) that make nonwhite identification less costly (i.e., less stigmatized) or simply more common. Like the political identity hypothesis, this alternative argument suggests that

[32] According to James Scott, census-taking is one strategy states employ to make their populations "legible," but "the builders of the modern nation-state do not merely describe, observe, and map; they strive to shape a people" (Scott 1998, 81). Censuses, moreover, are increasingly catching the attention of social scientists, who see official censuses as important institutions that shape not only identities (Hochschild and Powell 2008; Kertzer and Arel 2004; Prewitt 2013), but also citizenship (Nobles 2000, 2004), nation-making (Loveman 2014), state performance (Scott 1998), and violent conflict (Lieberman and Singh 2017).

such a process would unfold over time, and, as it were, simultaneous to the social policy expansion I argue lies behind the patterns of racial reclassification. Unlike the political identity hypothesis, however, the recognition hypothesis does not predict heterogeneous effects according to level of education, which is the key difference in the observable implications of these two hypotheses. In the empirical analyses, I disentangle these hypotheses: first by leveraging educational heterogeneity in longitudinal analyses; and second by employing survey experiments to isolate the causal effect of discourse on racial identification.

Additional Explanations

The empirical analysis of this dissertation will focus the three preceding hypotheses, but the broader literature on ethnic and identity politics nonetheless provides additional conventional wisdom on the question of identity change and politicization. Before concluding this chapter, I briefly discuss these alternative explanations and lay them to rest as plausible explanations for the observed patterns.

Elites and Politicization from Above

First, a prominent line of research in identity politics, and in particular ethnic politics, attributes the politicization of identities to political elites. Particularly in contexts where elites seek political office to gain access to patronage or state resources, scholars argue that elites politicize those identities that allow them to win office and maximize their material payoffs. Posner, for example, argues elites politicize those cleavages they are most likely to win them elections, either because they are large relative to the political arena (Posner 2004) or because electoral rules shift incentives to form minimum-winning coalitions (Huber 2017; Posner 2005). Similarly, Chandra (2004) argues that in patronage democracies like India, where voters and elites are likely

to improve their lot mainly their access state resources, individuals see ethnic identities as particularly useful because they are reliable and exclusive channels to material payoffs for voters and politicians alike. In these and other accounts, the logic of identity politicization is that political elites play an important role in politicizing identities by actively mobilizing those differences that will win them office.

These accounts, however, fall short in Brazil. Indeed, to the extent that social differences have entered into the calculations of rent-maximizing elites, they have sought to disarticulate social differences, often through clientelism (Hagopian 1996). Likely for this reason, scholars have by and large remarked on the few social correlates for electoral behavior or the party system in Brazil (Mainwaring 1999; D. Samuels 2006; D. J. Samuels and Zucco 2018). Second, while it may seem that ambitious politicians would want to politicize race in order to win over votes, there is reason to believe that doing so is a losing electoral strategy. In fact, in his controlled comparison of mayoral races in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Oliveira (2007) finds that nonwhite politicians who campaign explicitly on race lose, while those who campaign using implicit racial cues and explicitly politicize class-based issues win.[33] In a study of the campaign strategies of Afro-Brazilian officeholders, Mitchell (2009) finds that these politicians are acutely aware of racial issues when they are on the campaign trail, but they are careful not to campaign explicitly on racial platforms, because doing so is likely to mobilize the feelings of racialized stigma and potentially demobilizing voters. Thus while conventional wisdom in the ethnic politics literature see elites and agents of identity politicization, there has been recent pattern of top-down mobilization of race and there is little strategic utility in doing so.

[33] Also see Madrid (2012) on the electoral strategy of "ethno-populism" in Latin America, in which ethnic appeals are successful only when combined with class-based appeals.

Social Movements and Politicization from Below

A second alternative explanation attributes the development of political consciousness and reclassification to social movements and mobilization. Indeed, social movements have been shown to foster identity formation and politicization. Notably, in his seminal study of the civil rights movements, Doug McAdam (1982) describes mobilizing efforts and movement participation as a form of "cognitive liberation," or a change in consciousness in which the political system loses legitimacy, people begin to demand change, and they develop a sense of political efficacy.[34] And while social movement scholars promote the views that collective identities are both causes (Friedman and McAdam 1992; Klandermans 2002) and consequences (Escobar and Alvarez 1992) of mobilization, plenty of scholarship has argued that, collective identities aside, social movement participation itself can play a role in developing political consciousness (Klandermans 1992; Roberts 1998; Stokes 1995).[35]

To be sure, Brazil's Unified Black Movement (*o movimento negro unificado*) has existed for nearly a century in Brazil, and despite being driven underground during the military dictatorship, re-emerged in the 1970s and has been actively working to organize and build racial consciousness. Yet the black movement has, by and large, been seen as ineffective at mobilizing the masses (Burdick 1998b, 2005; Hanchard 1994). Tianna Paschel's (2016) study of the black movement has shown that, despite these difficulties, the movement has been remarkably successful in recent years in shaping state discourse and racial policies, in particular affirmative action. But movement success in influencing elites cannot be equated with success in other political domains. As we will see, many of those who have reclassified are active militants of the black

[34] Also see Lee (2002) on movements' influence on public opinion.
[35] Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 54) write that class interests are often ill defined, heterogeneous and contradictory, and any class-based mobilization must engage in a process of redefinition of "class interests."

movement, and there is no doubt that race-based activism is on the rise in a variety of diverse "interest arenas" (Caldwell 2007; Collier and Handlin 2009; Perry 2013; Smith 2016). But it is unclear whether movement participation itself has served as an independent (or direct) cause of reclassification. As I elaborated above, I argue instead that it is only channel through which the effect of education operates.

Cleavage Structure

Finally, structural theories of identity politics attribute the political salience of identities or cleavages to cleavage structure, or the degree to which various group allegiances coincide or cut across one another. In his classic study of ethnic conflict, Horowitz (1985) argues that conflict between groups is more likely when groups are organized in some form of hierarchy (also see Dunning and Harrison 2010; Rogowski 1990). Similarly, Cederman et al. (2013) argue that civil war onset becomes more likely when political and economic inequalities map onto group divisions. Even outside of the study of violence, prominent structural theories, have seen identity or cleavage politicization simply as expressions of social structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) or as a function of a group's size relative to the political arena (Posner 2004).

Structural theories, however, suffer from two major shortcomings. First, to the extent that social structure alone matters for understanding the politicization of identities or cleavages, then Brazil ought to have seen the politicization of both race and class long ago, given the country's deep inequalities and racial stratification. Instead, racial and class cleavages have historically been weakly politicized in Latin America (Horowitz 1985; Yashar 2005) and in Brazil in particular (Hanchard 1994; Lieberman 2003, 2009; Mainwaring 1999; Marx 1998; D. Samuels 2006). Moreover, that reclassification has occurred alongside a period of unprecedented upward mobility for

the lower classes does not comport with the idea that structural grievances alone lead to politicization (leaving aside the implicit presumptions of stable group boundaries).

Looking Forward

The remainder of this dissertation subjects these hypotheses to empirical testing. Chapter 4 illustrates the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy with analysis of in-depth interview data collected in two Brazilian cities. Chapter 5 test the political identity, instrumental, and recognition hypotheses. Chapter 6 analyzes the consequences of this political identity formation for political engagement and the exercise of citizenship. Before turning to these analyses, the following chapter historically situates the recent era of social inclusion and racial recognition and maps educational expansion.

CHAPTER THREE

RACE, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP, AND THE BRAZILIAN STATE

In 1911, doctor and biomedical scientist João Batista de Lacerda, then-head of the prestigious National Museum of Natural History in Rio de Janeiro, traveled to London where he served as the Brazilian delegate to the First Universal Races Congress. Scholars and delegates from around the world, including W.E.B. DuBois and Franz Boas, gathered at the University of London to discuss issues of anti-racism in an effort to improve relations "between the so-called 'white' and the so-called 'colored' peoples" (quoted in Weatherly 1911, 316). Later in the twentieth century, Brazil would eventually be seen as exemplary on this question, having avoided both institutionalized racial oppression and the atrocities of genocide.

Yet at the time of the Congress, Brazil had not yet held such exemplary status. Much to the contrary, the prevalence of race mixture in the country earned Brazil the derogatory title "the laboratory of the races" (Schwarcz 2011). In an era that would come to be defined by scientific racism, many anthropologists and medical scientists believed that miscegenation between "the races" produced degenerate and inferior offspring. Brazilian elites, too, feared that such degeneracy would doom Brazil's prospects for becoming a modern and developed nation (Loveman 2014; Skidmore 1974). Given this backdrop, the Congress was an opportunity for Brazilian elites to try to rescue their nation from a fate of backwardness in the eyes of the international community. In his paper titled "On the *mestiço* in Brazil," Lacerda sought to appeal to an alternative, Lamarckian genetic logic (Stepan 1991) in an attempt to cast the future of the Brazilian nation in optimistic light:

> Sexual selection always continues toward perfection by subjugating atavism and purging the descendants of *mestiços* of all the trace characteristics of the negro. Thanks to this process of ethnic reduction, it is logical to suppose that in one century's time

> *mestiços* will disappear from Brazil, a fact that will coincide with the parallel extinction of the negro race among us. (quoted in Schwarcz 2011, 239)

Miscegenation would not, Lacerda insisted, breed degeneracy. Rather, it would inevitably produce a "so-called white" population.

By the mid-twentieth century, the tune of Brazilian nationalism had changed. Brazil was no longer preoccupied with the "degenerate *mestiço*." Instead, it preferred not to deal with the question of race at all. As political regimes oscillated between democracy and authoritarianism during the twentieth century, Brazilian leaders and elites, sharing goals of development and modernization, relied on Brazil's myth of racial unity to aid in this national agenda, just as they had Lamarckian genetics. So long as miscegenation was believed to breed degeneracy, elites perpetuated notions that Brazil was becoming whiter; and so long as the Brazilian state believed that a homogenous national community aided industrialization and modernization from above, the state promoted ideas of racial unity that avoided political fissures that might undermine such goals. Eventually, international norms would favor multiculturalism and respect for diversity as markings of a modern democratic state, and the myth of racial unity would be replaced by explicit recognition of past wrongs. In this era, the state would not seek to eliminate "negros" nor gloss over their existence, but rather would work to include them as full members of the citizenry through expansionary and race-targeted social policy.

This chapter briefly traces the evolution in the Brazilian state's (un)official posture toward the racial question over the course the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Alongside these shifts, it also traces the evolution of education and social policy to show that different sectors of society benefited from social policy expansion differently over these periods. By mapping these two trajectories, this chapter places the more recent era of social inclusion and racial recognition in broader historical context.

It also aims to highlight the ways in which the state's stance toward the racial question and to whom the state granted social policy benefits were both functions of the state's goals of modernization and development at various points in time. Replacing racial democracy with recognition, and informal with inclusive citizenship, created the conditions under which reclassification toward blackness could occur as it did. These conditions, however, were as much a product of the historical and developmental trajectories pursued by the Brazilian state as they were the political will and incentives shaping contemporary politics.

Scientific Racism, Raceless Nationalism, and Affirmative Action: Three Eras of Racial State Policy

Scientific Racism in Post-Abolition Brazil, 1888-1940s

Current historical research estimates that approximately 40 percent of enslaved Africans arrived to what is present-day Brazil, making the country the single-largest destination of the slave trade (Andrews 2004). Following the peaceful abolition of slavery in 1888 (the last country in the Americas to do so), Brazil was left with a large slave-descendant population. The scarcity of European descendants posed a dilemma to elites at the time, who were heavily influenced by the prevailing ideas of the eugenics movement (Dávila 2003; Schwarcz 1993; Stepan 1991). In this era of scientific racism, which separated the human population into a finite set of mutually exclusive "races," elites were particularly concerned with the implication of Brazil's racial composition for the country's national destiny, mainly its ability to develop into a modern and civilized nation, as described in the introduction to this chapter.

The response on the part of elites and the state was to "whiten" the population. This was to be accomplished in part through race mixture, following the genetic logics articulated by Lacerda (Schwarcz 2011; Stepan 1991), as well as through European

immigration (Skidmore 1974). Though they believed, or hoped, that nonwhites could be absorbed into the white population with little trace of African descent, elites sought to speed up this process by increasing the numbers of Europeans to lighten the nation's genetic stock. Immigration policy in the early twentieth century sought, explicitly and implicitly, to encourage immigration from western Europe and to limit immigration from countries that could not more quickly advance this goal. Immigration policy as early as 1891 sought to restrict immigration by country of origin with this purpose (Skidmore 1974, 197). Indeed, even as the dominance of scientific racism began to wane, Brazilian elites continued to promote immigration to Brazil from Europe. Notably, during his dictatorial rule, Getúlio Vargas issued a decree shortly before his ouster in 1945 stipulating that immigrants should be admitted to Brazil in keeping with "the necessity to preserve and develop, in the ethnic composition of the population, the more desirable characteristics of its European ancestry" (quoted in Skidmore 1993, 199).

Thus early years of Brazil's first republic and its experiments with populist dictatorship represented a state posture on the racial question heavily influenced by scientific racism and European beliefs that only white nations could develop and prosper. Insofar as the state concerned itself with "the social question" of poverty and poor living conditions of the country's large nonwhite population, it saw race as an independent cause of "degeneracy" and thus aimed to deal with the racial question by promoting policies that would absorb nonwhites into the desirable white population. With the demise of scientific racism in international epistemic communities, however, the state's posture on the racial question would shift, carrying different consequences for the political and social realities of Afro-descendants in Brazil.

Racial Democracy, 1940s-1990s

Starting in the 1920s and finally by the end of the second world war, scientific racism had lost international legitimacy. Ideas on the innate inequality of "races" were replaced by environmentalist theories that saw all individuals as innately equal and that recast "degeneracy" as products of social and economic forces—as acquired behaviors—rather than as fixed and inherited traits (Dávila 2003; Loveman 2014). Preferences for whiteness, however, would not disappear with the demise of scientific racism. Proclamations and decrees as explicit as Vargas's may not have been issued in the following decades, but as Skidmore (1974) notes, these immigration policies remained largely intact long after his rule since no other policies were issued to replace them. Indeed, the period following Vargas and the era of race science can be characterized as a period of "racial silence" (Fischer, Grinberg, and Mattos 2018). Whereas in prior decades the state made explicit its desire for whiteness as part and parcel of its goals of development, this would be replaced by an embrace of the myth of racial democracy, which downplayed racial differences and put forth an image of Brazil rooted in racial unity. As Loveman (2014) documents, this shift in racial state policy tracks with a shift in international norms of modern statehood, which came to be rooted in homogenous national communities. The logic was simple: sameness was more conducive than difference to developing a modern and efficient state and nation.

Brazil was well positioned to abide by these new international norms. Renowned sociologist Gilberto Freyre, himself a student of Franz Boas at Columbia University, had only years prior published his seminal revision of Brazilian history *Casa-Grande e senzala* (Freyre 1933)—translated to English as *The Masters and the Slaves*—in which he not only argues that Brazil's race relations were harmonious (a legacy from the humane treatment of slaves in colonial Brazil), but that the Brazilian population was best understood as constituted through race mixture between European settlers, enslaved

Africans, and indigenous populations—a process of miscegenation facilitated by the Portuguese propensity for race mixture with the Moors. In Freyre's words: "Every Brazilian, even the light-skinned fair-haired one, carries about with him on his soul…the shadow, or at least the birthmark, of the aborigine or the Negro" (Freyre 1986, 278). By the 1970s and 1980s, racial democracy would be denounced as a myth by academic researchers in Brazil and beyond, and it would be attacked by social movements and activists for whitewashing Brazil's history of slavery, rampant discrimination, and deep and persistent inequalities (Andrews 1991; Hanchard 1994; Hasenbalg 1979; Nascimento 2016; Silva 1985). But before these denunciations, racial democracy served a vital function to the Brazilian state and nation, both providing a constitutive myth and enabling the state to conform to international expectations of how best to modernize and develop (Loveman 2014).

This was particularly true as democratic institutions were replaced with dictatorial ones. It would be a stretch to say that the racial question was of utmost concern to the military regime that came to power in 1964. Yet the emergence and prevalence of the racial democracy myth also provided the military regime with an out: racial democracy made it possible to dismiss race from discussion altogether because stark racial differences, per se, did not exist in Brazil. Indeed, in the 1970 census, the first conducted under the military regime, questions regarding racial (or color) identification were removed from the census (Loveman 2014; Nobles 2000). Such a decision suggests the regime's lack of interest in the racial question. Additionally, the military regime engaged in overt acts of suppression and censorship, targeting the black movement and other civil society groups (Hanchard 1994; Nobles 2000), providing more direct evidence of the regime's interest in dismissing any political activities that might undermine their goals of delivering stable economic growth and performance.

Racialized Democracy, 1990s-present

By 1985, the military regime had agreed to restore political power to civilians, and in 1988 a new constitution was ratified that lifted literacy requirements on political citizenship rights, greatly extending the franchise to the poorest segments of the population. Academics, social movement activists, and international organizations had also waged major campaigns against Brazilian racial democracy (Bailey 2009; Hanchard 1994; E. E. Telles 2004). Important, too, was that national myths that united and homogenized populations were no longer seen as effective ways of progressing toward modernization. Instead, recognition of ethnoracial—among other—differences, inequalities, and social forces of discrimination were seen as the efforts of a modern state to fulfill the promises of democratic citizenship for all of those in whose name the state claimed to legitimately govern (Loveman 2014).

In this context, the Brazilian state shifted from colorblind to color-conscious. As Htun (2004) and Paschel (2016) show, the alignment of these international norms with a domestic political context of democracy incentivized the state and made it more responsive to political actors. Indeed, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, himself a former professor of sociology at the University of São Paulo and scholar of race relations in Brazil (Cardoso and Ianni 1960), marked a departure from the past in his inaugural address in 1995: "We will enthusiastically ensure equal rights for the equal: for women, who are the majority of our people and whom the country owes respect and opportunities for education and work; for racial minorities and near-minorities – for blacks, principally – who hope equality is more than just a word, but a portrait of reality" (Cardoso 1995). Thus from his first day in office Cardoso represented a symbolic break with the Brazilian state's past posture toward race: Brazilian elites no longer perpetuated ideas of race mixture that sought to eliminate blackness, or to whitewash it as "mixed"—

Cardoso instead recognized racial groups as distinct and as deserving of equality and respect.

Yet though Cardoso's inaugural address signaled his willingness to engage with activists, the 1990s would bring little else in the way of symbolic or other change with regard to the race question. But by the early 2000s, activists began to use Brazil's participation in the UN Conference on Race and Racism, held in Durban in 2001, to apply additional pressure to Cardoso to reckon with Brazil's past. Cardoso complied, and in December of that year he gave a speech in which he formally endorsed race-targeted affirmative action policies, saying "The Brazilian state recognizes the painful consequences that slavery caused in Brazil and will continue to aspire to repair them through public policies that promote equality of opportunity…affirmative policies in favor of Afro-descendants" (Cardoso 2001). Cardoso's statement shocked both citizens and scholars, few of whom expected such an unequivocal endorsement for what was surely to be a controversial set of policies in this former racial democracy.

Nonetheless, Cardoso's endorsement of affirmative action and its subsequent implementation in the form of means and race-targeted quotas for university in state and federal universities has thus come to symbolize Brazil's new era of racialized democracy. To be sure, Brazil remains one of the most unequal and racially stratified societies in the world, but by the early twenty-first century, Brazil had evolved in ways that position the country in sharp contrast to its past.

The Evolution of Social Policy

The Vargas Era: O Estado Novo *and the First Incorporation*

Alongside the evolution of the state's posture toward race was the extension of social benefits over the course of the twentieth century and the punctuated incorporation of sectors of the Brazilian population as citizens. After the Brazilian monarchy was

deposed and the first republic established in 1889, the early stages of Brazil's first republic coincided with early industrialization, the growth of cities, and the rise of mass politics (Conniff 1981). Populist leader Getúlio Vargas is widely credited with the creation of many social policy institutions, some of which have persisted to the present day. Vargas, who seized power in 1930 and who remained in power until his ouster in 1945 (before returning in 1951), is known today as "The Father of the Poor" for his construction *o Estado Novo*, or the New State. Somewhat paradoxically, the Estado Novo constitution of 1937 centralized power and the apparatuses of the state in Vargas's hands, previously decentralized in Brazil's federal system. This centralization of power reestablished Vargas as a dictator, but this also enabled him to play a strong role in the creation and extension of social rights.

Vargas is perhaps best known for the labor code established during the Estado Novo and which largely remained in place until the 1990s. This code allocated many rights and benefits for urban labor, including a minimum wage, eight-hour work day, pensions and social security, and paid holidays (Conniff 1981). These benefits, however, were reserved for members of state-recognized unions. Moreover, this labor code was enforced through a corporatist system that reserved the power to sanction unions and withhold benefits from unrecognized unions. Though Vargas would eventually make electoral appeals to workers and form alliances with leftist workers and communist parties, his engagement with labor was largely driven by this desire to control the potential threat to his power that urban labor posed (Collier and Collier 2002). Thus unlike the labor-mobilizing populism of Argentina's Perón (Roberts 2014), for example, Vargas' incorporation of the citizenry was highly selective and designed to suit his political interest in controlling the growing sectors of urban labor (Collier and Collier 2002).

This labor code represents one of the greatest social advances of the era, but Vargas gave attention to other policy domains as well. As for education, Vargas set agendas and established agencies that continued to exist for much of the twentieth century. It was under Vargas, for example, that the federal government created a Ministry of Education and articulated the first national education plan (Dávila 2003). Prior to the Vargas era, education was reserved for the children of elites, and it was under Vargas that education was extended, primarily to urban labor, with the goal of fostering nationalism and the vocational training necessary for an industrializing economy (Silva 1980). At the time this certainly marked an advance in accessibility to public education, but census data reveals that access remained restricted and highly uneven (Dávila 2003; Fischer 2008). Nonetheless, the initial creation of federal education policy was simply a first step in creating a public education system as a right of citizenship.

Yet education policy in the Vargas era was more than a tool of industrialization. It was also heavily influenced by the ideas of eugenic nationalism that permeated much elite thinking and fears in this era (Dávila 2003; Loveman 2014; Skidmore 1974). While scientific racism had begun to lose its international legitimacy by mid-century, at the time when Brazil was establishing some of its first education policies and institutions, elites saw education as a tool for whitening the population not through Lamarckian genetics (Schwarcz 2011; Stepan 1991) or immigration (Skidmore 1974), but through educational socialization. As historian Jerry Dávila writes in his analysis of Vargas-era education policy,

> by the second decade of the twentieth century these elites began to seek escape from the determinist trap that tied Brazil to perpetual backwardness because of its large nonwhite population. Instead, they embraced a notion that degeneracy was an acquired—and therefore remediable—condition. Blackness still held all of its pejorative connotations, but individuals could escape the social category of blackness through improvement of their health, level of education and culture, or their social class. (Dávila 2003, 6)

Though access to education remained highly restricted in this period, those who were fortunate enough to gain access were being socialized into the logics of whitening, that is, learning that hygiene, education, and upper-class status are constitutive of whiteness.

Ultimately, the Vargas era represented a significant advance in the extension of rights and benefits to Brazilian citizens, even if these benefits predominantly targeted urban labor. Of course, the highly unequal allocation/accessibility of these rights and benefits created highly segmented societies that would lead to informality/illegality and weakened citizenship (Fischer 2008; Holston 2008). Yet it was also precisely in the highly segmented nature of citizenship, and the punctuated way in which citizenship rights and benefits would be extended, that would leave open the possibility for educational and other reforms that would create the conditions for reclassification towards blackness down the road.

The Democratic Interregnum and the Military Regime, 1946-1985

Such reforms, however, would only come decades later. After Vargas was ousted in 1945 a new democratic constitution was established in 1946, which established education as a right of all Brazilians. The country's first comprehensive national education plan, the LDB (*Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da educacão nacional*), would be first passed in 1961, establishing formulas for resource allocation, spending floors, and mandating school attendance at four years of age. These reforms appear progressive on paper, but schools were few and far between, those that existed were under-resourced, teachers were under-educated and poorly paid, and widespread poverty meant few families complied with mandates to send their children to school (de Mello and Hoppe 2005). This is clear in census data, which shows that the overwhelming share of the population failed to complete primary school. In this era,

access to high school and university remained the exclusive domain of a privileged elite (Castro 1989).

In 1964, democracy gave way to military dictatorship, which did little to improve national education policy, even though the military regime hung its own fortunes on its ability to deliver economic growth and modernization. As a result of the regime's preoccupation with eradicating leftist threats of communism and socialism, many of the architects of the 1961 LDB were sent into exile, and freedom of expression in education and innovative programs aimed at adult literacy were terminated. Aside from these more politically and culturally repressive measures, education policy remained largely intact until 1971, when the military regime passed an updated LDB in response to rapid urbanization and industrialization, which rapidly increased demand for urban labor. The 1971 LDB left much of the 1961 plan intact, but raised the age of mandatory school attendance to fourteen, added physical education, and made technical/vocational training the focus of high school education (S. Schwartzman 2016).

Yet while the regime sought to adapt national education policy to meet its goals of economic growth and modernization, the same resource shortages undermined these efforts and kept education out of reach for the vast majority of citizens. Moreover, while national education policy was set at the national level, implementation and resource



Figure 3.1 Education Completion rates for Brazilians aged 22-26, 1960-2010. Source: IPUMS, IBGE.

distribution was left to state governments, where these public goods often served as political grist in systems of patronage of clientelism (Melo 2017; Plank, Sobrinho, and Xavier 1996). On paper, education policy and access to rights seemed progressive and expansive, and in many ways it was. Access to education did improve over the course of the twentieth century, but poor quality and resources meant that quality remained low (Castro 1989), and major gaps in access continued to exist according to race and income. By the end of the military regime educational outcomes disappointed many, and economists increasingly saw education as the key weakness that would undermine Brazil's joining the ranks of high-income countries. Indeed, economists would come to see this period as an "opportunity foregone" (Birdsall and Sabot 1996).

Figure 3.1 shows rates of educational attainment from the census from 1960 to 2010, according to racial identification (Minnesota Population Center 2018). In the 1960s, education was a rare commodity. The vast majority of Brazil's population had not completed primary school, let alone high school. Rates of university education remained in the single digits until 2010, and later survey data reveal that those accessing university were of the most privileged class sectors, and likely lighter-skinned. With the Brazilian economic miracle from 1968-1973, the regime greatly expanded the number of primary schools in the country, but failed to provide additional resources, which continued to be reserved for universities (Castro 1989; Plank, Sobrinho, and Xavier 1996). By 1980, there were improvements in educational attainment at all levels, though census data reveal much greater gains for the self-identified white population, compared to the nonwhite populations. Of course, given the tendency toward reclassification and the prevalence of whitening in this period, these statistics must be taken with a grain of salt. In any case, the data suggest that the educational outcomes did indeed improve, though in ways that would leave much room for additional improvement.

Educational Expansion in the Era of Inclusion, 1985-2014

The period of educational expansion that led to the patterns of reclassification began with redemocratization, which ratified a new democratic constitution that not only codified the universal right to education that appear only on paper in previous constitutions, but also lifted literacy requirements for voting rights. As Candelaria Garay (2016) argues, the pairing of these rights meant that for the first time politicians found themselves competing for the votes of the poor masses, providing great incentive for and mobilizing the political will of elites to invest in social policies for "outsiders." An additional facilitating factor was the electoral competitiveness of the leftist Workers' Party (PT), which continued to win greater vote shares in successive elections through the 1990s and into the 2000s (Hunter 2010). The presence of the PT as a potential electoral threat gave more conservative parties incentive to moderate their policy programs so as to appeal to what might be natural constituencies for leftist parties (Garay 2016).

The first set of major education reforms came in the form of an updated national education policy, the LDB, which was passed in 1996 under Cardoso. This new law



Figure 3.2 All Government Spending on Education, 1995-2015. Source: UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. Note: Brazil's National Institute for Education Research (INEP) reports slightly higher figures for spending as a percentage of social spending, though the same trend is apparent.

entailed a number of reforms, but one set of reforms in particular took aim at the political bargaining between state and local governments that undermined resource delivery and education quality (Melo 2017; Plank, Sobrinho, and Xavier 1996). The 1996 LDB established FUNDEF (the Fund for Maintenance and Development of the Fundamental Education and Valorization of Teaching), which reorganized the administration of basic education and created new incentive structure designed to circumvent this political bargaining. Specifically, FUNDEF mandated a spending floor of 25 percent of state tax revenue on education, as well as 18 percent of federal tax revenues. Of the state spending earmarked for education, 60 percent was required to be spent on teachers' salaries and training programs to improve quality (de Mello and Hoppe 2005). The 1996 law also stipulated that for ten years, 50 percent of federal funds be dedicated to addressing illiteracy and universalizing primary school coverage. Moreover, rather than leave local school funding to the discretion of state governors, federal funds would be transferred directly to local governments on the basis of student enrollments, creating incentives for local mayors to keep school enrollments high (Melo 2017).

The result of these institutional reforms was immediately apparent. As Figure 3.2 shows, spending as a percentage of GDP rose from roughly 4 to more than 6 percent between the late 1990s and 2015, higher than the OECD average (OECD 2018; World Bank 2002). In addition, education came to occupy a significantly larger share of social spending overall, growing from roughly 10 to 16 percent of all social spending over this same period. This, of course, is not to suggest that there was no room for improvement in terms of education quality and coverage in Brazil. But over this period, both domestic and international observers agree, Brazil has made encouraging improvements in education quality and student performance (INEP 2016a, 2016b; OECD 2011).

A common critique, however, is that average figures on education spending overall mask inequities in the allocation of resources, which might only be exacerbated by increased spending. In particular, a disproportionate amount of resources have historically been allocated to free public university, traditionally accessible only to a small minority of the population wealthy enough to afford high-quality primary and secondary education in expensive private schools. But governments began addressing these disparities as well. Figure 3.3 shows public spending on university education across all levels of government. Figures indicate that in 2000, universities received 75 percent of government resources spent on education. By 2015, this figure dropped to just above 50 percent. The share of education spending on primary and secondary education, which comprises the remainder, thus doubled over this period. Additionally, there is no sign that changes in the allocation of resources has meant a decline in the quality of public university education: between 2000 and 2015, per capita university spending has remained relatively stable. Clear, then, is that increased investments have sought to make public education spending more equitable.

In addition to increases spending and improving resource allocation, the 1996 LDB took on a distinctly democratic character by incorporating elements of the



Figure 3.3 Public Spending on University Education, 2000-2015. Source: INEP/MEC

philosophy of renowned Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire, author of such works as *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (2014) and *Education for Critical Consciousness* (2005). Freire is best known for advocating a teacher-student relationship based on the shared transfer of knowledge, rather than authority and discipline. But Freire also promoted education as one of the best ways to combat inequity and intergenerational poverty. Freire also saw education as critical to democratic citizenship because it would empower individuals to become critically aware of the world in which they lived, and to become agents in their lives. Freire's views initially led to his exile in Chile during Brazil's military dictatorship, where he authored some of his most famous works. He later returned to Brazil, where his ideas would gain influence in policy circles and would eventually influence in the 1996 LDB reform. The 1996 law states, for example, that the goal of national education is to prepare the student for "the exercise of citizenship and her qualification for work" (*Lei de diretrizes de Base da Educação Nacional*, 1996, art. 2), as well as that students should be educated on the basis of principles of "pluralism of ideas and pedagogical approaches" (art. 3, sec. 3) and "respect for liberty and appreciation for tolerance" (art. 3, sec. 4).[36] In addition to expanded access and



Figure 3.4 Population aged 15 to 18 with Primary School Completed by Income Quintile, 1992-2014. Source: PNAD, IBGE.

[36] A 2013 amendment (Law no. 12.796/2013) included in Article 3 of the 1996 LDB "consideration for ethno-racial diversity" (art. 3, sec. 8).

resources, then, national education in Brazil became less vocational, technocratic, and elitist, and it incorporated pedagogical philosophies aimed at critical awareness and citizenship.

In any case, the effects of the 1996 LDB (which took aim at primary education) on attendance and completion rates was immediately apparent. Figure 3.4 shows primary completion rates for Brazilians aged 15 to 18 years of age. First, it is worth emphasizing that in 1992 there were massive inequalities in primary school completion rates by income quintile: whereas 70 percent of the wealthiest families saw their children complete primary school, only 10 percent of the poorest did. Yet the enormous gains in educational outcomes over the following two decades are a testament to the action on the part of the Brazilian state to improve access to education. It also should not go without mentioning that a significant factor in improving educational attendance among the poorest sectors is the stipulation included in Brazil's targeted cash transfer program, the *Bolsa Família*. This program offered cash payments to the poorest household conditioned on families' compliance with social requirements, like children's school attendance. The program began as a state-level initiative during the Cardoso administration, but the program was scaled up to the national level in 2003 under Lula and greatly expanded in years thereafter, eventually reaching the households of roughly 30 percent of the Brazilian population by 2014 (Weisbrot, Johnston, and Lefebvre 2014).

The 1990s saw unprecedented attention paid to improving primary school outcomes and the reform of federal education policy to make educational goals a reality, but there was also remarkable continuity between the Cardoso and Lula administrations. During Lula's presidency, the national congress renewed FUNDEF and expanded the program to include secondary education as well. In addition, Lula earmarked additional federal dollars to expand resources for federal funding of primary and secondary

education (Melo 2017; OECD 2011). The results of these renewed commitments are again clear. Figure 3.5 shows rates of high school completion from 1992 to 2014 by income quintile. As in other domains of education, access to education is stratified along socioeconomic lines. Indeed, in 1992 high school completion rates stood at 10 percent or less for the bottom 60 percent of the income distribution, and at just under 3 percent for the bottom quintile. Yet considerable gains in both access and completion are evident: by 2014, 30 percent of those in the bottom quintile completed high school, a tenfold increase.

Lula not only by renewed commitments began under Cardoso, but also extended them to the domain of university education. Unlike primary and secondary education, which has historically been seen as low-quality and under-resourced, university education received the lion's share of public spending on education (Figure 3.3 above), and served a small and elite minority of the country's population (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; Gomes and Moraes 2012). Moreover, the country's federal and state-run universities are of exceedingly high quality and do not charge students tuition. The irony, of course, is that students educated in public primary and secondary schools are dismally prepared to compete for the few university slots in public universities (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; Heringer 2015; S. Schwartzman, Pinheiro, and Pillay 2015).



Figure 3.5 Population aged 18-24 with High School Completed by Income Quintile, 1992-2014.
Source: PNAD, IBGE.

Lula sought to combat these inequalities by expanding existing resources for federal universities and creating new programs to facilitate access. In 2001, congress approved a national education goal of enrolling 30 percent of 18 to 24-year-olds in university, a goal that was increased to 33 percent in 2014. To meet these goals, Lula's administration: created 18 new federal universities between 2003 and 2014, including universities outside of state capitals to reach rural populations; created the federal Program for the Restructuring and Expansion of Federal Universities (REUNI), which awarded qualifying universities with up to BR$2 billion to invest in buildings, courses, and campuses, and to improve access and retention for vulnerable students; created the federal program Prouni, the University for All Program (Programa Universidade para Todos) in 2004, which awards full and partial scholarships to low-income and Afro-descendant students to attend private universities (a total of nearly 3 million scholarships were awarded as of 2016); nationalized and centralized the university entrance exam, creating a national exam analogous to the SAT in the United States (o Exame nacional do Ensino medio, ENEM) as well as a unified application system, allowing students to apply to multiple universities without the need to sit for separate entrance exams (SISU); and most notoriously, federal and state governments began to expand access through



Figure 3.6 Population aged 18-24 with Some University Education by Income Quintile, 1992-2014. Source: PNAD, IBGE.

the active inclusion of low-income and Afro-descendant students through the creation of means- and race-targeted affirmative action programs (Heringer 2015; Heringer and Ferreira 2009; L. T. Soares 2013).

The results in the domain of university education are unprecedented. Figure 3.6 displays rates of university access (those with at least some university education, if not completed) by income quintile. The figure omits those in the highest income quintile, where university access is far and away the greatest (17 percent in 1992 and 47 percent in 2014). The data tell a story similar to that seen in lower levels of education: among all levels of the income structure, access to university education has expanded greatly over this period, beginning in particular in the 2000s. And while stratification by income remains a challenge in efforts to democratize education, when we consider that the bottom forty percent of the income structure had essentially no presence in university education in 1992, then even the more modest gains among these sectors represent unprecedented access for the poor and disadvantaged in Brazil (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; Gomes and Moraes 2012).

Conclusion

Between the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Brazil saw remarkable change in both the state's orientation toward the racial question as well as the extent and accessibility of social citizenship. Brazil transitioned from aspirations of total whiteness in the era of scientific racism to the recognition of the suffering nonwhite populations endured and continue to endure. At the same time, the Brazilian state expanded citizenship rights in periodic fashion, moving from relatively few rights extended to restricted sectors of the population to universal, basic social rights for all citizens. By the end of the twentieth century, the groundwork had been laid for massive improvements in the accessibility of public education at all levels. At primary and

secondary levels, funding and quality improved and national education policy reflected values of democratic citizenship. At the university level, new and reformed policies and programs sought to make a university education an attainable goal for lower-income and darker-skinned students. Thus education overall became much more inclusive, inducing a new wave of social incorporation and upward mobility among lower classes. It is these very experiences of upward mobility, I argue, that contributed to the formation of racialized political identities and the newfound tendency for Brazilians to reclassify toward blackness. In the following chapter, I take up these processes and elaborate the mechanisms through which educational expansion could produce such sudden and unexpected social and political change.

CHAPTER FOUR

PATHWAYS TO CONSCIOUSNESS

This chapter seeks to better specify and illustrate the relationship between education and racial reclassification by exploring the causal pathways through which individuals come to develop political identities rooted in racial categories of social membership. To do this, I draw on qualitative analysis of in-depth interview data collected during more than 15 months of fieldwork in São Paulo and Recife, two major urban centers in distinct geographic regions of Brazil. The accounts of Brazilians at various levels of education and socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as with reclassifiers and non-reclassifiers, brings to light how individuals' racial self-conceptions are informed first and foremost by their personal and lived experiences. Yet by altering individuals' paths in life, inserting individuals into new space and social networks, and modifying their expectations, access to greater education and the social mobility this entails have greatly impacted individuals' experiences and their interpretations of them.

A long line of literature in political behavior highlights education—either as a determinant of socioeconomic status or the availability of cognitive skills or resources—as a strong predictor of individuals' political participation and engagement (Almond and Verba 1963; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987). More recently, scholars have called into question the causal validity of education as an imprecise, endogenous, and extraordinarily bundled "treatment" (Berinsky and Lenz 2011; Kam and Palmer 2008). I do not wade into these debates, but one contribution of this analysis is a clear specification of the mechanisms through which education can operate to impact individuals' political worldviews and engagement. Specifically, this analysis uncovers the ways that education increases individuals' *exposure* to information, social networks,

and labor market experiences. At the same time, greater education endows individuals with greater internal political *efficacy*, making them more confident in their political competencies and perspectives. Ultimately, better-educated individuals are more exposed to and made more aware of racialized power dynamics, and they are empowered to confront the stigma associated with blackness.

Qualitative analysis of rich ethnographic data is particularly well suited for the task of peering inside the black box of education, simultaneously providing opportunity to assess whether the effects of education are endogenous to other processes and illustrating the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy at work in ways that statistical models simply cannot. Before elaborating and documenting the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy in detail, I first discuss the sampling strategies and other methodological considerations in conducting these interviews.

Empirical Approach and Methodological Considerations

The data presented in this chapter come from thirty-four in-depth interviews conducted with reclassifiers and stable identifiers between July 2016 and August 2017. Interviews were conducted in São Paulo and Recife, both capital cities of their respective states, located in distinct geographic regions of Brazil. These two cities capture, in broad strokes, important subnational differences that one might expect to be related to racial reclassification (A. S. A. Guimarães 1999; Nogueira 1998). São Paulo, Brazil's largest city and one of it's most important economically, is located in the southeast region of Brazil, which is wealthier and more developed, overall, than the northern regions. The state of São Paulo, like many southern and southeastern states, is also majority-white due to waves of immigration from Europe in the twentieth century, which were incentivized to provide labor for the country's burgeoning industrial economy. Recife, the capital city of Pernambuco, is a large coastal city in the country's

northeast region, historically the principal destination for enslaved Africans trafficked to Brazil to work predominantly on sugarcane plantations. One legacy of slavery is that northeastern regions of Brazil have historically been, and remain, lesser developed than southern regions of the country. Moreover, due to the large slave populations in these regions, they have also historically been minority-white, according to the census.

In addition to demographic and historical differences, from the perspective of subnational variation these two cities can be considered "extreme values on Y," in Seawright and Gerring's (2008) terms: São Paulo is an above-average, and Pernambuco a below-average, case of reclassification. Seawright and Gerring suggest that selecting extreme values on Y is a fruitful case selection strategy for open-ended probing into causal processes, and one that can be combined with other cases or methods to test the representativeness of the findings. This is precisely the approach I employed in conducting these qualitative interviews. While the insights gleaned from these specific interviews leave open questions regarding generalization, the purpose of this methodological approach is to generate hypotheses that can account for these patterns and shed light on political identity formation (Martin 2013; Morse 1998, 1999). The analyses that follow, then, simply aim to probe empirically and illustrate in detail these causal processes. In the chapters that follow, I subject these insights to systematic empirical testing.

In line with these analytic goals (Lynch 2013), I recruited interview subjects via snowball sampling in large part because it is neither easy nor obvious how to identify who exactly is a reclassifier in this context. One's physical appearance in Brazil says little about how that individual identifies in racial terms, let alone whether or not they have reclassified. Because of this, I relied on the contacts I made over time to identify reclassifiers, and relied on them for additional references. When I first began fieldwork in São Paulo, I was exploring a hypothesis related to the importance of racial quotas in

university, both as a material benefit incentivizing black identification but also as a symbolic form of recognition by the state that might legitimate black identification for Brazilians. As a visiting researcher at the University of São Paulo, I had exposure to university students who benefited from affirmative action policies (of all kinds). But I also sought out students who had *not* benefited from such policies, but also might in the future. This led me to observing preparatory courses for the university entrance exam geared toward low-income students. Many of my contacts were made at courses offered with the organization Uneafro, a black-movement linked organization that offered free, nightly preparatory courses targeted towards "popular" sectors.

Table 4.1 presents basic descriptive statistics for my interview subjects. The majority of the individuals I interviewed were in their 20s and 30s, in part a function of my own access as a university-based researcher and how subjects were sampled. For this reason, the majority also had completed high school and university education. In general, interviewees came from the lower end of Brazil's income structure, even if their present-day salaries suggested otherwise. The mean monthly household income per capita of my interviewees was BR$1,307, roughly 40 percent higher than Brazil's federal minimum wage in 2017. The interviews were roughly split between Recife and

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Recife	0.47	0.51	0	1	34
Age	31.62	14.01	18	70	34
Female	0.59	0.50	0	1	34
Income	1307	1419.72	0	7666.67	34
Reclassifier	0.56	0.50	0	1	34
Education	3.15	1.02	1	4	34
(1) < Primary	0.15	0.36	0	1	34
(3) High School	0.41	0.50	0	1	34
(4) University	0.44	0.50	0	1	34
Racial ID	2.58	0.61	1	3	33
(1) White	0.06	0.24	0	1	33
(2) Brown	0.30	0.47	0	1	33
(3) Black	0.64	0.49	0	1	33

Table 4.1 Basic Characteristics of Interviewees. Income measures monthly household income per capita. Racial ID indicates the interviewee's self-classification in the official census categories. One interviewee declined to self-classify using census categories.

São Paulo, and there is reasonable gender balance. Finally, the vast majority of my interviewees also identified as brown or black in terms of the official census categories. For more on interview sampling and methods sequencing, see Appendix B.

My primary analytical goal is to mine the accounts of reclassifiers to illuminate how education impacts political consciousness through the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy. With regard to exposure, I rely on the detailed and personal accounts of better-educated interviews. To shed light on efficacy, I make greater use of comparisons across educational strata to shed light on differences in efficacy. To the quantitative researcher, thirty-four qualitative interviews may seem a small number, but the logic of determining sample size in qualitative research differs importantly from the goal of statistical inference in quantitative research (Morse 1998). Rather than aim for statistical generalizability, these interviews served to unearth insights into these processes, and were thus carried out until I reached "saturation" (Morse 2000).

Exposure: Information, Social Networks, and the Labor Market

Information

To begin, several individuals with whom I spoke discussed how education increased their information about salience of race for understand present-day inequalities in society, but also how "the racial question" was dealt with in Brazilian history, incorporated into Brazil's conception of nationhood, and is perpetuated through everyday forms of racial hierarchies.

Consider the case of Paulo, a twenty-year-old freshman whom I met while a visiting researcher at USP. Paulo grew up in a poor community in the west-zone of São Paulo and gained admission to USP using quotas.[37] Paulo has dark skin and kinky black

[37] At the time of our interview, USP as an independent institution had not adopted or implemented racial quotas in its admissions process, but used the "bonus system" for nonwhite students in its independent *vestibular*. USP, however, also accepts students who enter through the *Sistema de seleção*

hair, which he was wearing in the style of an afro at the time of our interviews. Paulo himself is not a reclassifier—he has always identified as black, accepting both labels *preto* and *negro*, and considers the rest of his family black as well. Today, Paulo is a politically active student, participating in various student groups on campus. He also considers himself a militant of the black movement and tells me that he has even played a large role in organizing poetry slams (*saraus*) in his peripheral neighborhood in the east zone of São Paulo.

Yet Paulo's political engagement in general, and in particular with the black movement, was a recent development for him. Prior to preparing for the university entrance exam—by enrolling in a specialized preparatory course known as *cursinhos pré-vestibulares*, or simply *cursinhos*—Paulo tells me that he rarely reflected on race. Paulo is rare in that as someone growing up in a peripheral neighborhood, he was able to attend good-quality public schools for much of his childhood, and in fact attended high school in Morumbi, one of the wealthiest neighborhoods in São Paulo, also one of Brazil's wealthiest (and most unequal) cities. During our conversation, Paulo describes the diversity in his school's student body, which mirror the socioeconomic and racial inequalities in much of Brazil:

> DD: And, you said that in terms of social class there was diversity. But in terms of race, was there also diversity at the school?
>
> Paulo: There was. There was, yeah. But the majority—I think the, half or the majority of the students were white, because of where the school was situated, too. And the black (*negro*) students were from the peripheral neighborhoods in the area. And I…but I think there was [racial] diversity in this way…
>
> DD: And did you notice a division between the *negro* and white students at the school? Or was this normal for you, you didn't think much about this?
>
> Paulo: Yeah. At the time I didn't think much about that. There wasn't exactly a division, but a lot of times for us to be included in that…in that group, we don't…don't…you need some characteristics. We need to have some characteristics.

unificada, administered by the Ministry of Education. Because SISU slots are allocated by the federal government, these included racial quotas.

> DD: Characteristics?
>
> Paulo: Yeah…
>
> DD: What does that mean?
>
> Paulo: It would be straight hair, or for example things that put us closer to this group—
>
> DD: —And did you suffer some kind of prejudice [in high school]?
>
> Paulo: Um… That I noticed? No. But I might have suffered and not have realized. I may not have noticed.

Clear in Paulo's comments is an awareness of a social hierarchy of inclusion based, at least in part, on one salient racial feature, hair, which as we will see emerges as a nearly universal grievance in interviews. Yet even as Paulo describes his feelings of social exclusion during his time in high school, and his awareness of the correlation between race and class ("the black students were from the peripheral neighborhoods"), he maintains that race had not surfaced as a salient factor in his social experience.

Paulo's experience in high school contrasts sharply with his perceptions today. Paulo reports that his transformation into a racially conscious and politically active university student began in a free *cursinho* he attended at USP's polytechnic school before entering university. Paulo says that history courses in particular played an important role in developing consciousness because it was there that he began to understand how little he had learned about *negros* in Brazilian history:

> …[a]nd slavery I [had learned] a few things, but not much. Like, I knew that there was slavery, I knew more or less the time period, but it was very…superficial, the lessons about this. I didn't know what slavery was like and a lot of times I never learned for example that there were [slave] revolts. For example, the most important was the Quilombo dos Palmares with Zumbi, and I didn't know about it. I came to know about it. I didn't know for example what happened after abolition, for example. After abolition came the Republic, and we heard nothing more about *negros* in the Republic. And the *negros* were there.

To be sure, slavery and Afro-descendants are integral to Brazil's official historical narrative as a former Portuguese colony and a racially mixed—and united—people. But, as is the case with most official histories, there is no guarantee that Brazilians learn

about the full extent of the history of slavery as a racialized institution. For example, several interviewees with less than primary education told me that they never knew about the history of slavery in Brazil—the single largest importer of enslaved Africans and the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery in 1888. One of these informants, Joanna, knows that slavery entailed coerced labor, but when I ask her where the slaves came from, she responds "I forget." Joanna also says that most of her familiarity with the subject comes from depictions on *telenovelas*, a comment Raquel, another interviewee, also relays:

> I didn't know about that slavery thing. I used to see it in *telenovelas*, you know, there were *novelas*, they had one of them from some *novela* that is still on, who is Slave Isaura, you know? It's on channel two. So I used to see it there, slavery there, but I didn't know they had it for real, that there was this thing of blacks suffering so much. So [I learned] when [my boss] told me that [slavery] didn't exist today because Isabel signed the freeing of the slaves.

Joanna and Raquel might seem like extreme examples, but it is striking that even students like Paulo, who is relatively well educated and fortunate in that he attended good-quality public schools, learned an historical account that downplayed the coercive and insidious details of slavery, as well as the fact that the institution enslaved Africans exclusively. Part of how this is omitted from Brazil's official history is via an emphasis on the peaceful abolition of slavery by Princess Isabel and scant attention paid to centuries of rebellion and maroon communities, known as *quilombos*. Paulo's invocation of the *Quilombo dos Palmares,* the most well-known of these communities, is a clear indication that exposure to new information led Paulo to rethink—or perhaps simply to think for the first time—his previous understanding of the importance of race in Brazilian history.

Contrasting this newfound awareness of the importance of slavery in Brazilian history and its legacies, Paulo reports that "lessons on slavery and Africa opened my mind a bit." He describes what he had previously thought about slavery: "I knew that

slavery happened, but I didn't know how. I didn't know how much this legacy exists today. You learn what happened, but a lot of times it's that 'the past is just the past' and has no legacy today, or it's very little. We just think 'oh, that's alright, that was the past and it's not like that anymore.' But there is a great legacy from this now." Reflecting on what he had previously learned, Paulo reports that the role of slavery was downplayed in the historical narrative. Moreover, Paulo goes on to connect this narrative to the persistence of racial inequalities into the present-day.

Paulo's comments in this regard were echoed by Glória, another university student whom I met at a race-based NGO in São Paulo. During our conversation, Glória describes not only what she had learned about Afro-descendants in Brazil's history, but she describes the "alienation" that she sees as a consequences of this official history:

> In high school, I learned just that blacks were enslaved and that they [were beaten], and that's it. If you take a book from primary school, you'll notice they dedicate two paragraphs with a picture of a black man being whipped. And we learn that Princess Isabel freed [the slaves] and full stop. That's what we learn and nothing more. You grow up learning that there was slavery in Brazil, but that's it. That the Italians also migrated here, suffered here. So the image that's spread is that everybody suffered. Except that they don't show the suffering of each ethnicity, each people. So the idea that's cultivated is that everybody suffered, that everybody can get ahead if they want. 'Look where the Italians are. Look where the Germans are. Why haven't the blacks [accomplished this]? Because they didn't want to. Because they didn't want to work. Because they really are lazy bums.' And so you watch TV and the whole time they show this. Who's stealing, assaulting? Who's in jail? You see a black guy and think 'lord, black guys only.' So it's all a structural process, isn't it? Of alienation. Of trying to spread an image of something that really isn't how it was.

Here Glória contests the official narrative of slavery as a past and bounded institution, its peaceful abolition by Princess Isabel, and the idea that all foreign populations were subject to similar conditions in their migrations to and upon arrival in Brazil. Glória also echoes Paulo's grievance that little attention is paid to the long-term consequences and legacies of slavery, discussing how the official narrative fuels stereotypes and negative portrayals of black Brazilians in ways that "alienate" them.

Returning to Paulo, he reports that he first became interested in history courses as he prepared for the university entrance exam. Despite the state's efforts to expand the number of slots, admission to public universities remains competitive, in particular for public school students who remain underprepared for the entrance exam. Because the quality of public primary and secondary schooling can vary considerably, many public school students receive some of their most in-depth lessons in many subjects in these preparatory courses. Paulo reports that this is precisely where he gained an appreciation for history that led him to change his planned course of study at university from business administration to history.

Of course, for Paulo, who has always identified as *preto*, this newfound racial consciousness identity does not take the form of reclassification. Yet this newfound and racialized political identity nonetheless has altered his perceptions and worldviews, what social movement scholars conceive of as a transformation in one's interpretive framework (McAdam 1982; Snow 2013; Snow et al. 1986). Consider, for example, how Paulo describes his discomfort with being a racial and numerical minority at USP, an experience that contrasts sharply with this experience attending a majority-white high school in one of São Paulo's wealthiest neighborhoods:

> DD: So, you said that at USP, arriving in a classroom you see one, two, four black [students] in a class of 80 students, something like that. But you also said that your high school was majority white…
>
> Paulo: Yes. The school where I studied was, yes.
>
> DD: And did you feel uncomfortable then? In high school…
>
> Paulo: At that time not so much. Bec—
>
> DD: —Why?
>
> Paulo: Because there is a question of political and racial consciousness. I think that I began to have more contact with the black movement through the *cursinho* and university and this made me think more about these questions. And in high school I was a teenager, so I didn't have much contact and I didn't think much about this. And there is also a cultural question. A lot of times…since in high school we don't, we aren't…we aren't incentivized to be critical towards this and reflect on this. So we don't

> realize, you know? And so when we enter and we start to reflect about this, to be critical about this we start to realize that these things are really happening.

Paulo's level of education and contact with the black movement are evident in the sophisticated way he describes his perspective then and now. But his choice of language aside, this brief description captures how existing in a space dominated by whites *became* a source of discomfort for him after developing a political consciousness constituted by his racial self-understanding. Certain situations—like being a numerical racial minority in a given space—did not register with him as a high school student, even though racial inequality and exclusion was apparent at the school. Now a racially conscious student at USP, by contrast, this is a circumstance that causes him discomfort.

The impact of this newfound political consciousness is also evident in the specific terminology Paulo chooses when he identifies. When I ask him about the language he uses to describe himself in racial terms, Paulo tells me that he prefers the word *preto*, rather than *negro*—a distinction not all want to make in Brazil: "*Negro* is monopolizing *pardo* and *preto*. That's what *negro* would be. And *preto* is…it's stronger because people reject *pretos*." He goes on to say: "there was always this idea of *preto* being bad…'ah, the *preto* was a slave.' […] So that's why [I choose *preto*], to break the horrible stereotype that *preto* is bad." Thus Paulo's choice of the specific label *preto* is at once a product of his racialized political worldview as well as part and parcel of his efforts to confront and challenge racial hierarchies.

Education can increase exposure not only historical facts that may be obscured in official histories, but also exposure to new interpretive frameworks and worldviews through course material and classroom experiences. Such was the case for Jorge, a doctoral student in sociology whom I met through on-campus student groups at the Federal University of Pernambuco in the capital city of Recife. At the time of our interview, Jorge was in his mid-thirties, married, and had a one-year-old son. Jorge

describes himself as "a light-skinned *negro.*" When Jorge and I first spoke, he felt the need to qualify himself as "light-skinned," which he described as a source of aggravation for him because many in Brazil do not see him as black. Despite this, he says: "I have a black phenotype, so I have kinky hair, I have the mouth and the nose."

Contributing to his frustration are his parents, both of whom consider Jorge white, which is also how he is classified on his birth certificate. Jorge describes his mother as white and his father as *negro.* During our interview he said he would classify himself officially as *pardo,* though in general he prefers to describe himself using the term *negro*. Jorge says his upbringing was solidly middle class—indeed, during my first interview with him we met at his parent's gated home in a relatively safe neighborhood close to Recife's downtown. Jorge and I had our conversation in a private space in a building separate from the main house on the property, where he used to live with his wife before he moved closer to the university. Growing up, Jorge, like many middle-class Brazilians, attended private schools, which he describes as mostly white, and says that he always knew that he was different from his classmates:

> Jorge: I knew that I wasn't white, you know? Because I always thought I wasn't white, but like, I had a lot of doubt. […] Since there was no conversation about race or ethnicity at home, it was always a really big barrier for me to self-identify, and I lived a—since I lived middle class. The middle class is, let's say this, the middle class in Recife is essentially white. I had very few black friends, you know? But, for example, from the moment I went to… [a new private school], which really was for rich people and the upper middle class, there were almost no *negros* at the school, like, there were a few, very few, super exceptional.
>
> DD: And at the time did you notice [the absence of *negros*]? When you got there?
>
> Jorge: No, no I didn't notice. Honestly there is an American expression *colorblind, colorblind*. […] Because I lived in an extremely white environment, and didn't discuss the racial question at home, it was always difficult for me, but like, I wasn't able to verbalize that difficulty, because I felt that difficulty subjectively. I suffered, right? With racism, but I didn't know to say it was racism, because I was a light-skinned *negro*, and I didn't know that I could be *negro*, self-identify as *negro*.

Despite his parents' seeing him as white, Jorge reports that intuitively he always felt different from his white, middle-class peers in private school, even though he didn't

know to call what he was experiencing racism. In particular, Jorge has always struggled with how to understand himself in racial terms, because he has always felt too dark to be white, but too light to be black. Describing his confusion during adolescence, Jorge says, "No one is going to call me *negro* in Brazil, but at the same time, they are going to classify me as ugly, right?" Recounting his desire to get a piercing in high school, he describes his friends' reactions:

> So I said, 'I'm gonna get it on my nose.' And someone says 'no, don't, your nose is ugly.' 'Oh, ok, I'm gonna get it on my [lip].' 'No, your mouth, your mouth is really big, your mouth already calls a lot of attention, so don't put it on your mouth.' And I stopped trying because of that. I was hearing comments like 'you're a white [guy] with big features,' and in this sense, it's, like, I was always put in another box, you know? Except when there was a dark-skinned *negro*, like, then it's 'he's black, but you aren't.' So I…felt closer to this *negro*, but like, I couldn't identify as *negro*, because people always…declined, like, always made me believe that I wasn't black. There exists a really strong force in this, like, even dark-skinned *negros*. If he isn't the totally darkest shade of black, [someone's] going to be—be like, 'ah, you aren't *negro*, you're *moreno*.' This exists, since I have light skin. So for me it was impossible to identify as black, like, even today I have to fight to self-identify as black, mainly among my white friends, who are the majority [of my friends], and…in some places, among *negros* too. Sometimes they don't recognize me as black because of my light skin.

Jorge's description of his intuitive sense that he was "closer" to the dark-skinned *negro*, but was always denied affinity with him by his white friends captures the deep ambivalence Jorge felt and still feels around his racial identity. His self-understanding as *negro* is motivated significantly by his past experiences and in particular how he was treated as "ugly," which he interprets today as instances of racism. But clear in Jorge's description is the battle he faces between the older, status quo discourse of colorism—in which blackness is defined as one end of a continuum—and a newer discourse, one certainly promoted by the black movement, in which blackness is understood in more broadly encompassing and political terms.

Thus in assuming a black identity, Jorge faced several hurdles. First, he needed to come to understand himself as black, something he "felt" early on in adolescence, but not something to which he had not assigned an explicit label. Second, he needed to

confront the emotional hurdle of accepting the stigma attached to blackness. I describe this in greater detail later when I discuss the importance of internal efficacy, but Jorge reports that when he began to "discover himself" as black, "it was a moment of great pain," he says, because "I remembered everything I went through." Third, he needed a new way of understanding blackness, one in which he could be included as black and that could counter his and others' logics and euphemisms that distanced Jorge from blackness.

Jorge gained exposure this new interpretive frame at university. As a graduate student, Jorge enrolled in a sociology course on black feminism, where he read texts like Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, introducing him to the ways in which the dominated internalize the norms and stigma of racial (and other) hierarchies, and even participate in their maintenance. But more importantly, Jorge describes his experiences in the classroom, and his exposure to other "light-skinned *negros* who self-identified as *negros*." Because of the topic of the course, he reports it was common for students to share their personal experiences, which allowed Jorge to relate and come to understand his own past experiences as racially based:

> We were discussing the body and black hair, which I think hair is a form, I think as strong as [skin] color and, for some researchers even stronger than color. Hair, it's more meaningful, isn't it? For the racial question, for the question of self-identification, and of acceptance itself, and…and in the classroom there was a majority of black women and such. We were discussing, and they were talking about the cases of racism that they went through, and I identified with their stories. In my case what I had gone through [I thought] was because I was insecure, or because there were jokes in bad taste that I heard, or teasing. [I thought] that wasn't racism, like…so I had suffered racism and I didn't know to classify it as racism.

Jorge describes here how he came to understand himself as black by relating to others' shared experiences, even if those other "self-identified *negros*" also had certain features that, according to a colorist logic, might disqualify them as black. Yet through this Jorge comes to reinterpret his past experiences—that he had dismissed as cruel jokes or his own insecurity—as racial. Whereas previously his own ambivalence about his racial

identity, and others' denial of his black identification, prevented him from understanding he could be a target of racism, the experience of identifying with others in the class, and in particular with their grievances over hair, led Jorge to both claim a black identity and see the world through a racial lens.

Jorge identifies one moment in particular that had a particular impact on his racial identity and identification (not something all interviewees could do). In high school—and indeed even long after completing earlier university degrees in communication (with a focus on radio and music)—Jorge describes the affinity he shared with other *negros*, even those with much darker skin than his own, mainly because of his feelings of difference from his white peers. Though he knew he didn't fit in, he did not necessarily interpret this as *racial* difference. This changed in the black feminism course, not only because of the academic work or alternative discourses he was exposed to, but also from a particular instance in which a student confronted him about his racial identification: "from the moment that a student in the class asked me—she was really incisive—'do you self-identify as *negro*?' she asked me. And I was like this [he acts out sitting motionless]. Without knowing what to say." Today Jorge looks back on this course, and this moment in particular as a turning point for his racial identity, but at the time this was moment was filled with doubt and ambivalence. Later in our conversation he describes this moment in greater detail:

> [A student] was discussing a text in the front of the classroom, and so the conversation was going toward questions of racism, like, it had everything to do with the theme of the class, of the text and such, but like, people started giving personal accounts, like, so, so there was a time when I said, "damn, I went through that, too," you know? And so [the student] pointed her finger at my face and said, like—like, she was far, you know, she was in the front, in the pulpit—and she asked like "do you identify as *negro*?" And I said...[laughter] I didn't even know what to say. […] So I said, I was there like, my heart beating fast, like, my adrenaline was [pumping], and I…I said, "I'm discovering myself," I said. Because it was something I had felt my whole life, but with periods of horrible doubt. But like, it's…it was also something that resonated with me and that I didn't know how to verbalize.

Intuitively, Jorge felt *negro* and says that he had a desire to associate himself with dark-skinned *negros*. But this moment, in which a classmate is, in a way, inviting him to assume the *negro* label, he is instantly filled with anxiety and even a physiological response.

In many ways, Jorge's situation and his ambivalence around his own racial self-understanding and classification is insightful for understanding the complexity of racial identification in much of Brazil. Jorge embodies the racial ambiguity many see in Brazil that results from both race mixture and the absence of racial group membership rules. Jorge reads his skin tone as light, but also sees that his other features are commonly understood to be black. Many in Brazil share Jorge's ambivalence, and classify themselves as mixed-race simply as a residual category, or as some kind of institutionalized gray area (Osorio 2004; N. do V. Silva 1996).

One challenge in conducting this research through interviewing emerged frequently in my conversation with Jorge, which is that he discusses his racial identity change as his adoption of *negro* identity—something rather common for many of those with whom I spoke. However in order to understand the broader structural changes that appear in the census data, I often pushed interviewees to relate this *negro* identity to any change this might incur on their classification using official census categories. Some, like Paulo, have a conscious and clear understanding of their relationship to their census category. But for others who prefer racial euphemisms or the label *negro*, how they themselves relate to the official categories is not always so clear. When I push Jorge and ask if his adoption of *negro* identity preceded his self-classification as *pardo* using the census categories, he says he's unsure because he always "felt a difference" between himself and his white friends, but he's not sure what this meant for his own self-classification. When I ask him if he can remember the first time he identified as *pardo*, he responds with "the only demarcation I have for certain to give you is from the time I

had contact with the professor [of the black feminism class] and of the accounts of my peers in the classroom. That's when I was like 'I am *negro*,' you know?"

After my first interview with Jorge, I reached out to him again to ask for a follow-up interview. He immediately agreed, saying he also wanted a second interview because he felt uncomfortable discussing some things in the presence of this parents, even though we had our conversation in a separate building on their property with a good amount of privacy. Initially Jorge explained that he wanted to tell me more about his parents' treatment of race and his racial transformation, which he was uncomfortable discussing when they were close by. At the end of this conversation, because Jorge expressed ambivalence about his own blackness and I felt our rapport allowed it, I asked him a question I did not ask any other interviewees:

> DD: Do you think there will come a day when you identify as *preto*?
>
> Jorge: *Preto*? I think so. Honestly I already want to.
>
> DD: You do?
>
> Jorge: Yeah.
>
> DD: So why not?
>
> Jorge: It's…I even wanted to change that in the interview. [Laughter]
>
> DD: You wanted to change it?
>
> Jorge: I did. I wanted to talk with you to change it, because—but it's a question of—
>
> DD: —well , it's recorded.
>
> Jorge: [Laughter] Because it's a question of, like what I told you, that I don't see a problem of being a light-skinned *negro*, you know? I don't see a problem.
>
> DD: So, two weeks ago, when I interviewed you the first time, I asked, like, 'if the [census bureau] arrived today for the census [and asked your racial identification].' [And] you would have said *pardo*. But today, like—today like right now—if the IBGE arrived, what would it be?
>
> Jorge: The question today…*preto*.
>
> DD: It would be *preto*?

> Jorge: It would be *preto*. What I was agonizing about was this—which was something that I talked about a lot with [my wife] too—that my son was going be born, and so I was with this doubt [of how to classify my son], you know? And so I said, 'I'm going to put *pardo*," and then she was like 'No, don't put *pardo*. Put *preto*.' And then I [said] 'Dammit, that's right. I'm going to put *preto* for my son.' He's the son of *negros,* you know?

Thus for Jorge the transformation of his racial self-understanding from something of a social identity—when he "felt closer" to black Brazilians—into a political identity has been a slow and ambivalent process, but one that is ultimately consequential for his relationship to official census categories. Of course, his self-classification as *preto* in this instance is due in part to my own prodding, but what is clear throughout our conversation is how much his newfound racial consciousness, and his own personal experiences that he reinterpreted as racial, factor into how he classified himself racially, departing from a colorist interpretation that could cast him as white.

The accounts of Paulo and Jorge illustrate how their pursuits of higher education impacted their racial consciousness and education by exposing them to greater information. For Paulo, this information included a counter to the idyllic official history that largely whitewashes Brazil's history with slavery and ignores the legacies of this institution for understanding present-day inequalities. For Jorge, education and his experiences encountering other self-identifying black Brazilians gave him a new way of seeing blackness, one that included him.

Social Networks

Paulo and Jorge's accounts illustrate some of the direct effects education can have on consciousness, increasing individuals' exposure to information and alternative frames that alter their understandings of blackness and legitimate their own self-understandings as black. Education, as others have pointed out, is something of a black box—it is a multidimensional and drawn-out set of experiences that affect different people in different ways. One more indirect, yet no less consequential, effect of

education is a change in an individual's social environment and social networks. For Brazilians in the lower classes, who have gained unprecedented access to higher education in recent years, access to education often results in a kind of mobility that exposes individuals to new environments and new social networks. Even the high school-aged, with their sights set on upward mobility or university education, may try to attend public schools in neighborhoods that are known to be of high quality (like Paulo), or seek slots in the rare public high schools that have great success in placing public school students at universities. Important, too, is that those who arrive to universities from marginal communities are often suddenly thrust into environments where they are in contact with socioeconomic elites (Artes and Ricoldi 2015; Gomes and Moraes 2012). For some, these new environments might trigger an awareness of class differences, and only later might these become overlain with race. For others these differences are immediately inseparable from race. And yet even for those students, like Jorge, who would consider themselves financially secure and middle class, university campuses can put students in contact with social movements and other civil society groups that provide individual with alternative worldviews and discourses, or frames (Snow 2013; Snow et al. 1986), that can alter individuals' understandings of power and society.

Consider the case of Carol, a former university student in her late 20s whom I met at a public debate on the question of religious racism in Recife. Carol grew up and lives in a peripheral community in the greater metropolitan area. She describes her mother as black and her father as white, and reports that she used to self-identify as white, but that today she identifies as black. Explaining this, Carol describes herself as "the lightest person on my mother's side of the family," and says she was born "white with blond hair," what folks in Recife describe as *galega,* but that as she grew her skin darkened somewhat and her curly hair turned to brown. With regard to her own family,

which she calls "black," Carols says "nobody considers themselves black. No one has this black racial identity in my family. I'm the only one on my mom's side that has this black identity and has this black militancy."

Growing up, Carol says that because she was considered the whitest member of her family and had blonde hair, "it was like I was the hope, you know, of the family. Or like, an opportunity [to be] a bit lighter." Carol describes many of the racial socialization practices Hordge-Freeman (2015) describes in her research on racial socialization within families, such as being brought to have her hair straightened starting in her early teens and sleeping with a clothespin on her "wide" nose. Though Carol reports that her skin and hair began to darken at an early age, she tells me that as a teenager in high school, a time when identifying as nonwhite would have been advantageous for using affirmative action benefits, she thought of herself as white.

Carol reports that her assumption of black identity and consciousness was ultimately due to her contact with social movements, but that the initial seeds of this process were planted by an ex-boyfriend, who questioned why she straightened her hair:

> I think the beginning of the beginning was the question of hair, which I straightened. And so I started to date a person, who isn't my current partner, he was my former ex, and he started to say that—question why I let—why I straightened my hair, why I didn't let my hair [grow] natural. And so I started to think about this. And I started to let it [grow naturally] and I think the hair question was important too, which was long before I started to participate in movements, before I started in those spaces. I think the hair question, black aesthetics were what started [it], you see? So I started to let my hair grow. I cut it really short. I think I was about…twenty—twenty-three, twenty-two, twenty-three…It was twenty-three and since I let my hair grow, I cut it short and it started to grow curly, and I started to like [my] curly hair. So that was also important for me to identify the racial question, which is really linked to appearance, isn't it? To black aesthetics.

For Carol, the process of racial reclassification and consciousness-building began with her questioning taken-for-granted practices that she had been socialized into. Her boyfriend—an outsider—questioning her practices encouraged her to change these

practices and to accept her natural hair even before she began participating in social movements.

Yet while her acceptance of her natural hair began the process, Carol reports that it was as she was pursuing her interests in public health, her area of study at university, that she began to gain repeated exposure to "the racial question," and that these experiences paired with her contact with social movements, led her to think more about race:

> I started…hmm…to frequent a lot of spaces, like roundtables, where in those spaces there is a majority of black people. I also started to frequent feminist social movement [events]. In the feminist movement I felt the absence of the question of black women. [They] talk a lot about the gender question, but they don't talk about the racial question. Also in my residency I started, I went [to work] for a project focused on the health of the black population, so I worked there during my residency, in that project, and so I started to have more contact, right, with the racial question.

Carol describes her experiences in social movement circles as significant for exposing her to the political discourse of her "black militancy," but other experiences at university also led her seek out these movement spaces. Speaking about her education at a public university in Recife, Carol says that she also "started to read a lot, to get interested…my undergrad—my final project in my residency was about black women's health and my current master's project is too." Thus Carol has sought to insert the racial question into her ostensibly non-racial studies in public health—for which race could certainly be relevant, but need not be. Thus Carol's path is one of questioning, changing her habits and practices (hair straightening), and seeking out spaces of political activism that ultimately provided her with an interpretive frame that resonated with her. Though Carol's personal journey was somewhat circuitous, she describes her arrival to black movement spaces as critical to her ultimate embrace and acceptance of her natural hair:

> Right when I started to participate in those spaces and I started to also see other girls with the same hair as mine. I started to frequent groups, um, relating to [their] hair. [I started] to leave [my] hair natural on Facebook, where there are some groups. Anyway, when it started a lot of people—a lot of women were assuming their hair and I started

> to see them and frequent those spaces. So I started to like it and I started to assume [my natural hair].

Ultimately, this all came full-circle for Carol, who drew on her experiences in social movement space to deepen her acceptance of her hair, and to ultimately come to understand herself as black.

Tiago, another university student in Recife, also came to reclassify and develop a racial consciousness through contact with social movements after enrolling in university. Tiago grew up in a peripheral neighborhood in the north zone of the city, but because his mother worked in the public sector he describes his upbringing as economically secure. With a stable and good salary, his mother paid for him to attend private schools through high school, which Tiago describes as populated by overwhelmingly white students.

With regard to race, Tiago describes his racial heritage as "all mixed." He reports that his mother is of black and indigenous, and his father of black and Portuguese, descent. Despite this mixture, Tiago reports that he is classified as white on his birth certificate, but that he is unsure if he was classified by his mother or hospital or other administrators. Growing up, however, Tiago reports that he used to understand himself as *moreno*, and saw his color as "a little bit light," but not dark enough to be considered black. *Moreno,* of course, is notoriously ambiguous, and Tiago says that at the time that he was in primary and high school he "didn't understand" he was different from others in his class. Today, however, he describes old class photos as "very funny" because "everyone is white and there in the middle is a black guy. You know those memes 'find the black guy'? That's me. The only one, you know?"

It's clear early on in our conversation that while he was a young student, he rarely thought about race and his own racial identification. For example, Tiago says he "didn't understand" that he was racially different from his peers. I ask him to elaborate:

> DD: But at the time did you identify as—
>
> Tiago: —No, I didn't think about it, I was a child.
>
> DD: Not at all?
>
> Tiago: Yeah, that's right. Until I was nine years of age, so I didn't think about that.
>
> DD: But you, you thought that you knew you were different? You knew—
>
> Tiago: Yes. Yes, yes, yes.
>
> DD: Ok.
>
> Tiago: Right. Thinking about it after, at the time I knew that I had something different, for example. That game would start, 'oh, so-and-so is going to date so-and-so,' 'I don't know, I don't know.' They never included, I don't know, the fat kid, the blind kid—the blind girl, it was a blind girl in my class—the blind girl and not one negro, you see? Those people weren't included in the game of who would date whom. You know—I, at least, knew that I would never be included in those dynamics, so…
>
> DD: Did you know why?
>
> Tiago: I didn't have the slightest idea. I only thought that I was different. I had no idea, I didn't think about…I didn't have the slightest idea at all, like, and I think that I only came to understand that, I don't know, two years ago, looking back. Then I realized, 'ah, that was being of my skin and such.'

As a young student Tiago understood himself to be socially different from his peers somehow, but, like Paulo and Jorge, it was not until later on that he came to attribute those feelings of difference to race. Drawing on instances of game-playing among young students, Tiago identifies moments of playful social interaction as the ways in which peers sort themselves into social insiders and outsiders. In his recounting, Tiago was not excluded explicitly on the basis of race, and this occurred as well to students belonging other stigmatized or "lesser" groups. But Tiago adds that his own racial self-understanding also prevented him from interpreting this form of exclusion as racialized:

> I remember that at the time I didn't have—I didn't know that I was *negro*, like, I didn't have this perspective. I saw myself as strange and after I came to understand that I felt strange because I was *negro*. But at the time, I was strange and the other people weren't strange, it was like that. I didn't look around and 'ah, people are white,' you know? Today I look [back] and remember, and 'ah, it was because of that, probably.' But at the time it was 'I'm strange and everyone else isn't strange.'

Tiago knew he was different, but he did not think he was different *racially*, necessarily. Much like Jorge, who didn't think he was "dark enough" to be black yet was told he was ugly, Tiago believed he had a "strange" personality and assumed this was the basis for his social exclusion. Toward the end of our conversation, Tiago reiterates this point:

> I think it's because I never thought that I was so black. It's like, I'm dark, but [when] you look at me, do you say 'negro'? Do you think 'he's surely black,' right? You look [at me] and you don't have that certainty. I think it was because of this. I used to say I was *moreno*, so I wasn't *negro*. People would say 'oh, because the *negros*,' so I [would think] 'Ok, the *negros*, is it? That's not me,' you know? I didn't identify, because—because of my color, which was a bit lighter.

Like, Jorge, Tiago can also identify feelings of closeness and belonging to those who seemed similar to him phenotypically. Tiago eventually tells me that his racial identity began to change when, as a university student, he began to date his ex-girlfriend, whom he describes as white and socially elite. Yet Tiago had spent a considerable portion of his primary and secondary schooling in private schools, overwhelmingly populated with light-skinned students. When I ask why his girlfriend suddenly seemed different from him when it seemed he had long had exposure to light-skinned elites, he explains that as a young student an unconscious social sorting took place:

> In fourth grade I went to study at the [primary school affiliated with the federal university] and it was different. In my class I think there were about five negros out of thirty and, I don't know to what extent that was a coincidence or not, but at the time I got a more solid group of friends, which was me and two other guys—we were best friends, the three of us, the three of us were *negros*. I don't know, I can't remember, to know where this association came from, you know? Where there was, if there was thinking about race. But like, the fact is, [we] were the three *negros* in the class, we were 'the trio,' full stop.

Things began to change for Tiago when he arrived at the federal university in Recife, the finest for those from Pernambuco and the most elite. There he quickly made new friends and contacts. Tiago says he and his best friend from University, Danilo, who he describes as white and upper-middle class, became friends "automatically" because of their shared interests in jazz, movies, and videogames. He adds: "it was never

an impediment, my being black and his being white, never. I never thought about his, ever, not even after, like 'ah, could it be that the situation,' no. We had various problems, but none of them had to do with that." Though Tiago had attended largely white private schools in Recife prior to university, his friendships were limited to "the trio" of the handful of other black students, and his exposure to their lifestyles was more limited. When he began to date his now ex-girlfriend, however, he gained an inside look into her lifestyle and personal life and felt rejected by her parents:

> Tiago: It's more in the social interaction itself, like, that—you know? [In my] academic life I never felt a difference, I never looked at a situation and [thought] 'this is happening because I'm *negro*." Never, it's more in the social life and still in this vein, after I had some confusions, after I started to hang out more with [my friend] Danilo I started to date [my ex-girlfriend]. […] And so, she was the stereotype of Danilo, except even more so. She wasn't upper-middle class, she was upper class, really rich…yeah, the level 'oh, I, I want to spend some time, I'm gonna spend some time in Switzerland,' you know? Like, that person that has money just like that, but [her] friends were all upper-middle class and my [ex-]girlfriend never treated me differently. Ok, I'm going to say it, I'm going to say what I always—but her parents didn't accept me.
>
> DD: Did you notice that at the time?
>
> Tiago: Yes, but then I already, ok, then I was already starting to realize that it could be because of skin color. I went to a barbecue at her house and her father didn't look me in the eye [when] we were introduced, and she was like 'hey, dad, this is my boyfriend.' He kind of didn't look [at me], opened his hand and left. Her mom was normal, said hi, but always with a face—you know that side-eye, like that?

Tiago's experiences with his ex-girlfriend were pivotal for him for two reasons. First, the rejection of Tiago by her parents and the close-up exposure to her lifestyle reaffirmed his understanding that they were different in at least class terms. Second, he suspected racism on the part of his ex-girlfriend's parents, but it was also via contacts of this ex-girlfriend that Tiago was led to civil society groups ultimately responsible for his racial consciousness. Tiago describes his girlfriend's friends as leftists, and it was at one of the civil society events to which they brought him that he began to understand himself as black and develop a racial consciousness:

> So through [them] I went to one of their events, which was the 'week of racial consciousness.' […] And so I went to this event, it was a whole week, of panels,

> debates, there were things about…from the turban to, I don't know, discussions about the history of slavery, it was everything. […] I arrived there and I identified, like, there were people who said 'you know, everybody's been through that moment where you choose a colored pencil [to draw] the skin color of your friend, and you don't know what color he's going to give you,' you know? Those situations that black people always go through? Always, always. […] It was there that I started to realize. There I was like 'brother, all those situations had to do with the color of my skin. How had I not realized this before?' You know? And so, it's, when I realized this there, I made a few decisions. First was [that] I'm going to let my hair grow.

Tiago, like many others, describes one of his first steps towards assuming this black identity and consciousness as changing the way he wore his hair. Moreover, this was a change that was prompted from his relating to the experiences and accounts shared by other racially conscious Brazilians. His making new contacts at university—both his exposure to his girlfriend's family life as well as the social movement circles he gained access to through her social circles—were a turning point for Tiago. Indeed, after breaking up with this girlfriend, Tiago recounts his feelings when seeing how her family reacted to her new, white boyfriend:

> And so, she started to date another guy after a while, white [guy]. Soon there were photos of her and him with her parents, you know? And I—of course, like, I was already in another, it wasn't that thing where I was still in love with her and feeling—but [it was] the situation of going 'look at that.' The white boyfriend, that was easy with her parents. With me it wasn't easy.

Tiago's experience dating a white and upper-class Brazilian, whom he may not have met without attending university, led him to interpret his experiences of perceived discrimination as racialized. Comparing their reaction to her new, white boyfriend, helped this crystallize even further.

In our conversation, these two moments stand out for Tiago, though he places much greater weight on how his contact with social movements allowed him to relate to other self-affirming blacks:

> DD: I want to ask about the two moments you've identified, like, that event with the black movement and that photo that you saw of the new [boyfriend] of your ex. So, in the black movement, when you started to identify with the speeches of the people there, what was the impact on your identity? Like, for you was it—you said that you started

> to identify, to consider yourself negro, but was it just like that, 'I consider myself negro'? Was that what was happening? How were you thinking about this?
>
> Tiago: It was more a feeling. It was really simple in reality. It was really—I looked and said 'jeez, that all happened because I was black, because I am black.' It was really just like that. It was a discovery. It wasn't very, like, 'ah, if I'm black what's going to happen, if I say this?' It wasn't, so explicit like that. I looked, like, I went through everything the people were talking about, they were saying that they're black and they went through this because they were black. It made a lot of sense and a lot of people…[I thought] 'it must be right.' And so I started to think this.
>
> DD: So you're thinking, like, I'm black because I lived through the same things they're talking about? Because before you said that, like, someone would talk about blacks, but 'I'm not black,' so 'the blacks' are others—
>
> Tiago: —others. And then I met the others and those others were similar to me. That's what it was.
>
> DD: I see.
>
> Tiago: I used to think blacks were others because I didn't have contact, but when I met the black people there I [said] 'I am,' you know?
>
> DD: I see.
>
> Tiago: They aren't others, I'm part of the others.
>
> DD: And when you saw that photo [of your ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend], did that change anything for you? Was it a confirmation? An affirmation? What was it?
>
> Tiago: Not really, it was more a question…It was another, it was one more [example] of that, you know? One more situation. Was it a powerful situation? It was, but it was, it wasn't a significant situation in my life. I don't think it was, but it was a moment where I went, 'yup. It's another situation,' you know? That's what it was. I think it was that, I don't know, like for example basic situations. If I'm talking with white friends and someone says 'oh, I can't drink and drive because they have [police checkpoints] on the road,' and someone says 'oh, but I'm never stopped.' 'oh, me either.' And then I say 'Oh? I'm always stopped.' Always. One hundred percent, and so you know those situations when you realize that you're different? Everyone says one thing and with you it's exactly the opposite?

Thus for Tiago his experiences being exposed to a new social class and racial environment was an important part of what allowed him to begin to develop an awareness of his racial difference, but much more significant was the greater affinity and identification with others' experiences that led him to understand himself as black. In turn, Tiago then describes how his understanding of events that transpire in his life, like his relationship with his girlfriend's parents, become racialized. Tiago describes

how this change in his racial self-understanding led him to reflect on and reinterpret his past experiences, even though at the time he didn't understand them as racialized:

> So I vented to [my now-girlfriend] that it was a shock, you know, for me to remember my school and be like 'that happened because I was black,' to remember another school, 'lord, that happened because I was black,' to remember things like that, the things about clothes in the end, that happened because I was black, to remember, I don't know, my mom. She always used to say to me, when I would leave the house with messy clothes 'you're going out like that?' I would go, 'I am, all my friends go out like this." And she would say 'but you aren't like all your friends." I thought it was something moms just say. 'You're not like the rest of the world, you're my son so you…' you know? But after, with time, her comments were changing. She started to talk about police, for example, saying 'you're going out like that?" and I [say] 'I am, all my friends go out like this.' And she [says] 'But for the police you aren't the same as you're your friends." And so I—you know? Those things were, honestly I remembered that and was like 'aha, that was because I was black and I didn't realize at the time.'

For Tiago and Carol, education had a different but no less consequential effect on their racial identities and consciousness by altering their social networks. In Carol's case, education led her to begin participating in civil society groups, exposing her to discourses that resonated with her as she began to assume her natural hair. For Tiago, education both put him in contact with people he understood to be racially and socioeconomically different from him, and through these new contacts he gained exposure to a discourse that resonated with his past experiences and that racialized his worldview.

The Labor Market

As preceding sections have shown, education can have more direct and short-term effects on one's consciousness by altering information and social networks, but one final and more indirect pathway through which education can shape consciousness is through the labor market. Individuals pursue education not necessarily as an end in and of itself—that is, simply to acquire knowledge—but also simply as a pathway toward upward mobility. Exposure to information and social networks might be particularly likely for students with particular academic inclinations (for example, in the

social sciences). Many in Brazil and elsewhere, however, pursue education in more specialized and technical fields, such as medicine, law, engineering, or business and may not have the same exposure as students selecting into certain fields of study.

Nonetheless, the pursuit of education can still affect individuals' political consciousness by altering one's set of labor market experiences. Individuals may pursue education simply for the promise of greater economic opportunity and advancement, but in these pursuits they might come face-to-face with racialized inequalities in the labor market. Foundational studies of racial inequality in Brazil document that wage penalties for nonwhites are greatest in high-status jobs (Campante, Crespo, and Leite 2004; Hasenbalg 1979, 1985; Lovell 1999; Lovell and Wood 1998; Osorio 2009; N. do V. Silva 1985; S. S. D. Soares 2000; E. E. Telles 2004). As one ascends socially, moreover, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept class-based explanations for instances of perceived discrimination. For darker-skinned Brazilians, higher education may not bring economic success, or those who succeed may find themselves suddenly thrust into elite and largely white spaces. Thus education can also have the effect of racializing one's worldview by altering one's expectations and experiences in the labor market, in particular those from marginal communities for whom access to higher education is not a foregone conclusion.

Consider the case of Gilberto, a thirty-four-year-old doctoral student in anthropology, whom I met through a mutual friend in Recife. Gilberto grew up in the northern state of Rio Grande do Norte and moved to Recife for graduate school. Gilberto describes his upbringing as middle class, but says that his family experienced economic hardship at times and describes the neighborhoods he grew up in as peripheral. Despite some financial struggles, his parents always prioritized his education, paying for him to attend private primary and secondary schools before attending public universities.

Gilberto has medium-tone skin, though unlike many men with kinky hair, he does not keep his hair short and instead wears it in long dreadlocks. Today Gilberto identifies as black, accepting both labels *negro* and *preto*, though in the past, he tells me, he thought of himself as *moreno*, despite his father—whom Gilberto describes as dark-skinned and self-identifying as *negro*—always referring to him as *negão*, a colloquial term reminiscent of "big guy" in English, with an additional racial inflection.

Gilberto describes himself as something of a contrarian, saying that quite young he had developed a reputation for himself as a "militant." He says that growing up he was always a natural leader among his classmates, and that once in middle school when students were unhappy with a teacher, he organized this discontent among the students, brought the issue to the school director, and eventually got the teacher fired. Describing himself, Gilberto says, "I was always on the left…I was also counter, I always questioned a lot."

In many ways, Gilberto fits stereotypes of movement activists, yet he tells me that the development of his racial consciousness was a slow process, and one that began when he was a university student. Reflecting back on his time before university, Gilberto says that his self-understanding as *moreno* was a "euphemism of non-recognition," one that he equates to the mixed-race census category: "[*pardo*] doesn't mean anything either. [*Laughter*.] It's a word that tells you nothing." When I ask Gilberto when he stopped identifying as *moreno* and assumed the label *negro*, he reports that this began for him while a university student, and that prior to this he paid much more attention his socioeconomic condition, rather than his racial identity:

> DD: Because you were always a militant of something, like, in school you were the student organizer to remove that teacher. And you arrived to university, you said you were part of the student movement. It's—but did these activities have to do with color, with race?
>
> Gilberto: In middle school, no. In middle school, no. At university, yeah. It took a while, the racial question. It look a long time.

> DD: Ok.
>
> Gilberto: It was class. It was a question of class consciousness, but not race.
>
> DD: So you had—when you were in [middle] school, you had class consciousness?
>
> Gilberto: In school, it was really visceral. It wasn't exactly consciousness, but I also wasn't unconscious. Because I was even living through my family's bankruptcy, so I knew that we weren't middle class. I had consciousness that, of the forces that put me there. Of things that [made] me not equal to my peers. So no, it's not, yeah, to some extent I was always conscious of my class situation. I didn't know that some reactions, some facts that mattered to me had to do with this position, with knowing that this position [was about being] *negro* as much as class. For example, I suffered racism from the director of the school at one time. And my response seemed like someone who had a lot of consciousness. [But] it was a visceral response. It was that thing [where] someone was jolted, of someone who was in pain. A metaphorical scream.

Thus Gilberto describes a situation in which he was well aware of his family economic situation. Gilberto also hints here that he indeed experienced racism as a teenage student, and that he reacted against this treatment, but that he may not have been fully aware of the racist content or of why exactly he had the particular reaction he did. He describes one such incident in middle school, which he reacted to viscerally at the time, but that, like many others, he says he did not come understand as racialized until much later:

> For example, I participated in a play in school and I played god. And the principal [of the school] came [and] suggested to the teacher that they make me lighter. And so my reaction [to the principal] was "[You've] seen god?" And she left, not getting it. And so I only came to understand that I was confrontational because of the racism I suffered, but ten years after I suffered it. I was twelve, thirteen at that time. So, I used to hear things like "ah," from a peer I remember well saying, "the only black my dad likes at home is our dog." It was an all-black dog. Or [I] wear an earring and hear "oh, you're wearing that to try to be pretty?" When the reference point for beauty was all white people with straight hair. So there has always been [stuff like] that.

When I ask Gilberto what changed, how exactly he came to reinterpret his past experiences as racial, he says for certain that this began while he was at university. But Gilson link university to his personal experiences in the labor market, rather than something he learned or new access to social movements. At one point in our interview, I press Gilberto on when exactly and what happened to push him to start thinking more

about race. He reports that it was when he became a high school teacher as a side job while attending university. While public universities are free in Brazil, students are often responsible for such costs as books and printing, transportation, not to mention the wages foregone by attending university in the first place. Even these costs can burden students and families with low incomes. To compensate, Gilberto began working as a philosophy teacher in a high school:

> Gilberto: That's when I started to problematize with the students of the school being black and being white. Because that was thrust upon me, because the doorman of the school didn't recognize me as a teacher. I got there, young, I was twenty-one, twenty. It was a while ago. And like, it's…I…went to go into the school and he opened the gate for a Portuguese professor, an old white lady, kind of old. And then when I went to enter he closed the gate, 'what do you want, young man?' And I [said], 'if you let me in I want to teach class.' And so that's when he looked at my face, 'oh, sorry, but I didn't recognize you.' I said, 'it's alright. Next time I'll wear a button-down shirt and old jeans and leather sandals, maybe then you'll recognize me as a teacher.' […] I understood, it wasn't because I was young, because there were other young teachers at the school. It was because I was black. So from that point forward [things] started to change. Because in 2004, which was up until that year, I was against racial quotas, because that's what generally happens with middle-class blacks.
>
> DD: When this happened with the doorman, were you shocked? You weren't expecting this?
>
> Gilberto: No, I wasn't expecting it.
>
> DD: What were you feeling?
>
> Gilberto: At the time I, I had to teach, I was at work. I didn't understand and stuff. I didn't even think about it. But I know that that was a turning point in my life, you know? Because I had been participating in various debates about racial quotas and I was always against [them], I was the black guy against racial quotas. And it was my class condition that prevented me from thinking about the racial quotas, [because] I never needed them, so I thought that—I had a meritocratic discourse that I have nothing in common with at all today. I don't believe in meritocracy at any level, in any state, in any country. I see countries like Sweden, Norway, people always use them as example of something, don't they? But I tried to believe that story, [but] it really produced the place of whiteness in Brazil. I had a really white trajectory—not white, whitened. It was never white.
>
> DD: But you—that wasn't the first time you were occupying a middle class space, meaning, 'really white.'
>
> Gilberto: No, no. My whole life.
>
> DD: So why did this situation provoke you? For example, [when you were] in school why didn't—you were a minority—

> Gilberto: —always.
>
> DD: But that didn't provoke you, other than the joking?
>
> Gilberto: No, you don't think about it. Because it's that thing, you naturalize. Thinking hurts. You create a self-defense mechanism to not feel pain. You don't think about that. […] How can I say it? I never thought about it, you know? I knew that I wasn't the same, I knew that I was a minority. This was obvious, people call you black. But I didn't reflect on this, I didn't reflect in that way. And so, it's, honestly it took a long time, it took me more than ten years to understand that these things had to do with being black. I took a long time. And I think that the fact of you being in a predominantly white environment, middle class, your social class blinds the black man to reflecting on his situation of blackness.

Two things become clear from Gilberto's experience as a racial minority attending private school as a teenager, and his experiences as a high school teacher. First, though he has difficulty articulating this explicitly, one obvious difference between being a student and teacher is the position of authority—supposedly. Gilberto ascended socially but was not treated by others in the job as presumably having the look, intelligence, or training, and this bothered Gilberto. Second, Gilberto's telling here highlights the complexity of this process of identity change. Gilberto reports that it took him a decade to feel he understood how race was a significant factor in his past experiences, and that, when they occurred, he naturalized and/or individualized the incidents that inform his racial consciousness.

Also clear here is the complexity of the change between how individuals understand their own racial identities (*negro, negro assumido, negro consciente*, etc.) and the relationship to the census categories. Many individuals invoke the term *negro* as a kind of collective label that indicates their support for group politics. Others do so without this political intention. And some individuals, like Paulo, opt specifically for the census category *preto*, which is stigmatized and can even be deployed as a slur, but many individuals understand the development of racial consciousness as claiming the label *negro*—in contrast to the famously ambiguous *moreno* or some other euphemism that emphasizes mixture over difference. Understanding this transformation as it relates

to census identification, then, can be difficult for some to articulate, or even to recall. At one point in our interview, I push Gilberto on trying to figure out why this was "the moment" for him, and he responds:

> You're provoking me now to think about what that moment was. So, I chose that moment from 2004 because of that experience, but I had never thought, until now, that that experience was all of that. But it was, in fact. In fact, because 2004 was the year that I changed my position on racial quotas, that I started to change. […] I…took a while to understand that I was the first in my family [to attend university], the first black man in the family and the second black person, the first black person was a woman, and there's that factor too. But I was the first black man in the family, in a family that is really numerous, as much on my father's side as my mother's.

Today Gilberto considers himself an activist and militant in the black movement. Gilberto tells me that "teaching did that to me. It provoked me toward this because the students, on the first day of class they didn't think I was a teacher." He goes to explain:

> Because I was black. But what they said is that it was 'No, professor, it's because [you] are really young,' and I said 'you don't have teachers as young as me?' They did. So what's left for us? 'ah no, it's the dreadlocks.' And I [said] 'The dreadlocks? The dreadlocks I get too. But let's say it, how many black teachers do you have besides me?' 'Ah, just [you].' So that was shocking, like it was in 2004, it's linked to teaching. So work, which is the thing I love most in life—teaching, and research—work made me realize how black I was and close that cycle of what we in the movement today call empowerment. Of understanding blackness as a political position. It was above all my experience as a teacher that led me to this. And so I start[ed] to look at my history and see 'oh, it was only me teaching while black.'

Thus Gilberto links his development of racial consciousness directly to his experiences in the labor market, during which he ought to have been endowed with authority, but which was challenged by other staff in his workplace, as well as his own students. The process of developing consciousness unfolded over a considerable period of time for Gilberto, and because he reports also having identified as *preto* officially, the development of this consciousness is not manifest as reclassification. Yet the impact of these experiences on Gilberto's self-understanding, the strength of his attachment to this social category, and the meaning he attaches to it, are clear. While officially he also identified as *preto,* Gilberto reports that he at one point thought of himself more as

moreno than *negro*. I ask him about this change, and he is somewhat ambivalent because his father used to call him *negão*.

> DD: And when did you adopt the word *negro*?
>
> Gilberto: Adopt, I don't know. It always existed in my life.
>
> DD: But there was a time when you considered yourself *moreno*.
>
> Gilberto: Yeah, but that category *moreno* lived—I was *moreno* on the street, but *negão* at home. So *negro* was always present at home, but it gained a political identity in the last ten years, like I was telling you, 2004. But from 2007 until now, which is mainly the end of university, is when it started to gain a political weight. It's understanding racial identity, understanding identity as something politically constructed in relation to the other, whites.

Though not a reclassifier, and though Gilberto has some ambivalence pinpointing the exact moments when his identity changed its form, Gilberto is certain that his racial identity morphed into something "political," in his words. Whether or not Gilberto's understanding of political identity conforms to that which I employ throughout this research, it is clear from his articulations of his own experiences and his worldview that Gilberto exhibits a clear commitment to his racial group, and that this shapes his understanding of power in Brazilian society.

Gilberto's experiences in the labor market resonate with, and are also clearly illustrated by, Yasmin's experiences of upward mobility in São Paulo. Yasmin is a 35-year-old, light-skinned woman who wears her hair in long, purple-colored braids. In response to an open-ended question about her racial identity, Yasmin identifies emphatically as a "black woman" (*uma mulher preta*). She says that her mother, who has light skin and eyes, likely self-identifies as white, but Yasmin thinks she doesn't have good reason to because of her mixed-race heritage and physical features that Yasmin describes as African. Yasmin says that when she was a child her mother always used to tell her—pejoratively—that she was "the blackest daughter she has," that members of her family often referred to her as *morena*, but that she often thought of

herself as brown (*marron*). She is unsure of how exactly she is classified on her birth certificate, but believes her mother considers her brown (*parda*).

In describing her transformation into a black woman, Yasmin says that she first came to understand how she was emulating whiteness in effort to be accepted as beautiful, and only later, after ascending the social ladder, did she come to reinterpret many of her experiences as racialized and connected to political and economic inequality. For example, Yasmin describes her experience when she started straightening her hair in her early teens: "I remember well when my mom brought me to have my hair straightened, and I saw myself with that hair and I thought I was so beautiful. I thought, 'ahhh.' Because I always had curled up hair, and suddenly I could let my hair down…my hair was huge, it was so big, so I said 'lord'…at the time I thought it was beautiful." Yasmin recalls others' responses to her hair, in particular from boys at school, saying "the day I arrived [to school] with my hair straightened, I started getting looks…I was the girl that the boys wanted to get with, you know? They wanted to hook up with me, to date me. Suddenly it wasn't the same game, you know?" Today she looks back on this differently: "you start remembering…the…it's because…we take a while to understand the process, you know? Of racism…but it…after a while you say, 'god, that was racism,' something like that. And I didn't at the time, obviously. At the time I was just thirteen. For me, it was just…nothing."

Yasmin reports that what led to her reinterpretation of these interactions as racialized was landing a competitive and well-paid job at a public-sector bank. Before the affirmative action era, Yasmin attended a private university in São Paulo, where she studied pedagogy—a common major for many university students from marginal communities, like Yasmin. She worked for several years as an underpaid teacher before deciding to apply for a better-paid public-sector job, for which she was qualified by virtue of having a university degree. Much to Yasmin's own surprise, through the civil

servant exam she earned a job at the public bank where she worked when I interviewed her. While working as a teacher in a peripheral neighborhood in São Paulo, Yasmin reports she did not suffer racism because she was surrounded by black women in the job and almost everyone in the community was in a vulnerable economic position, which she says prevented discrimination. This changed, however, when Yasmin began working at the bank:

> I was whitening myself from the moment I straightened my hair because I have a light [skin] color, straight hair, so it was easier to be accepted. I worked in a school where I also didn't suffer racism because the majority of educators were black women…poor…because…[as a teacher] you work a lot and it's precarious. From there, soon after, I entered the bank, you know. In the bank you have a different situation…because…because in the bank where I work you see very few blacks in management positions, because they often don't pass the exam, because the exam is very competitive and is really difficult.

Yasmin's social and professional environment changed from economically precarious and majority-nonwhite to elite and majority-white. As Yasmin reports, this new exposure to elite, white spaces planted the seeds of her racial consciousness by giving her a close-up view of the absence of nonwhites in high-status positions and the barriers nonwhites face in ascending the social ladder. Moreover, with this new high-status job, Yasmin began to earn significantly more money, which in turn further exposed her to the whiteness of elite spaces:

> And so at the bank I…there I think the process was more difficult because you're more alienated, you know? In relation to this, because there you start to live another way of life, you know? So, for example, when I entered the bank, I think I escaped the cycle of economic violence. Obviously the racial [cycle] I can never escape, but from the economic [cycle] I think I escaped from the moment that I started to earn more [money], frequent other places. And then you start to notice, like…we go to some places, there are no black people. You go to another, no black people. You got to a restaurant, no black people. You get on a plane to go to Europe, almost no black people. Families of all black people? Impossible, depending on the destination.

Working in a high-status job and starting to enjoy the luxury goods that disposable income affords made her even more aware of the absence of nonwhites in these socially advantaged circles. Yasmin is cognizant of her privilege as someone who

earns an enviable salary in Brazil, but she calls her current social position a stroke of luck and says she "hate[s] the word meritocracy." In describing why, Yasmin talks about the lack of opportunities for her sisters: "[w]hile I was able to leave that cycle of [economic] violence, my sisters never will. They are there, at the bottom, you know?" She even goes so far as to link this marginalized status and the inaccessibility of quality education to a lack of political interest and/or efficacy, saying "in the periphery people don't even know what is happening in the politics of Brazil today." She points to her mother as an example:

> My mother is a layperson, you know? She didn't study. Later she—she studied until fifth grade (*quinta série*), she finished her studies as an adult, you see? So she never had this political foundation, you know? And so, my—in public school you never find this, you know? Obviously race isn't discussed in school, never in public school, truthfully. You see, the books that you use in school don't talk at all about African religions. Blacks are treated in history books only as slaves. You don't have…in school you don't talk about race, you know? You talk vaguely about slavery, and that's it.

Yasmin's trajectory illustrates one pathway of reclassification, through which individuals might move from mixed-race identification or more euphemistic forms, such as *marron,* to an affirmed black identification. Yasmin's story illustrates how social ascension and experiences in the labor market made her cognizant of racial inequalities by granting her an enviable degree of upward mobility and showing her firsthand how poorly nonwhites are represented in elite spaces, professional or otherwise. Noticing the contrast of these spaces with the marginal areas with which she had been familiar, Yasmin develops an awareness of racial differences and starts to reinterpret her own past experiences, her aesthetic practices, and the misfortunes of her family members as racialized.

The accounts of Gilberto and Yasmin shine a light on the indirect ways that the effects of education can unfold over varying lengths of time. While for individuals whose worldviews were altered via information they acquired or new social contacts they made, individuals in the labor market may come to understand their own success

and their relative positions as shaped by race long after they complete their education. Indeed, Gilberto reports that his racialized reinterpretation of his past experiences took place over a decade. Thus even for those individuals whose areas of study do not directly expose them to alternative interpretive frameworks, education can still be a consequential mechanism for altering individuals' political consciousness and racial identities.

Efficacy: Challenging Hierarchies and Confronting Stigma

In addition to increasing individuals' exposure, equally important in understanding the effects of education is the effects on one's sense of internal efficacy, which can empower them to confront the stigma attached to blackness and challenge commonsense racial hierarchies. Ethnographic research has documented the ways in which Brazilians participate in the maintenance of racial hierarchies through such forms of institutional racism as negative stereotyping, beauty standards, and holding discriminatory attitudes (Hanchard 1994; Twine 1998). Hordge-Freeman (2015) argues that racial socialization leads Brazilians to internalize these hierarchies and actively reproduce them. One consequence of education, I submit, is that education endows individuals with a greater sense of internal efficacy—that is, the individual's sense of their own self-competence and self-esteem—that empowers them to recognize and confront racial hierarchies and discrimination when they encounter them, and to challenge their reproduction. Efficacy matters, I argue, because it leads individuals away from individual-based interpretations of their relative positions – for example, I didn't get that job because I wasn't qualified – towards more systemic interpretations – I didn't get that job because I am black.

Through greater exposure, education can have the effect of altering the personal experiences and logics that inform individuals' racial identities. Moreover, as one

ascends the social ladder, it can become increasingly difficult to accept class-based explanations for one's relative social position. But if exposure provides personal experiences and worldviews, then efficacy can provide individuals with the fortitude to face and embrace stigmatized social categories.

It can be difficult to observe "efficacy" directly, and even more difficult, then, to link this to racial identification and reclassification. My approach in this final section is to rely on comparisons of individuals at different levels of education with regard to their own racial self-understanding and the logics behind their racial identifications. What I aim to show here is that individuals at all levels of education have, to varying degrees, been socialized to internalize stigmatized blackness. But what is much more likely at higher levels of education is the willingness – and, in some cases, desire – to recognize and challenge racial hierarchies. Thus education contributes to consciousness by endowing individuals with the internal fortitude needed as they attempt to interrupt the reproduction of racial hierarchies.

When I first began interviewing reclassifiers, one expectation I had was that reclassifiers, whom I suspected to exhibit some degree of racial consciousness, would describe positive feelings with regard to their assumption of black identities. My expectation was motivated by a logic that accepting this label would, to a certain extent, mean self-acceptance and perhaps feelings of liberation from self-inflicted oppression. One reclassifier in São Paulo, Isabel, did express such feelings, saying that identifying as black made her feel "empowered," and described it as a "self-affirming" process to "show that you have value." However far more common were negative and painful feelings reported by interviewees. Consider, for example, how Jorge responds when I ask him about how assuming a black identity makes him feel:

> DD: And you were in that moment, and you start to discover yourself, and was it…a positive moment?

> Jorge: Totally, like, it was very—honestly it…it was a moment of great pain.
>
> DD: Why?
>
> Jorge: Because I remembered everything I went through. […] Because being black isn't [a] good [thing] in Brazil, so like, you suffer a lot of racism, you suffer violence, you, um, suffer all kinds of prejudice, you're abandoned, and you're in the favela, you're in prison, you suffered a past of violent exploitation, so…it's very much in education in Brazil. What do schools teach in history [class]? That the black is a slave, that the black was—is—primitive, that the black—you know?
>
> DD: Mhm.
>
> Jorge: So who wants to be black, you know? So who wants to have been tortured? Enslaved, imprisoned, raped, you know? Who wants this as their heritage?

Recall that Jorge had assumed a nonwhite identity less than a year before I interviewed him. At the start of his "process of discovery," he says he "spent a week without being able to do anything…just thinking, half-dumbfounded. Sometimes I had, I, sometimes I was really pensive and sometimes half-euphoric." Jorge's comments resonate with Gilberto's, who described his process of assuming a political black identity this way: "Thinking hurts. You create a self-defense mechanism to not feel pain." He goes on:

> This development of consciousness was really slow, it was really gradual because it was really painful too. Thinking hurts, doesn't it? [I think] we can agree that we don't become happier after we start to study. I don't know about you, but I didn't become happier, I became more conscious. [And] so more critical. But there is an ignorance, a happiness in ignorance, but you lose that. […] Not knowing that pain exists leads you to feel less pain, at least I think. That's where the problem is, racism is there acting upon my way of seeing the world, on my self-esteem, on my belief in myself, on my belief in my people, black people. But not reflecting about this avoids more disturbances too, doesn't it?

In addition to the pain caused by "thinking," taking steps to alter one's appearance, such as hair, which is common among those who accept blackness, also invites discrimination. Carol, for example, says that her process of reclassification began with her hair: "initially I thought that—I thought I was going to [look] horrible with my natural hair." When I ask Carol how she felt once she decided to let it grow naturally, she says "The beginning was difficult…because a lot of people started to criticize [my hair]. I heard, would hear *a lot* of criticisms saying, 'what ugly hair'…A

lot of negative criticisms, you know?" Nina, a 19-year-old enrolled in the university preparatory course in São Paulo who reclassified from *parda* to *preta* and who now lets her hair grow naturally, tells me, "the process of your assuming *afro* hair is painful, because you, like, you come up against the standard of beauty established in society." Thus individuals who decide not to conform to prevailing standards of beauty often anticipate, and indeed need be prepared for, negative reactions and direct criticisms from others, including family members.

But individuals also internalize these ideas and inflict them on themselves. Nina tells me that she used to straighten her hair so much that, as a teenager, her hair began to fall out, prompting her to start wearing partly synthetic braids as an alternative to straightening: "I didn't like braids very much, but I had to use them because my hair was being damaged and, when—when the idea came up of me wearing my *afro* hair, I even said 'no, I'd rather stay with braids because can you imagine my natural hair? People, like, people are going to think it's ugly. I'm going to feel ugly.'"

Thus taking on a black identity, which may involve reclassification for some but not necessarily for all, entails a degree of accepting the stigma attached to blackness and the pain of reflecting back on one's experiences. Isabel describes how the internalization of black stigma can affect racial identification:

> It's as if the person felt ashamed to admit it, you see? That they're black. Because it's associated with, I don't know, you being poor. Not everyone says it, you know? And people do [this thing] of saying *pardo*, just to not say the word *negra*. Here it also isn't…How do I say this? People are afraid of saying the word *negra*, *preto*, you see? They don't like saying it….It's like Harry Potter saying the name of Voldemort.

In Isabel's view, "people are afraid" of even saying the word "black," let alone using it to describe themselves. If individuals comply with racial hierarchies by conforming to commonsense views that features considered "black" or "African" are inherently inferior to those considered "white" or "European" then it becomes clear how an

individual's self-esteem, and desire for a positive self-image, might motivate decisions related to racial identification.

Of course, the perspectives shared here all come from reclassifiers, who given my sampling methods have had access to secondary and higher education in Brazil. Yet the insights these informants provided with regard to self-esteem and internal efficacy find support in the behaviors and rationales exhibited by my lesser-educated informants.

As the hypothesis regarding the link between education and reclassification emerged during my fieldwork, I began to seek out greater contact with individuals I suspected were candidates for reclassification towards blackness (that is, were of somewhat darker complexion and thus met commonsense understandings of nonwhiteness) but that had not had access to the same levels of schooling as my other interviewees. This was also crucial, in my view, because while educational opportunities had expanded in recent decades, these opportunities were available mostly to younger generations. Older generations, on the other hand, came of age when public education was far less accessible and of poorer quality at primary and secondary levels. To gain access to these sectors of the population, I began to observe adult literacy courses offered for free at an NGO located in a lower-class neighborhood of Recife. These courses were oriented toward individuals needing basic skills: many classes were spent practicing writing one's own name, reading aloud, and basic arithmetic. The circumstances of the individuals enrolled in these courses might seem extreme, but sadly they are modal: according to the 2010 census, just over half of the population is illiterate or did not complete primary schooling, and just among those aged 50-59 and over 60, these figures rise to 57 and 75 percent, respectively. This setting, therefore, offered an opportunity to gain insight into how the absence of education can affect racial identification.

A large majority of the students in the course, in my view, could identify as black without controversy—the large majority had kinky hair and skin on the darker side. But for much of my time observing this course, I knew nothing about how they self-identified in racial terms. Most in the class were women and grew up in poverty in either the capital city of Recife or in Pernambuco's interior. All the students whom I got to know personally worked as domestic workers beginning at a very young age, and those who did not used to, but found themselves unemployed at the time. Almost all students were over the age of 50, and most were in their 60s and even 70s.

One day in the course, the teacher decided to hold a group discussion with the students on the topic of prejudice. The conversation became somewhat energized when the discussion turned specifically to racial prejudice and when one student, Joanna, reacted hostilely to a question about her racial identification. Joanna has medium-dark skin such that no others in the class consider her white, but she is not the darkest-skinned member of the classroom. She wears her dark and graying hair in a neat bun, which conceals the texture of her hair to an extent. When I interviewed Joanna after the fact and asked in an open-ended format how she identifies racially, she describes herself as *morena*; when I ask her to classify herself using the census categories, she classifies herself as white. Many students in the class, including Joanna, identified as *morena* when the teacher first asked. When the teacher asks Joanna if she "would accept it" if someone referred to her as *negra*. Joanna replies, "I would not accept it, no! Why would someone call me that?" Her response was met with a burst of laughter from others in the class. After settling down the room, the teacher then asked Joanna if she would be offended, to which Joanna replied: "If someone called me *negra*? Yes!" This was met with another burst of laughter. Joanna's hostile reaction to these questions are clear evidence of her awareness of and, to an extent, compliance with racial hierarchies. And her resistance to the label *negra*, unlike the reclassifiers who claim blackness, suggests

that she seeks to maximize her status and self-esteem by distancing herself from the stigma of this category.

Joanna's racial self-understanding and her discussions of racial prejudice and the word *negro* that emerge in later conversations reveal the contradictions of her approximations to whiteness as well as the logic behind her distancing herself from blackness. When faced with the census categories, Joanna opts for the white category, instead of *parda*, which many understand to be between white and black. In this instance, I do not suggest to Joanna that *parda* might be closer to her open-ended response of *morena*, in fear that doing so might alter how she responds to my questions. Because of this, it is difficult pin down exactly whether Joanna's self-classification as white reflects a distancing from any nonwhite category, or a lack of familiarity with the census categories. If the latter is true, this would be far from the first time in Brazil that someone expressed this lack of familiarity to me.

During my interview with Joanna, I return to the topic of prejudice which provoked her strong reactions, first asking her if she thinks that she suffers from prejudice. She responds: "Boy, that's our life, isn't it? I'm this color. [*Gestures to her arm.*] There are still people that pass by you like [*gesturing*], don't even want to touch you, because I'm this color and they're white, you know? I'm not [prejudiced], but there is always prejudice. But I pay no attention." Notably, when I ask her about prejudice generally, she understands this to mean color-based prejudice—a response that she confirms later on, saying "[prejudice] has to do with color, right? It's because you see [it]." In describing her own experiences, Joanna points to her own skin color as a source of prejudice—an implicit admission that she understands her skin color is likely read by others as nonwhite. Moreover, she then describes whites as "they," as others.

Thus it seems Joanna herself sees her claims to whiteness as tenuous. Later in the conversation, knowing well that Joanna doesn't like the label *negra*, I ask her if

anyone ever referred to her in that way. She reports that only as a child was she called *neguinha*, saying: "because that's how kids are, right? The little ones, 'monkey.' Monkey over here, monkey over there. Kid stuff, you know?" Joanna clearly associates blackness and its less ambiguous labels with stigma and discrimination, which informs her decision to opt for the more euphemistic label *morena*:

> DD: So in that conversation we had as a group, there were a few people—I think it was [teacher] who asked the question, like, how many of you identify as *negros*. Two people raised their hands, and someone said to you, said that you identify as *morena*, like many in the class. And someone asked you something about the word '*negro*,' but you—what do you think about this word? What does *negro* mean? Is it the same as *moreno*?
>
> Joanna: Boy…alright, how am I going to say this, my lord. Because when a guy is really black, he [gets] prejudice. He's called monkey, you know? […] I don't like anyone to—I myself don't like it when anyone calls me black [*nêga*].
>
> DD: But you don't call yourself *negra*?
>
> Joanna: I call myself *morena*.
>
> DD: *Morena*?
>
> Joanna: Right.
>
> DD: So, for you is '*negra'* offensive?
>
> Joanna: It is.
>
> DD: It is? What does it mean exactly?
>
> Joanna: It's like, because…because—I'm white. 'My lord, look how black so-and-so is, so-and-so is so black, that guy is a piece of charcoal.' Because they say, people say this, right? I don't…like it very much.
>
> DD: Who says this?
>
> Joanna: People say this, so much. Even on [the TV news program] *Repórter*. Even on TV we see it.
>
> DD: So, do you think—for example, Raquel, she calls herself *negra*.
>
> Joanna: Yeah, but…I call myself *morena*.
>
> DD: But what do you think about the fact that Raquel calls herself *negra*, for example?
>
> Joanna: Boy, I think it's because she likes her color, right? She likes her color.

Again here, Joanna identifies as *morena* and white, and associates the word *negra* with stigma and discrimination, describing racist insults she hears hurled at dark-skinned people. When I ask her to contrast herself with her classmate, Raquel, who is lighter-skinned than Joanna but who confidently claimed the label *negra* in the classroom discussion, Joanna reports that this must be because "she likes her color." When I ask Joanna if her reluctance to accept the *negra* label for herself means she doesn't like her own skin color, she denies this. But her visceral reaction to even the suggestion she would be labelled as such, as well as her descriptions of the word as offensive, suggest that Joanna's identifications as *morena* and white reflect an internalization of racial hierarchies and an attempt to avoid the stigma and discrimination attached to blackness that she herself describes.

Of course, the label *moreno* is too ambiguous to be logically incompatible with whiteness (N. do V. Silva 1996; E. E. Telles 2004), but other students in the class make sense of Joanna's visceral reaction to the word *negra* as a consequence of the stigmatized blackness and her internalization of racial hierarchies. Gisele, one of the students in the class and who has tan-colored skin and also identifies as *morena*, says "the word *negro* is very heavy, you know?" She goes to speak specifically about Joanna:

> I think that she isn't satisfied with the color god gave her. I think it's like, because if I were *negra*, if I am a dark color and someone says that I am *morena escura* and I don't accept it, it means that I don't like being *morena*. I don't like, I don't accept the color god gave me. That's it, I think that it's because she is dark [*morena escura*I, she doesn't accept it. She's not accepting it.

Gisele makes sense of Joanna's reaction as a lack of acceptance of her skin color. Raquel, the self-identified *negra*, understood Joanna's reaction in the same way: "because, David, she doesn't like being—having the color she has. I think that the moment someone calls someone else black [*nêgo*] and she [goes] 'no, don't call me black,' I think that's because she doesn't accept her color." Of course, others' interpretations of Joanna's reaction can give us limited insight into Joanna's thought

processes, but Raquel tells me during our interview that soon after the incident, she spoke with Joanna on the phone: "Soon after leaving [the discussion], speaking with [Joanna] on the phone, I said 'Look, creature of god, you said you don't like being called *negra*, but you're *negra*.' So she says 'And because I'm black others have to call me [black]?'" Thus Joanna may not deny certain aspects of her physical appearance, but insists that others don't "have to call" her black. Instead, she prefers the ambiguous terminology that allows her to minimize her association with blackness, and at times to approximate whiteness.

Joanna, however, is probably the most extreme case in the class in that she exhibited such a strong reaction to being labelled black and also makes a claim to whiteness. Farthest from Joanna in this regard is Raquel, who has medium-light skin and kinky hair that she straightens. When I interview Raquel, she identifies as *morena* and *parda,* but in the discussion she also unabashedly accepted the label *negra*. Unlike Joanna, Raquel reports that she accepts and even likes, her color: "Are you black? Accept what you are. People call you black, you feel offended? You don't have to feel offended, lady, you have to say 'I'm black and very proud,' you know?" Yet even in Raquel's case the desire to evade, rather than confront racial stigma, can be found. During our interview Raquel, who works for a family as a domestic worker, tells me through tears that her boss once falsely accused her of stealing from the family a sum of money that was later discovered to be misplaced, and as a result she spent six years working for the family without pay. This shocking story prompted me to ask Raquel about modern slavery, a topic that had been broached in the group discussion, and one she could easily relate her terrible personal experience:

> DD: Let me ask, a few weeks back we had a group conversation, remember? We were talking about modern slavery. Do you remember?
>
> Raquel: Yes.

> DD: What did you think? I think the question was, like, do you think slavery still exists today.
>
> Raquel: That was it.
>
> DD: Yeah, what do you think?
>
> Raquel: David, I think…slavery…I think it doesn't, no.
>
> DD: It doesn't? Why not?
>
> Raquel: Because we…when we feel…then I would be [one]. If I believed that slavery still existed, I would be a slave, to my bosses, because I'm there twenty-four hours and I don't get anything for that. So if I believed in slavery then I would be one. But I don't believe, no. I believe that we accept that situation because we want to, because we like to be there with our boss, so I don't consider it slavery, no.

Raquel would likely agree with Jorge, who said regarding slavery, "who wants this as their heritage?" Striking here is the explicit admission by Raquel that her denial of modern slavery is motivated by her desire to not be labelled a slave—regardless of whether her lived experience might qualify as such.

Yet even with this in mind, Raquel is an example of how not all attempt to distance themselves from blackness or have internalized this stigma to the same degree. Take, for example, Madalena, one of the darkest-skinned members of the classroom, who self-identifies as *negona* and *preta*. Unlike Joanna, Madalena doesn't opt for the ambiguous label *morena* and claims blackness. In a conversation I had with Madalena and Alice, another student in the class who identifies as *morena* and *parda*, Alice tells me in response to Joanna's reaction, that she thinks "it's wrong" to call someone *negro*. But Madalena contends that "sometimes it's with love, to call [someone *negro*], you know? When a woman says '*negona*, come here,' she says it with love." Thus for Madalena, being called black in this way is affectionate, and Madalena even reports that in her neighborhood "everyone just calls me *negona*. [Someone says] '*Negona*!' [and] I say 'on my way.'" Madalena, then, does not exhibit the evasive strategies that Joanna seems to employ to avoid identification as black. But this is not to say that Madalena necessarily exhibits racial consciousness or challenges racial hierarchies. In fact, one

domain in which they comply is regarding attitudes toward hair. At one point, discussing her son, Madalena says "he's white with bad hair." When I ask her after she invokes this widespread expression to describe what exactly qualifies hair as "bad," Madalena responds by telling me that my hair is "good" "because you're white," and that "real whites have to have good hair."

Thus the individuals in the course participate in the maintenance of racial hierarchies to varying degrees. But also evident in these interviews is how they choose not to confront instances of racism, even when they recognize it. When Joanna, for example, describes people avoiding sitting next to her in public because of her color, she reports that she chooses to simply ignore it: "I pay no attention (*eu não ligo, não*)." Madalena reports that she handles instances of racism the same way. She says that because her son is much lighter-skinned than she is, she often hears comments like "'that *negra* with a white son,'" but that she often says nothing in response: "I didn't respond. I stayed quiet because I'm a believer [*crente*] and I can't hit back [*revidar*]." Alice's decision to ignore racism seems to go even further:

> DD: Do you think you suffer prejudice?
>
> Alice: Ah, why, I don't know. People…a lot of people have that prejudice thing, right? But…for me, it's all normal.
>
> DD: It's normal?
>
> Alice: Not normal. I think everyone is equal. It's not up to someone to—
>
> DD: But do you think other people treat you with prejudice?
>
> Alice: No, I don't pay any attention.
>
> DD: You don't think so?
>
> Alice: I'm saying, whatever they say, I pay no attention. I pretend that I didn't hear anything.
>
> DD: I see.
>
> Alice: It's…I pretend I didn't hear anything, I let it go. I'm not looking to yell, to argue, no. I come, or I go, and that's it.

Not only does Alice "pay no attention," she pretends to hear nothing. Contrast this with the response of Yasmin, the public bank employee. She describes her husband as white and says that people regularly ask her, as they do Madalena, if her light-skinned daughter is really hers. Unlike Madalena's silence, Yasmin instead opts for a subtle, yet confrontational, response: "If I'm walking down the street and [someone] asks 'lord, is she yours?' I say 'Yes,' and that's it. I don't respond any more than that. That person can swallow their prejudice, you know?"

Yasmin's response was like those of my better-educated interviewees. Isabel, for example, says that when she encounters everyday forms of even subtle racism, she intervenes: "for example, if I hear some comment like 'ah, a black woman with white features' as if beauty was only the white stereotype, with delicate features, more feminine, you know? It's…I don't know. There I intervene. 'What do you mean?' […] Day to day, when I'm somewhere that generates some [racial] question, I give my opinion, you know?" Isabel says that she often notices comments like these, and that rather than "paying no attention," she prefers to confront these commonsense racial hierarchies, not shying away from inserting her view on the matter. Ednilda, a primary-school teacher in her late 50s who identifies as *negra* and *preta*, similarly describes how she would react when receiving comments about her hair: "and if someone asked 'why are you wearing your hair like that?' 'Because I want to! Because my grandmother did it!' 'You don't think it's ugly?' 'No, I don't. Go mind your own business,' you know? I was always like that too, very...I always had comebacks [*muito respondona*]." Here, too, we see Ednilda responding to a common form of racial prejudice by asserting herself against racial hierarchies and those that perpetuate them through racism. Nina, too, expresses a similar sentiment:

> When you go through that situation [racism], and you see other people going through it…Today I say 'No,' today I have my essence of the fact that I'm black and the fact that even people, even people attacking me, carrying out racist attacks against me—I

> know who I am. Now I'm not going to allow another racist attack, kind of cast doubt on who I am. So you see people who don't have this consciousness, they slip into doubt, 'could it be that I really am?' Or even like, someone's a victim of racism, and sometimes she ends up propagating that racism toward other people who are like her.

When she encounters racism, Nina not only identifies it rather than ignoring it, but she also draws on internal reserves of strength to prevent others from "casting doubt" on her self-esteem. Here, Nina also distinguishes herself from others who experience racism and either perpetuate it themselves by subjecting others to it, or by questioning whether a racist comment is accurately applied to them, rather than questioning the content of the racist comment itself.

In sum, what comes through in these data is the susceptibility of my less educated interviewees to the commonsense racial hierarchies and the logics they perpetuate. Of course, the better-educated in my sample are also reclassifiers, which complicates inferences drawn from these individuals alone. But by their accounts it is clear that the assumption of black identities – in official census as well as everyday and euphemistic forms – entails some degree of internal efficacy. That is, it entails an ability to understand that another's racist or discriminatory opinion about blackness in general is not a reflection of one's individual worth or value. This internal efficacy, then, empowers individuals to pursue voice over exit.

Conclusion

This chapter has relied on qualitative analysis of in-depth interview data with Brazilians at various levels of education and with reclassifiers and stable identifiers to shed light on the mechanisms through which education produces political consciousness and racial reclassification. These interviews have been fruitful in this regard, helping flesh out and illustrate the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy. The heterogeneous and complex personal narratives that interviewees offered revealed that, indeed,

education is a multidimensional variable. In particular those with access to secondary and university education, they gained access to new information, social networks, and labor market experiences, all of which can contribute to consciousness-building. Moreover, the better-educated exhibited greater levels of internal efficacy, endowing them with the confidence and self-esteem to confront racial hierarchies and challenge the stigma associated blackness through commonsense. Of course, the insights gleaned from these data are not conclusive on their own. In following chapter, I subject the observable implications of these insights to systematic empirical testing, alongside tests of the alternative hypotheses.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONSCIOUSNESS OR CONVENIENCE?

The previous chapter elaborated the processes and mechanisms of political consciousness that are central to the political identity hypothesis. While the interview data are particularly useful for illustrating and elaborating mechanisms in detail, the sampling strategy employed and the limited sample size call into question the generalizability of those findings. This chapter systematically tests the insights and propositions generated through qualitative fieldwork. Namely, it focuses on the observable implication of the political identity hypothesis, that individuals with higher levels of educational attainment, and those with lower-class backgrounds, are most likely to reclassify toward blackness. Without panel data that spans the time period of this recent trend, I test this hypothesis by conducting longitudinal analysis of annual household surveys.

In addition to subjecting the political identity hypothesis to systematic testing, this chapter also presents tests of the alternative hypotheses. The first, which I term the instrumental hypothesis, attributes these patterns to new material and strategic incentives generated by the implementation of race-targeted affirmative action policies. The second, which I term the recognition hypothesis, attributes these patterns to the Brazilian state's stunning shift in its posture toward the racial question. In this view, it is the symbolic meaning of the state's explicit recognition of racial difference, the historical roots of racialized inequalities, and the present persistence of racial discrimination that has encouraged the growing and newfound tendency to identify as nonwhite.

To test these alternative hypotheses, I draw on two survey experiments to test the casual validity of these hypotheses: first, a priming experiment in which respondents

are reminded of the material incentives created by affirmative action policies and of the historical recognition of nonwhite suffering by the state to see how these primes affect racial identification; and second, a list experiment to probe for evidence that individuals have manipulated their identifications in the past, if not on the survey. Finally, to probe for additional evidence of instrumental behavior, I conduct a panel analysis of university applicants' racial identifications, based on an panel dataset of university students' racial identifications in high school, on the university entrance exam, and in university.

The coincidence of many of the institutional changes each explanation hypothesizes is responsible for these patterns presents inferential challenges to adjudicating between competing explanations. The general strategy in this chapter is to employ distinct empirical strategies that test each hypothesis most appropriately and that most plausibly isolate specific effects. To begin, we turn first to the political identity hypothesis.

The Political Identity Hypothesis: A Longitudinal Analysis of Birth Cohorts

The main hypothesis this chapter aims to test is that individuals with greater levels of education are most likely to reclassify toward blackness in Brazil. This ought particularly be the case among individuals arriving to higher education from lower class backgrounds, that is, who tend to be darker skinned and yet who are racially ambiguous. As prior scholarship has shown, it is among these social sectors that individuals are most susceptible to compliance with racial hierarchies and colorism, who might otherwise capitalize on the fluidity of racial boundaries to self-whiten. Among these newly mobile sectors, by contrast, greater access to education is expected to increase their exposure to information, social networks, and the labor market, all of which inform their racialized political consciousness.

This hypothesis entails not only classificatory change, but a process that unfolds over time. Ideally, the empirical test would involve a microlevel panel dataset to allow for repeated observations of individuals' racial identifications over the relevant time period, in this case from 1992 to the present. In the absence of such panel data, I test this claim by constructing a synthetic panel, or "pseudo panel," from repeated cross-sections of household surveys, carried out by the census bureau.

Not particularly common in political science, pseudo-panel approaches are regularly employed in other social sciences following Angus Deaton's (1985) pioneering application. In many cases, researchers are interested in testing hypotheses that would require panel data but are able to find only repeated cross-sections of surveys carried out annually, with samples drawn anew. Such surveys, like the household survey under examination here, allow researchers to construct estimates of aggregated individual-level behavior by tracking "cohorts," defined as a group with fixed membership over time. In my application, I rely on repeated cross-sections of household surveys to follow birth cohorts and estimate the aggregate likelihood, in any given year, that individuals in these cohorts will identify as nonwhite. Rather than estimate repeated individual-level probabilities of racial identifications over time—that is, direct observations of racial reclassification—the pseudo-panel approach replaces individual-level observations with cohort means as indirect estimates of the likelihood that individuals belonging to particular birth cohorts will identify in any one racial category over time (Deaton 1985; Verbeek and Nijman 1992).

My analysis relies on the Annual Household Sample Survey (PNAD, *Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicílios*), a large demographic survey similar to the American Community Survey in the United States, commonly viewed as the census in census off-years. For consistency in the racial classification scheme employed, I analyze PNAD surveys for each year from 1992 to 2015 (excluding 2000 and 2010 census years,

and 1994, when the survey was not conducted). As a demographic survey, this survey provides the sample sizes needed to construct adequately sized birth cohorts in each survey year to compute reliable estimates. One drawback, however, is that demographic surveys rarely include information for typical control variables in the social sciences. Nonetheless, these data are sufficient to test the major propositions under consideration here.

Moreover, applying this method to these data offers its own advantages. Because the first survey suitable was conducted in 1992, long before affirmative action policies became a salient topic of national political debate in Brazil, the analysis can focus on individuals who likely completed university long before nonwhite identification offered any incentives or benefits. If instrumental motivation alone accounts for the observed changes in racial identification, then older cohorts—those highly unlikely to seek to benefit from racial quotas in university admissions—ought demonstrate stability in their racial identifications. This approach and these data, therefore, offer leverage on the political identity hypothesis by allowing me to isolate the effects of education in at least some time periods without potential contamination from affirmative action policies.

Table 5.1 shows the cohorts under examination in this analysis. Pseudo-panel analysis naturally requires the analysis to specify the size and number of cohorts in an analysis, inducing a bias-variance tradeoff. Verbeek and Nijman (1992), however, show that the effect of ignoring bias will be small so long as there is sufficient variation in

	Birthyear		Age		Observations	
Cohort	Min	Max	1992	2015	Min	Max
1	1950	1954	37-42	60-65	8,877	11,403
2	1955	1959	32-37	55-60	10,252	12,674
3	1960	1964	27-32	50-55	9,962	14,496
4	1965	1969	22-27	45-50	6,722	14,135
5	1970	1974	17-22	40-45	2,058	13,472
6	1975	1979	12-17	35-40	104	12,610
7	1980	1984	-	30-35	6	11,509
8	1985	1989	-	25-30	4	8,349

Table 5.1 Birth Cohorts in PNAD Sample

cohort means over time. These authors recommend a minimum cohort size of 100 observations in any given year, but suggest a minimum of 200 observations. It is clear from Table 5.1 that cohorts 7 and 8 suffer from small sample sizes in some survey years (because the sample is restricted to heads of household), and are thus not suitable for analysis.

Pseudo-panel analysis makes two additional assumptions. First is that the cohorts identified across surveys are based on reasonably stable membership over time. An obvious and common choice is respondent birthyear, the criterion employed here. Second is that the cohorts analyzed are based upon stable populations (Guillerm 2017). This second stipulation is relevant with respect to age, which is used to construct the cohorts, and with respect to education, the explanatory variable of interest. In the former case the rationale is ensure accurate identification of cohorts across surveys. In the latter case, stability in educational attainment will be important to identify the effect of

	Cohort					
Year	1	2	3	4	5	6
1992	1.97	2.06	2.07	1.97	1.81	1.60
1993	1.99	2.07	2.09	2.01	1.89	1.70
1995	2.01	2.07	2.07	2.04	1.92	1.78
1996	2.01	2.08	2.11	2.07	1.97	1.82
1997	2.03	2.11	2.11	2.08	2.01	1.86
1998	2.04	2.11	2.12	2.10	2.06	1.95
1999	2.03	2.11	2.14	2.12	2.08	2.01
2001	2.02	2.11	2.14	2.13	2.12	2.04
2002	2.06	2.13	2.18	2.18	2.17	2.14
2003	2.05	2.13	2.17	2.18	2.19	2.19
2004	2.05	2.13	2.18	2.20	2.21	2.22
2005	2.05	2.14	2.19	2.22	2.23	2.27
2006	2.06	2.16	2.22	2.24	2.27	2.31
2007	2.06	2.17	2.22	2.25	2.29	2.35
2008	2.06	2.18	2.26	2.31	2.32	2.38
2009	2.08	2.18	2.26	2.36	2.32	2.40
2011	2.05	2.16	2.26	2.36	2.33	2.44
2012	2.07	2.20	2.30	2.39	2.38	2.49
2013	2.07	2.19	2.30	2.41	2.42	2.51
2014	2.06	2.21	2.29	2.40	2.42	2.52
2015	2.07	2.22	2.31	2.42	2.47	2.53

Table 5.2 Cohort Education Means in Each Survey Year, 1992-2015. In this analysis, education is coded categorically to capture four major levels of educational attainment: 1) less than primary education, 2) primary education, 3) high school, and 4) university.

education on likelihoods of racial identification. In other words, stability in educational attainment is ideal so that estimated changes in likelihoods of racial identification can be attributed to education, per se, rather than movement between levels of education by respondents. These two constraints limit the number of cohorts that are suitable (or ideal) for pseudo-panel analysis of education and racial identification: because mortality rates spike among Brazilians aged more than 55 years, the underlying population of cohorts that reach this age during the period in question is not stable (Appendix Table A3); and because younger individuals are most likely to gain additional education over time, educational attainment is unlikely to remain stable in younger cohorts. Thus the analyses below will place the greatest weight on models estimated from cohorts 3 and 4: these individuals are old enough to have completed university education in the first survey year, but not so old that their mortality rates will spike by the final survey year.

This strategy, of course, entails a number of tradeoffs and is less ideal than true panel analysis. First, because of assumptions of stability in cohort populations, this analysis will focus predominantly on cohorts that attained higher levels of education prior to the time period that I hypothesize is relevant to understanding the apparent shifts in patterns of racial identification, namely the mid-1990s through the 2010s. Restricting the analysis to these cohorts thus raises questions about the temporal generalizability of these findings to younger cohorts. It also raises the question of whether individuals in older cohorts will match the socioeconomic profile of those citizens who were granted unprecedented access to education in the recent era of social inclusion. On the first point, I stress that the main goal of this analysis is to test the proposition that greater education increases the likelihood of nonwhite identification. This entails prioritizing the internal validity of this analysis, that is, in isolating and identifying the effect of educational attainment on patterns of racial identification. To address concerns over external validity, I will also expand the analysis to include younger and older cohorts to test the

robustness of findings in the restricted analysis, setting aside potential assumption violations.

Finally, in the absence of panel data that covers the relevant period in question, it bears reemphasizing that the pseudo-panel approach offers leverage in particular with regard to the recently-implemented affirmative action policies in Brazil. By constructing cohorts in the first survey-year of 1992, this enables analyzing individuals who acquired university education before the affirmative action era, and long before affirmative action policies became a politicized issue in Brazilian national politics. Thus analyzing the behavior of older cohorts also offers the unique advantage of eliminating the potential contaminating factor of affirmative action as a material incentive for nonwhite identification.

Data and Samples

Construction of the pseudo-panel requires repeated cross-sections of an underlying population, in this case the Brazilian population, over a relevant period of time. PNAD surveys are conducted annually with the exception of census years, with samples drawn anew in each survey-year. Because these samples are intended for demographic purposes, the samples are considerably (and fortunately) larger than most social science surveys, which allows for the construction of a sample restricted for theoretical reasons while still providing a large number of observations for efficient and unbiased estimation.

A test of the political identity hypothesis ought be able to cover the period relevant to the shifting patterns of racial identification apparent in the census data. While these patterns became apparent in the early 2000s, this analysis includes as many survey years as is possible while maintaining consistency in the survey and enumeration practices employed by the census bureau. In particular with regard to the classification

scheme, PNAD surveys are consistent from 1992 through 2015. Before 1992, an indigenous category was not included in the close-ended survey response. Since 1992, the five-category classification scheme has remained consistent (Appendix Table A1). While including prior PNAD surveys would add to the temporal scope of the analysis, the classification scheme is not consistent and those surveys are unfortunately not suitable for analysis.

PNAD surveys are household surveys, and thus they enumerate all members of randomly selected households. However we cannot be certain that all household members are present and respond themselves to survey questionnaires. In such cases it may be that heads of household provide information regarding other household members, and thus racial identifications are ascribed and do not reflect self-identification. Given this constraint, this analysis restricts the sample to heads of household.

Year	< Primary	Primary	High School	University
1992	0.65	0.46	0.32	0.14
1993	0.66	0.46	0.35	0.17
1995	0.65	0.46	0.36	0.17
1996	0.64	0.46	0.34	0.19
1997	0.66	0.46	0.35	0.19
1998	0.66	0.47	0.35	0.18
1999	0.67	0.47	0.36	0.19
2001	0.67	0.49	0.39	0.21
2002	0.67	0.50	0.40	0.22
2003	0.69	0.52	0.42	0.24
2004	0.68	0.52	0.43	0.26
2005	0.71	0.54	0.45	0.26
2006	0.71	0.54	0.45	0.28
2007	0.71	0.56	0.47	0.28
2008	0.71	0.57	0.48	0.31
2009	0.71	0.56	0.48	0.32
2011	0.70	0.56	0.50	0.35
2012	0.73	0.58	0.50	0.35
2013	0.72	0.57	0.50	0.34
2014	0.74	0.58	0.51	0.38
2015	0.73	0.60	0.52	0.38

Table 5.3 Mean Nonwhite ID by Education and Year (Cohorts 3 and 4)

The samples analyzed below, then, are comprised of heads of household in Brazil from 1992 to 2015, totaling 21 individual surveys. Because autoregressive models are estimated, estimates span 1993 to 2015. The sample is time-pooled, and the full sample of heads of household across all 21 surveys contains 1,339,169 observations. Because the analyses below are interactive-fixed effects models, models are estimated on reduced samples spread over time (1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2015). In this reduced sample, the total number of observations is 328,122 observations. Select models below will include all cohorts or select cohorts, and models will also be estimated on select subsamples based on one's location in the income structure.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in these analyses are coded from the close-ended racial identification questions employed by the census bureau. Specifically, respondents are asked "what is your race or color?" and are asked to self-classify in one of five categories: white, black, yellow (Asian), brown, or indigenous. Because Asian and indigenous identification fall outside the scope of this study, respondents identifying as such are excluded from the analysis. I analyze respondents' white, black, and brown identification in two ways. First, I construct binary white/nonwhite variables by collapsing black and brown identification together. This coding reflects the understanding of blackness promoted by the black movement, in which "*negro*" is meant to unite all Brazilians of African descent, and is sometimes understood to describe one's "race" rather than one's "color." Table 5.3 presents means of nonwhite identification by level of education for each survey-year in the sample.

In addition to binary measurements, I also analyze racial identification as a trichotomous variable, which, according to some, better reflects the panoply of racial identifications in Brazil, does not impose a black/white divide, and better reflects the

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	1,339,169	2004.83	6.46	1992	2015
Education	1,339,019	2.19	0.90	1	4
Income	1,307,554	5.85	2.90	1	10
Female	1,339,169	0.27	0.44	0	1
Local Native	1,339,165	0.43	0.49	0	1
State Migrant	1,339,169	0.09	0.29	0	1
Cohort Lag	1,300,213	0.52	0.04	0.45	0.63
State	1,339,169	32.66	10.63	11	53

Table 5.4 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables

choice set from which survey respondents are asked to choose. In the analyses below, I begin with analysis of the binary variable and follow with analysis of the trichotomous variable.

Independent Variables

The independent variable of interest in this analysis is education, measured as years of formal education completed and categorized into four categories: 1) less than primary education completed, 2) primary completed, 3) high school completed, and 4) university or more completed. In addition, the models also include controls for income, which is measured as the respondent's decile of household income per capita; and dummies for gender, and migration status at the municipal and state levels. In the case of migration, scholars suggest that subjective understandings of racial classification vary across geographic regions of Brazil (A. S. A. Guimarães 1999; E. E. Telles 2004), thus changes in classification might be shaped by movement across geographic boundaries. Additionally in this vein, I include fixed effects for the respondent's state of residence, to control for these differences and any other state-level heterogeneity. Summary statistics of the independent variables are presented in Table 5.4.

Models and Estimation

To capture changes over time, I estimate the likelihood of nonwhite identification with time-interactive, autoregressive, fixed-effects logit models. In

keeping with the econometrics literature on pseudo-panels, I estimate fixed-effects models by measuring time with survey-year fixed effects (Deaton 1985). Additionally, to control for autocorrelation in the dependent variable, namely that Pr(nonwhite ID) at time *t* depends in part on that probability at time $t - 1$, I include lagged means of nonwhite identification for each cohort. In the absence of individual-level fixed effects that can be controlled for in time-series or panel analysis, these models interact the survey-year and cohort mean lags, which instruments for individual-level fixed effects, as Moffit (1993) shows.

In the analyses that follow I estimate models of the form

$$log(Y_{i,c,t}) = \alpha_0 + year \cdot \tau_t \cdot (\bar{y}_{c,t-1} \cdot \lambda + educ_{i,t} \cdot \gamma + \sum_k \boldsymbol{X}_{i,t}^k \cdot \beta_k + \delta_{i,t} \cdot \zeta),$$

where *Y* is the binary variable indicating nonwhite identification for individual *i* in cohort *c* in year *t*. *Year* is a survey-year fixed effect, $\bar{y}$ is the lagged cohort mean of *Y*, *educ* is the categorical education variable, $\boldsymbol{X}$ is a matrix of control variables, and δ represents state fixed effects.

Because the proposition being tested here hypothesizes change over time in the relationship between select covariates and the probability of nonwhite identification, the survey-year variable is interacted with the full model. In the case of binary dependent variables, models are estimated with logistic regression; in the trichotomous case, multinomial logit models are estimated. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, below I present fixed-effects models drawing on select survey-years over this period, and present coefficients only for relevant variables. Full estimates for these models, along with predicted probabilities and difference tests of marginal effects, are presented in Appendix Tables D1-D24.

	Full Sample (1)	
1998 x Primary	-0.033	(0.061)
1998 x High School	-0.106	(0.082)
1998 x University	-0.094	(0.137)
2003 x Primary	0.028	(0.060)
2003 x High School	0.172	(0.078)*
2003 x University	0.198	(0.129)
2008 x Primary	0.077	(0.061)
2008 x High School	0.252	(0.076)*
2008 x University	0.424	(0.122)*
2013 x Primary	0.048	(0.064)
2013 x High School	0.271	(0.078)*
2013 x University	0.422	(0.123)*
2015 x Primary	0.110	(0.064)+
2015 x High School	0.301	(0.078)*
2015 x University	0.527	(0.122)*
1998	-0.918	(0.878)
2003	-0.279	(1.043)
2008	-1.812	(1.167)
2013	-0.057	(1.002)
2015	-1.152	(0.923)
Primary	-0.321	(0.046)*
High School	-0.777	(0.061)*
University	-1.460	(0.107)*
Interactive Controls	Y	
Interactive State FX	Y	
Observations	137,410	
AIC	156984.253	

Table 5.5 Estimated Longitudinal Relationship between Education and Nonwhite Identification. + $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each fixed-effects interaction term is estimated relative to the baseline year of 1993 and the education category "less than primary."

Longitudinal Analysis of Nonwhite Identification

Table 5.5 presents estimates from logit models estimating self-identification as either black or brown (nonwhite), relative to white identification. This model, which estimates this relationship on the full sample of heads of household, shows a positive and increasing relationship between education and nonwhite identification. The main effects of education show a *negative* relationship between education and nonwhite identification on average. This clearly reflects baseline racial inequality in education

(and potentially a tendency to self-whiten) in that darker-skinned Brazilians remain under-represented in higher levels of education. Over time, however, there is a positive relationship between education and nonwhite ID. The model estimates slight declines in nonwhite ID across all education groups in 1998, but by 2003 these estimates are positive and considerably higher for the high school and university-educated. For the university-educated in particular, the coefficient on the interaction term more than doubles between 2003 and 2015, from 0.2 to 0.53.

Figure 5.1 puts these estimated effects in substantive terms, displaying the changes over time in the predicted probability of identifying as black or brown. The figure displays the difference between the probability estimated in each given year, relative to that probability in the baseline year of 1993. As these are pseudo-panel estimates, these probabilities can be interpreted as changes in the probability that, in the aggregate, individuals in the given cohorts will identify as nonwhite over time, given their levels of education. These probabilities thus reflect not individual-level changes in the sample, but changes in the cohort means over time (Deaton 1985). As is clear, over the long-term there is a monotonic relationship between greater educational attainment and growth over time in the likelihood of identifying as nonwhite. For the university



Figure 5.1 Changes in the Estimated Probability of Nonwhite Identification by Level of Education

and high school-educated in particular, there is consistent growth. Between 1993 and 2015, this probability grew by 14 percentage points for the university-educated (0.29 to 0.42) and 11 percentage points (0.41 to 0.52) for the high school-educated (see Appendix Tables D3 and D4 for difference tests).

Of course, the central hypothesis I am advancing has to do not only with education itself, but access to education for particular social classes. In these cohorts in particular, a considerable portion of the university-educated falls into the top income decile of the income distribution (51 percent in 2015, and 68 percent in 1993). Based

	(2) Excl. Top Decile		(3) Bottom 5 Deciles		(4) Top Decile	
1998 x Primary	-0.043	(0.062)	-0.090	(0.073)	0.634	(0.591)
1998 x High School	-0.108	(0.085)	0.098	(0.133)	0.385	(0.578)
1998 x University	0.117	(0.196)	0.205	(0.599)	0.279	(0.586)
2003 x Primary	0.020	(0.060)	0.044	(0.072)	0.242	(0.561)
2003 x High School	0.146	(0.080)$^{+}$	0.298	(0.125)*	0.523	(0.545)
2003 x University	0.282	(0.184)	0.836	(0.529)	0.458	(0.551)
2008 x Primary	0.066	(0.061)	0.087	(0.074)	0.642	(0.522)
2008 x High School	0.201	(0.079)*	0.423	(0.121)*	0.857	(0.507)$^{+}$
2008 x University	0.570	(0.172)*	1.075	(0.467)*	0.669	(0.513)
2013 x Primary	0.029	(0.064)	0.074	(0.080)	0.630	(0.492)
2013 x High School	0.244	(0.081)*	0.475	(0.125)*	0.631	(0.478)
2013 x University	0.554	(0.173)*	1.108	(0.467)*	0.552	(0.484)
2015 x Primary	0.086	(0.065)	0.028	(0.081)	1.197	(0.497)*
2015 x High School	0.256	(0.081)*	0.495	(0.125)*	1.320	(0.483)*
2015 x University	0.573	(0.171)*	0.963	(0.465)*	1.333	(0.488)*
1998	-0.453	(0.917)	-0.082	(1.247)	-6.511	(3.143)*
2003	-0.862	(1.092)	-0.034	(1.495)	4.307	(3.609)
2008	-1.624	(1.234)	-2.021	(1.755)	-2.613	(3.730)
2013	0.202	(1.065)	1.327	(1.566)	-0.911	(3.104)
2015	-0.665	(0.987)	0.245	(1.453)	-4.281	(2.822)
Primary	-0.325	(0.046)*	-0.306	(0.055)*	-0.928	(0.409)*
High School	-0.750	(0.064)*	-0.887	(0.102)*	-1.318	(0.401)*
University	-1.387	(0.157)*	-1.591	(0.447)*	-1.827	(0.407)*
Interactive Controls	Y		Y		Y	
Interactive State FX	Y		Y		Y	
Observations	120,468		61,464		16,942	
AIC	139551.998		70295.603		17285.052	

Table 5.6 Estimated Longitudinal Relationship between Education and Nonwhite Identification. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each fixed-effect interaction term is estimated relative to baseline year 1993 and the "less than primary" education category.

on the discussion above and in earlier chapters, the top percentiles of the income distribution (and the light-skinned) are not likely candidates for reclassification. Table 5.6 presents estimates computed from separate income-based subsamples. Model 2 removes the top income decile from the sample and estimates the same patterns, though in this case the positive relationship between university education and nonwhite identification is consistently positive and increasing even in 1998. Model 3 further restricts the sample to the most theoretically relevant population, individuals in the bottom-half of the income distribution. This model estimates an even more pronounced pattern, with large, positive, and increasing coefficients estimated for the high school



Figure 5.2 Estimated Longitudinal Probabilities of Nonwhite Identification Computed From Models 2-4.

and university-educated. Model 4 estimates the model for those in the top income decile alone. A much noisier and unclear pattern emerges among these respondents. There is initially a strong positive effect in 1998, but this diminishes considerably and then surges in 2015. Moreover, there is no clear relationship between greater education and nonwhite identification among this decile of the income distribution.

Figure 5.2 displays predicted probabilities computed from each model presented in Table 5.6. The top-left panel displays estimates from Model 2, which excluded respondents in the top income decile. By and large we see the same longitudinal pattern in these data, with a monotonic relationship between greater levels of education and the over-time change in the probability of nonwhite identification. The over-time change, however, is estimated to be slightly larger for the university-educated (17 percentage points). The bottom-left panel displays estimates from Model 4, which restricted the analysis to those individuals in the top income decile. No clear pattern emerges from these data: there is no clear monotonic relationship between levels of educational attainment and over-time change. Though there appears to be an upward trend following 2003, the estimated probabilities among the top decile bounce somewhat randomly.

The top-right panel displays estimates computed on the subsample comprised of those in the bottom half of the income distribution. The estimated probabilities indicate that the relationship between greater education and over-time change in the probability of nonwhite identification are quite pronounced, providing strong support for the political identity hypothesis. Indeed, among the better educated there are consistent and substantial gains in the likelihood of nonwhite identification. For the university educated, this probability increased by 24 percentage points between 1993 and 2015, (from 0.36 to 0.6). Among the high school-educated, this figure is 14 percentage points (from 0.51 to 0.65). By contrast, those with primary education and less show little to no change substantial change in their likelihoods of nonwhite identification, 4 and 3



Figure 5.3 Over-Time Change in Probability of Nonwhite ID by Level of Education (All Cohorts)

percentage points, respectively (see Appendix Tables D6 to D11 for predicted probabilities and difference tests).

Longitudinal Analysis of Additional Cohorts

Though the sample in this analysis has been restricted to cohorts 3 and 4 for theoretical reasons, questions linger as to whether these findings are the product of subsamples analyzed. To test for this possibility, I estimate these same models with a sample expanded to include the two older cohorts (1 and 2) as well as the two younger cohorts (5 and 6). Of course, for reasons detailed above, one ought be skeptical of

estimates computed from analyses of these samples alone. But expanding the samples included in the analysis can, at the very least, address concerns as to whether these findings are artifacts of particular birth cohorts.

Full model estimates for these samples can be found in Appendix Tables D12 and D15. These models estimate similar patterns as those restricted to cohorts 3 and 4: with the exception of respondents in the top income decile, there is a monotonic relationship between greater education and nonwhite identification, a relationship that grows stronger over time. Among the top income decile, no clear pattern emerges. The substantive findings of these analyses are presented in Figure 5.3, which displays the longitudinal changes in the probability of identifying as nonwhite by level of education and relative to the baseline probability in 1993. The two panels in the top estimate these changes for the full sample and excluding those in the top income decile. As is clear, the same pattern emerges as in the restricted analysis, with the exclusion of the top income decile leading to slightly stronger effects of greater education. The bottom-left panel again shows particularly strong effects among those in the bottom-half of the income distribution, the most theoretically relevant population in the sample. Substantial changes in this probability are estimated for those with high school and university education, and little to no change for those with primary or less education. Finally, in the expanded sample the lack of a clear pattern remains among the top income decile.

While the findings of this expanded sample should be taken with a grain of salt, this additional analysis lends further support to the hypothesis. The main empirical finding, that individuals with greater education are more likely over time to identify as nonwhite, does not appear to be limited to cohorts born in the 1960s.

Longitudinal Multinomial Logit Models of Racial Identification

The analysis above provides evidence in support of the main empirical claim of the political identity hypothesis. However the aggregation of black and brown categories might potentially obscure interesting variation that can shed additional light on the shifting patterns of racial identification over time in Brazil. In particular, while a decline in the probability of white identification is clear, one might wonder if the growth in nonwhite identification is a function primarily of identification as black or brown. From the perspective of the instrumental hypothesis, growth only in the brown category might be interpreted as suggestive evidence of instrumentality, as it is the white/nonwhite boundary one must cross to claim affirmative action benefits. Growth in the black category, by contrast, would suggest motivations beyond short-term calculations of material payoffs.



Figure 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of Racial Identification by Level of Education and over Time

I thus further test the political identity hypothesis by disaggregating the coding of racial identification into three categories and estimate multinomial logit models. In this analysis, I focus again on cohorts 3 and 4 to maximize internal validity of the longitudinal analysis. I also focus on a sample that excludes respondents in the top income decile. While the logit model led to strong findings in the binary case, further dividing the sample in the case of the trichotomous variable leads to too few observations, seeing as lower-income Brazilians are not well represented in higher education in the early 1990s. Thus the estimates discussed here are computed from a sample that is relevant to the theoretical propositions, within reason.

Full estimates from the multinomial model are available in Appendix Table D22. Figure 5.4 presents the substantive findings of this analysis, displaying the change in the probability of identifying in each category relative to the baseline probability in 1993. Each quadrant shows these trends by level of education. First, clear from the plots is that the greatest decline in white identification over time is among those with high school and university education. Second, growth in both black and brown categories is most consistent over time among the most highly educated, those with university education. Third, growth in the black category is clear among all education levels, suggesting there is a general upward trend that is accentuated by education. Finally, growth in the brown category is rather uneven across education groups. Individuals with less than high school education show no significant growth in brown identification. The high school-educated show inconsistent and substantively insignificant growth.

Of course, these pseudo-panel estimates are not indicative of individual-level movement out of the white category and into the black category, per se. Instead they suggest net changes in the likelihood of individuals moving in or out of these categories. The patterns nonetheless suggest that the greatest identifiable shifts in patterns of identification is away from whiteness and specifically toward the black category. This,

again, provides additional support for the political identity hypothesis: not only are the better educated more likely to challenge status quo compliance with racial hierarchies (through whitening), they are more likely to classify themselves in the stigmatized black category.

Alternative Hypotheses: Evidence from Survey Experiments

The longitudinal analysis provides evidence in support of the political identity hypothesis. But, of course, this and the alternative hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Individuals might exhibit similar behavior for different reasons, rendering these hypotheses observationally equivalent. The longitudinal analysis sought to remove the potential for the alternative hypotheses to confound the effects of education by analyzing individuals who gained access to education before the implementation of affirmative action and the shift in the state's discourse. That strategy leaves open the possibility that alternative factors explain reclassification in later time periods.

This section assesses the two alternative hypotheses by drawing on original survey experiments conducted in July 2018 in São Paulo and Recife. The first, a priming experiment, is designed to simultaneously test the causal plausibility of both the instrumental and recognition hypotheses. The design seeks to take into account the entanglement of these two possibilities, seeing that the introduction of affirmative action policies and the historic shift in state discourse occurred simultaneously. Respondents are thus randomly assigned to primes to remind them of the change in state discourse and the availability of race-targeted benefits to assess the effect on racial identification. The second experiment provides an additional test of the instrumental hypothesis with a list experiment. While respondents may or may not feel compelled to alter their identifications in the context of an anonymous survey, they might still reveal that they

have in the past manipulated their identifications in pursuit of material benefits, provided a certain degree of anonymity.

The Priming Experiment

The first experiment is designed to test the effects of two contextual factors on racial identification. The first is, of course, institutional change in the form of race-targeted affirmative action policies (the instrumental hypothesis). The second is a symbolic change in the state's posture toward the racial question, namely the move to formally and explicitly recognize the historical suffering of Afro-descendants in Brazil, and the perpetuation of racialized inequality and discrimination (the recognition

		Instrumental Treatment	
		Control	Treatment
Recognition Treatment	Control	<u>Control</u> Now I am going to ask specifically about your color and racial identification.	<u>Benefits</u> Now I am going to ask specifically about your color and racial identification. *In recent years, the government began reserving slots for blacks and browns in public universities and the civil servant exam.*
	Treatment	<u>Recognition</u> Now I am going to ask specifically about your color and racial identification. **In recent years, the government recognized the inequality and discrimination suffered by black and brown populations in history and present-day Brazil.**	<u>Both</u> Now I am going to ask specifically about your color and racial identification. *In recent years, the government recognized the inequality and discrimination suffered by black and brown populations in history and present-day Brazil.* **Also, the government began reserving slots for blacks and browns in public universities and the civil servant exam.**

Table 5.7 Experimental Primes

hypothesis). In both cases, state-level shifts are hypothesized to affect racial identification.

Whether each, or both, of these hypotheses is true, however, is difficult to discern observationally because the endorsement and implementation of affirmative action policies occurred simultaneous to the state's unprecedented recognition of black suffering in Brazil. Moreover, these discursive and policy changes also coincide with the impressive expansion of educational access that, I argue, has also increased the likelihood of nonwhite identification. Thus while casual observation of the longitudinal patterns would suggest that one or both of these factors are responsible for the observed reclassification, such claims require further scrutiny and firmer empirical foundation.

To test the causal validity of the instrumental and recognition hypotheses, as well as disentangle their effects from one another, I employ a survey-based priming experiment in which respondents are randomly primed about each of these watershed shifts in Brazilian politics prior to self-identifying in racial terms. The experiment is a 2 x 2 factorial design, designed to prime respondents to think about both the recognition of the racial question by the state as well as the material benefits of affirmative action policies. Respondents assigned to receive the combined prime are informed of both changes, providing an additional test as to whether either of these factors matter in conjunction, rather than independently.

The result is four experimental conditions, which are displayed in Table 5.7. Respondents in the control condition are simply told that the interview will turn toward

Variable	Control	Recognition	Benefits	Both	F-Stat	P-value
Income	0.86	0.81	0.80	0.79	0.36	0.78
Age	4.08	4.02	4.04	4.01	0.09	0.97
Female	0.52	0.57	0.47	0.51	1.54	0.20
Recife	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.34	0.79
Education	2.54	2.61	2.55	2.58	0.21	0.89
Hair type	3.47	3.58	3.48	3.62	0.29	0.83
Skin tone	1.84	1.79	1.76	1.81	0.40	0.75
Ascribed race	1.84	1.80	1.76	1.83	0.56	0.64

Table 5.8 Balance Tests across Experimental Conditions



Figure 5.5 Predicted Probabilities of Racial ID by Experimental Condition. Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals.

questions of racial identification. These respondents are then asked to self-identify in racial terms in an open-ended format, followed by the close-ended census question. Respondents in one of the three experimental conditions, however, are informed that the survey will turn toward questions of racial identification, but before being asked to self-identify, are read their assigned primes. In the "benefits" and "recognition" conditions, respondents are informed of affirmative action benefits for blacks and browns (*pretos e pardos*) in Brazil and the state-recognition of racial suffering, respectively. Respondents in the combined ("both") condition receive both of these primes. This conjoint design will thus allow for testing of the causal validity of these two hypotheses, independently and together.

Table 5.8 presents means for each of the independent variables and balance tests across experimental conditions. F-tests indicate that randomization was successful and that respondents are statistically balanced across treatment groups. Because the goal of the priming experiment is to test the effects of these primes of racial identification and link this to the observed patterns in the census data, these analyses use the respondent's self-classification in the close-ended census categories as the dependent variable.

Respondents who self-classified as Asian or indigenous are removed from the sample in these analyses (43 observations). Respondents' self-classifications as white, brown, or black are then dichotomized to allow simple comparisons across treatment groups.

Figure 5.5 displays predicted probabilities of self-classifying in each racial category across treatment conditions. Respondents are most likely to self-classify as brown (roughly 45 percent), followed by white (roughly 30 percent), and followed by black (20-25 percent. There is no significant variation in the likelihood will self-classify in any of the racial categories based on whether they were informed of the presence of

	(1) White ID	(2) White ID	(3) Brown ID	(4) Brown ID	(5) Black ID	(6) Black ID
Recognition	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Benefits	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Both	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Education		-0.02		0.02		0.00
		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)
Income		0.04*		-0.06*		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Age		0.03*		-0.02		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Female		0.02		-0.05		0.03
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)
Recife		-0.02		0.01		0.00
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.03)
Skin tone		-0.32*		0.03		0.29*
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)
Constant	0.31*	0.87*	0.44*	0.44*	0.24*	-0.31*
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Hair type FX	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
N	864	864	864	864	864	864
R^2	0.068	0.367	0.020	0.048	0.039	0.363

Table 5.9 Regression-Adjusted Treatment Effects. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses. Treatment effects are estimated relative to the baseline control condition.

race-targeted affirmative action benefits, the shift in the state's posture toward the racial question, or both.

Simple estimates of the differences-in-proportions across treatment groups does not yield evidence that material incentives or discursive changes alter individuals' racial identification. To test the robustness of these null effects, I estimate regression-adjusted treatment effects to enhance precision and ensure that these null findings are not simply an artifact of statistical inefficiency. Table 5.9 present regression-adjusted estimates of treatment effects, each relative to the baseline control group. For each racial category, respondent classification is regressed on the treatment indicator variable, first in a univariate model then in a regression-adjusted model. These estimates show little change in the standard errors of the estimated treatment effects, suggesting that the null effects observed in Figure 5.5 are not due to statistical inefficiency. There is also little movement in the estimated magnitude of the treatment effects in the regression-adjusted models, and the effects remain statistically insignificant.



Figure 5.6 Estimated Treatment Effects by Level of Education. Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals.

Another possibility is that estimating average treatment effects on the full sample obscure potentially significant effects for specific subgroups within the sample. Any heterogeneity that is apparent across levels of education would be relevant in this case, as affirmative action benefits in Brazil are most relevant for individuals of higher levels of education. Thus Figure 5.6 presents estimated differences in proportions for each racial category by level of education. By and large, the estimated effects are not statistically different from zero across treatment conditions and for each racial category. One exception is the effect of the benefits prime on black identification among the high-school educated. This effect is estimated effect of 14 percentage points is sizable and statistically significant ($p < .05$). But this effect is *negative*, inconsistent with the instrumental hypothesis that material benefits ought to increase nonwhite identification. One experimental prime, the joint benefits and recognition prime among the least educated in the sample, is estimated to have a positive and significant ($p < .05$) effect of 20 percentage points on black identification. This prime is also estimated to have a *negative* effect of 13 percentage points ($p < .1$) among those with primary education. In sum, while there is evidence of heterogeneity by level of education in the sample, the results are mixed and are not clearly consistent with either the instrumental or recognition hypotheses.

A final potential source of heterogeneity that might be masked in the estimation of average treatment effects is in respondents' skin tones. The instrumental hypothesis in particular suggests that at least some reclassifiers might alter their racial identification without meeting commonsense (phenotypical) understandings of blackness, even in a context of racial ambiguity such as Brazil. To test whether individuals of lighter skin tones—"afropportunists" in common Brazilian parlance—indicate racial manipulation, Figure 5.7 presents estimates of average treatment effects according to respondents' skin tones, as measured by the survey interviewers. These estimates provide no evidence that survey respondents of any particular skin tone were likely to alter their racial identifications in response to survey primes.

In sum, the priming experiment conducted as part of this survey provides little evidence in support of either the instrumental or recognition hypotheses: neither informing respondents of either the material benefits newly available to Afro-descendants nor of the state's shifting posture toward the racial question had a



Figure 5.7 Estimated Treatment Effects by Respondent Skin Tone. Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals.

statistically discernible impact on respondents' identifications consistent with the predictions of these hypotheses. These findings thus run counter to the idea that the patterns of racial reclassification in the census can be reduced simply to savvy opportunists, or to the diffuse effects of changing state discourse.

The List Experiment

Even with the null results of the priming experiment there is reason to question whether such an approach is the best way to probe for evidence of strategic manipulation of racial identification. First, as with anonymous responses to census questionnaires, savvy opportunists who seek to take advantage of affirmative action policies are likely aware of the fact that their responses to a survey questionnaire are unlikely to yield any material benefits. With this in mind, respondents have little reason to engage in the kinds of strategic calculations that they might under other circumstances. Thus the null results of the priming experiment could be understood as a failure to replicate the conditions under which individuals are incentivized to manipulate their racial identifications.

To address this concern and to probe for additional evidence of instrumental behavior, I also analyze a list experiment in which survey respondents are provided with anonymity to reveal whether or not they have in the past manipulated their identifications in pursuit of material benefits. List experiments have become a common technique for eliciting honest responses regarding practices or attitudes that might be seen as socially undesirable, and that thus might lead individuals to conceal their true responses. While affirmative action policies remain controversial in Brazil, so-called

Assignment	Behaviors
Control	I used a fake ID to get discounts or free items I used the internet to watch TV or movies I tipped a civil servant to get something I needed
Treatment	**I changed my declared color to qualify for a racial quota**

Table 5.10 List Experiment Design

"fraud" in the use of affirmative action has provoked criticism and outrage from folks of all political stripes (albeit for different reasons). Respondents who have in fact engaged in such manipulation may then respond dishonestly to direct questioning about the strategic use of affirmative action, leading to biased estimates of such behavior.

I employ a list of ethically questionable behaviors and instruct respondents to inform the interviewer not which behaviors that have done in the past, but rather *how many*. Treated respondents are randomly assigned to receive an additional list item, which is the sensitive behavior of interest. The list items are displayed in Table 5.10. The selection of these list items follows common practice in the literature on list experiment design. First, the non-sensitive items are on a topic similar to that of the sensitive item: engaging in ethically questionable behaviors to gain something of material value or in one's own interest (Droitcour et al. 1991). Second, non-sensitive list items include both high- and low-prevalence items. Using the internet to watch TV or movies without paying, for example, is a common practice in Brazil, whereas engaging in direct bribes by tipping a civil servant is less common. Including high- and low-prevalence items reduces variance which avoids ceiling effects (which can

Variable	(A) Control	(B) Treatment	(A) – (B)	T-Statistic
Income	0.80	0.83	0.02	0.41
Age	4.07	4.01	-0.06	-0.61
Female	0.52	0.52	0.00	0.03
City	0.51	0.49	-0.02	-0.48
Education	2.55	2.60	0.05	0.69
Hair type	3.59	3.48	-0.12	-0.87
Skin tone	1.77	1.83	0.06	1.20
Racial identification	1.89	1.94	0.05	1.07

Table 5.11 Covariate Balance Tests of Treatment and Control Groups



Figure 5.8 Comparison of Means of Item Counts by Treatment Group. Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals.

undermine the anonymity intentionally provided to the respondent) and improves statistical efficiency (Glynn 2013).[38]

Table 5.11 displays covariate balance tests across treatment conditions, showing that randomization was successful. I analyze the list experiment in various ways, including standard difference-in-means tests, regression-adjusted estimation of average treatment effects, and other multivariate statistical methods to analyze item counts and to exploit information provided by covariates to attempt to understand subgroup heterogeneity in the sample. Following Glynn (2013), Table D27 in the appendix shows the proportion of responses falling in each item count by control condition. There is some suggestion of possible design effects, whereby the presence of the sensitive item affects respondents' responses to control items; but difference-in-proportions tests show no significant differences across treatment groups, and Blair and Imai's (2012) likelihood-ratio test for design effects (Table D28) in their "list" statistical package fails to reject the null hypothesis of no design effect (Bonferroni-corrected p-value = 0.43).

[38] The standard deviation among baseline respondents was 0.73.

	(1) Full Sample	(2) Full Sample	(3) Full Sample	(4) At Least 1	(5) At Least 1	(6) At Least 1
Treatment	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education		-0.01	-0.01		-0.05	-0.06
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Age		-0.15*	-0.14*		-0.02	-0.03
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Female		-0.20*	-0.21*		-0.12+	-0.13+
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Income		0.13*	0.10*		0.05	0.05
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Brown ID		0.09	0.08		0.06	0.06
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Black ID		0.02	0.03		0.05	0.09
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Skin tone		-0.05	-0.03		-0.02	0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Recife			-0.20*			-0.07
			(0.05)			(0.08)
Constant	0.54*	1.23*	1.24*	1.30*	1.50*	1.52*
	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Hair type FX	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
N	950	857	857	389	354	354
R^2	0.000	0.126	0.148	0.000	0.021	0.039

Table 5.12 Regression-Adjusted Estimated Treatment Effects. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 5.8 presents mean values of respondents' reported item counts across treatment and control groups. The left panel shows mean values for the full sample of respondents, with a slight difference of -0.01 items in the treatment group (T-test p-value = 0.76). The mean count for both groups is just above 0.5, which is rather low given the inclusion of a high-prevalence item. Indeed, roughly 59 percent of the sample reported having participated in zero activities on the list. Such a high rate of non-participation raises concerns over prevalence of satisficing and/or non-response bias in the sample. Following Glynn (2013), I attempt to mitigate this bias in the sample by



Figure 5.9 Estimated Treatment Effects by Level of Education. Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals.

restricting the analysis to those respondents who reported participation in at least one activity. The comparison of means in this subsample is displayed in the righthand panel. This analysis also reveals no difference in the estimated mean number of activities participated in across treatment groups. The estimated difference is 0.02 (T-test p-value = 0.70). Thus even accounting for potential satisficing and nonresponse bias, simple difference-of-means tests provide little evidence of this instrumental behavior.

Table 5.12 presents regression-adjusted estimates of treatment effects on both the full sample (Models 1-3) and removing responses of zero (Models 4-6). Adjusting for covariates adds little to no precision to the estimated treatment effects, which substantively remain close to zero. Appendix Table D30 also presents negative binomial estimates, which are more appropriate for analyzing item counts. These models estimate similar null effects.

The foregoing analyses focused on average treatment effects but do not consider heterogeneous treatment effects. As with the priming experiment, compelling evidence in favor of the instrumental hypothesis would be that individuals with higher levels of education respond affirmatively to the sensitive item. In the case of "fraud," one would



Figure 5.10 Estimated Treatment Effects by Respondent Skin Tone. Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals.

expect individuals of lighter skin tone to respond affirmative to the sensitive item. Appendix Tables D31 and D32 present full estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects by education and respondent skin tone. Figure 5.9 display average treatment effects by respondents' level of education for both the full sample and removing potential satisficers. These estimates provide no evidence of participation in the sensitive activity at any level of education.

Figure 5.10 presents similar estimates according to respondent skin tone. As with education, there is no evidence that respondents of lighter—or any—skin tone reveal participation in the sensitive activity. Removing potential satisficers, there is some movement among those with medium skin tone, though this fails to reach even marginal levels of statistical significance. The estimates are computed from simple interactive models without covariate adjustment, however full models in Appendix Tables D31 and D32 further confirm these null results.

Finally, I also analyze responses to the sensitive item by taking Imai (2011) and Blair and Imai's (2012) multivariate approach to list experiment analysis, estimating how the probability of answering affirmatively to the sensitive item varies according to

respondents' characteristics, as well as leveraging covariate information to more efficiently estimate the proportion of respondents who respond affirmatively. Given the particular concern for "fraud" in the use of university quotas, I estimate these probabilities according to various levels of educational attainment and respondent skin tone.

Because estimates from these models are difficult to interpret, I focus on the substantive findings on these analyses, though Appendix Table D33 presents full estimates from four models: linear and nonlinear least squares models, and constrained and unconstrained maximum likelihood models. All models assess the relationships between the covariates and the sensitive item. In only one model, the constrained maximum likelihood model, is the probability of affirmative response to the sensitive item estimated to vary significantly with covariates. This probability does not vary significantly according to gender, though this probability is estimated to diminish with respect to age and education. Darker skin tone is also negatively correlated with this probability, though this is only marginally significant and these estimates are not robust to alternative model specifications.

Figure 5.11 plots the predicted proportions of sample respondents who responded affirmatively that they have in the past manipulated their racial



Figure 5.11 Estimated Proportions of Respondents Responding Affirmatively to Sensitive Item

identifications to use affirmative action benefits. Predictions from each model are presented alongside a simple difference-in-means estimate. Three of five specifications, the difference-in-means and two linear models, estimate that no respondents in the sample responded affirmatively to the sensitive item. The maximum likelihood models, however, estimate small, but statistically significant, proportions of the sample responded affirmatively, roughly 8 percent in the constrained model and 4 percent in the unconstrained model.

Figure 5.11 estimates average proportions for the sample as a whole, which again may obscure conditionalities of affirmative response according to respondents' characteristics. Figure 5.12 displays estimates of these proportions according to respondents' levels of education. As with the sample averages, linear specifications estimate no significant proportion of the sample responded affirmative at any level education. Maximum likelihood models, however, do identify these responses and some variation by education. The constrained model in particular, finds sizable proportions of



Figure 5.12 Estimated Proportions of Affirmative Responses by Level of Education

the lesser educated, 19 percent and 11 percent of those without and with primary education, respectively, reported having manipulated their racial identifications for the use of racial quotas, compared to 6 percent of the high school-educated and no significant proportion of the university-educated. By contrast, the unconstrained model estimates a slight positive relationship between education and affirmative response, though these estimates are significantly smaller, if statistically significant. This model estimates that roughly 5 percent of the university-educated responded affirmatively to the sensitive item, compared to 2 percent of those without primary education.

Figure 5.13 computes these estimates according to respondent skin tone. Again, linear models estimate no significant proportion of respondents responded affirmatively, regardless of skin tone. The constrained maximum likelihood model estimates that 13 percent of light-skinned respondents answered affirmatively, compared to 6 percent of medium-skinned respondents, and no significant proportion of dark-skinned respondents, responding affirmatively. The unconstrained model again



Figure 5.13 Estimated Proportions of Affirmative Responses by Respondent Skin Tone

produces smaller estimates, estimating between 3 percent (of light-skinned) and 5 percent (of dark-skinned) respondents responded affirmatively to the sensitive item.

The overall picture that emerges from analysis of the list experiment is unclear. There is evidence that respondents have, indeed, manipulated their racial identifications to take advantage of race-targeted affirmative action benefits. This evidence, however, is not robust to model specification, and simple difference-in-means calculations do not provide any such support. Moreover, the constrained maximum likelihood model provides evidence that lighter-skinned and better-educated respondents were most likely to respond affirmatively to the sensitive item; but this pattern is not borne out in any other specification.

Taken together, these two experiments appear to lend additional empirical support to the findings of Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto (2012, 2013, 2015). While there is some discernible evidence that individuals will act strategically to manipulate their racial identifications, questions remain regarding the prevalence and longevity of such change in racial identifications. For greater insight into such patterns, we turn to a final analysis of the racial identifications of Brazilian university applicants.

A Panel Analysis of University Applicants

It may be the case that the presence of affirmative action policies has little impact on racial identification in contexts such as a survey (or, by extension, the census), where respondents' anonymous responses are unlikely to result in any kind of material benefit. Yet the fluidity of racial boundaries in Brazil and the common reliance on self-declaration as the standard mode of racial measurement make it possible for savvy opportunists who wish to take advantage of affirmative action policies to manipulate their racial identifications in the short-term. The lack of evidence uncovered in the survey experiments, however, raises questions about the longevity of such a shift in

one's racial identification. If material incentives are indeed responsible for the patterns of reclassification apparent in the census, then opportunists must not only alter their identifications to use racial policies, but they must *remain* in a nonwhite category.

To examine these dynamics empirically, I rely on an original panel dataset of university applicants constructed *post hoc* from three independent databases held by the Brazilian Ministry of Education (MEC) and the Anísio Teixeira National Institute of Educational Study and Research (INEP). Inep carries out two censuses of all students enrolled in accredited educational institutions (public and private), a school census comprising primary and secondary schools (*censo escolar*) and a university census (*censo da educação superior*). In addition, Inep administers the Enem, the public university entrance exam, and collects microdata on all individuals who register for the exam. These three sources of data collecting identifying information that allows individual students to be matched across databases.[39] These three sources of data thus provide repeated observations of racial identifications at three key moments: first, when they are in high school, before they may see incentive in nonwhite identification; second, when they register for the university entrance exam, corresponding to the moment when nonwhite identification dis/qualifies one for race-targeted affirmative action; and third, after matriculating at university, after one no longer stands to gain from using racial quotas for university admission.

These data are uniquely positioned to shed light on the dynamics of racial identification surrounding university admissions in this context. If patterns of reclassification are due to opportunistic behavior, then we ought to observe an increase in nonwhite identification at the time of the university entrance exam that does not recede at later points in time. If there is no such increase, or the increases prove

[39] The construction of the panel dataset relied on access to students' masked CPFs (*cadastro pessoa física*), as well as two additional identifiers assigned internally by Inep. For more information on data availability and gaining access to protected data, see "Serviço de Acesso a Dados Protegidos" (2018).

temporary, then instrumental motivations struggle to account for enduring change in racial identifications.

To gain empirical leverage on these questions, I conduct a difference-in-difference analysis exploiting the implementation of the federal affirmative action law, passed in 2012 and implemented starting in 2013. Though state-level affirmative action laws (which apply only to universities administered by state governments) creating race- and means-targeted quotas in public university admissions began to be implemented in the early 2000s, the federal law was not passed until 2012 and implemented starting in 2013. Thus the implementation of the federal law can be exploited to estimate the causal effect of material incentives on the likelihood of racial identification.

The sample is constrained in several ways to allow for valid comparisons and estimates. First, because this analysis exploits the federal law, only students enrolled at federal universities (i.e., those who might benefit) are analyzed. Second, because of the presence of state affirmative action laws, only students enrolled in universities located in states that did not already have race-targeted affirmative action laws prior to the federal law are analyzed (see Appendix Table D34). Third, to create similarly sized and comparable groups, this analysis focuses on students enrolling in the three years before the passage (2010-2012) and the first three years of implementation (2013-2015) of the federal law. And finally, the sample is restricted to those individuals that could be identified in each of the three databases. This means that the sample is comprised exclusively of individuals who not only applied to federal universities, but who were also admitted and chose to enroll. Given the highly competitive nature of university admissions in Brazil, this sample is surely to differ from the general population. But the motivation of this difference-in-difference analysis is to compute an internally valid estimate of the causal effect of affirmative action policies on racial identification.

The resulting dataset contains 409,725 observations, comprised of 136,575 individuals whose racial identifications were observed at each time period. Within each time period (high school, the exam, and university), individuals' racial identifications were observed multiple times (in each year of high school, for example). For the sake of simplicity, these data were collapsed to create a balanced panel. Racial identifications were measured to generate liberal and conservative estimates of reclassifications: to compute a liberal estimate, individuals were coded as nonwhite (1) if they identified as black or brown at any point during each of the three time periods, and white if they identified consistently as white (0); to compute a conservative estimate, individuals were coded as white (0) if they identified as such at any point in the three time periods, and nonwhite (1) otherwise.

I estimate the effect of affirmative action policies on racial identification with a simple difference-in-difference regression framework of the form

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \cdot D_i + \zeta \cdot Time_t + \delta \cdot D_i \cdot Time_t + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

where D_i indicates the treatment of enrolling in university after the implementation of the federal law; where *Time* indicates the period of time in which the individuals' racial identification was observed; and where δ, the coefficient of interest, estimates the difference in the over-time difference in the probability of nonwhite identification. I estimate the differences for the university exam and in university separately, and in both cases relative to the probability of nonwhite identification in high school.

Random and fixed-effects model estimates, along with full difference estimates, can be found in Appendix Tables D35 and D37.[40] Substantive findings are presented in Figure 5.14, the left-hand panel of which shows the predicted probability of identifying as nonwhite at each time period and across treatment groups. First, there is a clear

[40] There are no substantive differences across fixed and random-effects models, nor for estimates of the liberal or conservative codings of racial identification. Estimates in Figure 5.14 are computed from random effects models based on the conservative coding of racial identification.



Figure 5.14 Predicted Probabilities and Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effect of Affirmative Action Policies on Racial Identification. The left-hand plot shows predicted probabilities of nonwhite identification in each time period across treatment groups. The right-hand panel plots the difference-in-difference estimates at the time of the university exam and in university.

increase in the probability of identifying as nonwhite at the time of the exam, relative to the probability in high school, as the instrumental hypothesis predicts. This is the case for both treatment and control groups, suggesting that the implementation of the federal affirmative action law, specifically, may not have had a considerable impact on the identifications of applicants residing in non-affirmative action states. This is perhaps due to the broader or more diffuse effects of prior affirmative action policies, which may have incentivized students residing in non-affirmative action states who might leave their home states for university. Second, there is a considerable decline in the probability of nonwhite identification after the period of the university exam. Indeed, it appears that a large majority of those individuals who reclassified at the time of the exam reverted back to white identification at university, that is, once nonwhite identification no longer served the objective of gaining admission. Again, this is the case both before and after the implementation of the federal law, with a potentially steeper decline before the federal law.

The right-hand panel plots the difference-in-difference estimates. This analysis estimates that the federal law had a negative effect of roughly 5 percentage points. It is clear from the left-hand panel, nonetheless, that there is a sizable increase in this probability prior to admissions, but there is not evidence that this law has further incentivized nonwhite identification in this way. On the other hand, for those enrolling after the implementation of the federal law, the analysis estimates a positive effect of roughly 3 percentage points on the probability of nonwhite identification at some point during university. Thus insofar as there is evidence to suggest that the federal affirmative action law has led to an increase in nonwhite identification, this appears to occur *after* one stands to gain materially from such identification.

Of course, the results from this analysis must be taken with a grain of salt seeing as the presence of prior state-level affirmative action laws makes it difficult to find a fully isolated control group for comparison. Limitations on the availability of data rule out any possibility of assessing the impact of the first affirmative policies in the early 2000s with these data. But this analysis is minimally sufficient for lending face validity to the instrumental hypothesis. Indeed, just as Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto found at the University of Brasília (2012, 2013; 2015), university applicants more broadly do manipulate their identifications prior to university admissions. But these forms of racial reclassification reflect the short-term strategies of savvy opportunists, who quickly revert in their identifications in pursuit of the benefits of whiteness. In sum, then, there is evidence that the instrumental hypothesis might explain some of the observed reclassification, but it leaves much to explain and struggles to account for enduring identity change.

Conclusion

This chapter has subjected the political identity and alternative hypotheses to empirical testing. The longitudinal analysis of birth cohorts provided strong support for the hypothesis that better educated Brazilians are most likely to reclassify toward blackness, in particular those occupying lower rungs of the class structure. By contrast, survey experimental evidence provided little to no support for the alternative hypotheses that such trends of reclassification were motivated by material incentives in the form of affirmative action policies, or by the symbolic shift in the state's posture toward the racial question. Finally, panel evidence struggles to account for enduring identity change.

There is no denying, of course, the broader significance of these institutional and discursive changes in the Brazilian state, brought about in no small part by the militancy and tireless efforts of black movement activists. Yet while it was clear that these efforts have affected the behavior state elites, the impact of these shifts on the racial identifications and commonsense of everyday citizens had yet to be subject to systematic empirical test. These findings, then, raise questions regarding the extent to which the state's racial posture directly shapes individuals' racial identifications, and how readily everyday citizens will adhere to the understandings of race espoused by the state. As Robin Sheriff (2001) found in her ethnography of a Rio de Janeiro favela, on the ground individuals' racial worldviews can differ strikingly from the state's master narrative, at that time defined by the myth of racial democracy. Yet Sheriff's point may well stand regardless of whether scholars agree with, or see as normatively preferable, the state's newly adopted posture of racial recognition and inclusion.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the longitudinal analysis sought, to an extent, to decontextualize the patterns of racial reclassification in order to isolate and test the effect of greater educational attainment. But this analysis nonetheless makes clear how

the unprecedented access to high school and university education for Brazil's lower classes can have induced this sudden reversal in microlevel patterns of reclassification and, by extension, the macro-level shift in Brazil's racial composition. As the decades of the 1990s and 2000s introduced a number of major institutional reforms to Brazil's constitution, its franchise, and the accessibility of educational and other social benefits, lower-class citizens, those most likely to reclassify with greater educational attainment, gained unprecedented access to secondary and university education. Assuming and articulating these racial identities as *political* identities is one way, I argue, in which these newly conscious citizens exercise voice, that is, their civil and political citizenship rights. In the following chapter, we turn to the consequences of these newly formed political identities in shaping the exercise of citizenship and political engagement.

CHAPTER SIX

CONSCIOUS CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Previous chapters of this dissertation established educational expansion as the driving force of recent patterns of reclassification toward blackness, and explored the mechanisms through which education impacts political consciousness and reclassification. This final empirical chapter draws on original survey data designed to tap into these racialized political identities in order to test the relationship between political consciousness, racial identification, and reclassification, as well as to explore the consequences of these political identities for political engagement. These original microlevel data enable several systematic and empirical tests of propositions suggested or alluded to in earlier chapters, but for which second-hand data did not allow direct testing. This final chapter, then, aims to establish more systematically and precisely the consequences of this political identity formation for patterns of racial identification in Brazil, as well as its consequences for political engagement and the exercise of citizenship.

Measuring Political Identity

Central to the conceptualization of political identity elaborated in Chapter 2 is heterogeneity among members of a social category, in particular in the extent to which this social membership shapes their understandings of power relationships between racial "groups." Central to this analysis is the conceptual distinction between political identity and identification: whereas an individual may identify with a group (or classify oneself in a category) out of some awareness of membership, political identity refers to an affirmed attachment to a social group that shapes one's understanding of power. Because individuals vary in the extent to which any one social membership constitutes

a political identity, more individuals will consider themselves members of a given racial category than there are category members with a political identity rooted in that membership. Thus while it may seem obvious that identifications reflect political identities, the goal of this analysis is to test empirically and systematically the extent to which nonwhite, and in particular black, identification reflects individuals' racialized political attitudes and worldviews.

To tap into this variation empirically, I employed a battery of survey items designed to probe respondents' beliefs about the degree to which members of their racial group suffer from various asymmetries of power between groups. These survey items were developed first and foremost from insights gleaned from the qualitative interviews presented in the Chapter 4. The survey items were designed to include classic questions regarding group consciousness, like Dawson's (1995) linked-fate survey item (Item 5), and social identity (Item 4), as well as more specific views regarding the fair distribution of opportunities and resources, the prevalence of racism in Brazilian society, as well as the personal importance respondents place in their own race (or color). This battery was pre-tested on a convenience sample of university students at the Federal University of Pernambuco in Recife in June 2017. More information on the survey itself is provided in Appendix E.

Table 6.1 below presents the battery of ten questions revolving around the key issues that interviewees cited as legitimating their racial consciousness. Respondents were read each of the statements in the battery, and asked to describe their level of agreement with each statement using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. These survey items were pre-tested in using both quantitative and qualitative interviews to ensure that even individuals who did not exhibit high levels of political consciousness would understand the content of each survey item, and could confidently respond affirmatively or not.

Num.	Survey Item
1	I think that my color is an important part of who I am.
2	I think that my color affects my opportunities to get a good job.
3	I think that people with my color have the same opportunities in life as people of another color.
4	I feel more comfortable [when I am] with people of my color.
5	To the extent things get better for people of my color in general, I think that things will get better for me.
6	I think that people should be more aware of their color.
7	My color influences my political opinions.
8	I think that Brazilians should take color into account when they organize politically. (For example, social movements, political parties, etc.)
9	I think that racism is a serious problem in Brazilian society.
10	In my life, I have suffered racism because of my color.

Table 6.1 Survey Items for Political Identity Index

Because many Brazilians often discuss race and employ racial terminology in terms of "color" rather than "race," I conformed to this usage in the wording of these survey items. This is done primarily to ensure that individuals with low levels of racialized political identity, for whom the word "race" might not make sense, could respond without confusion. On the other hand, for individuals with high levels of political identity, speaking in terms of "color" will probably be equally likely to cue and carry the same meaning as the word "race," even if they take objection to avoidance of the word "race." Finally, these items were also worded in such a way that the measure of political identity could apply to all respondents, regardless of skin tone or any particular racial identification.

Respondents' responses to these ten items were averaged to create a continuous summary measure of "political identity," which ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 5 strong agreement with the survey items on average.[41] Figure 6.1 presents a histogram of political identity in the sample, showing a relatively normal distribution around a mean of 3.02. In the analyses that follow, I will employ this measure of political identity as an independent variable to assess whether within-group variation in political consciousness systematically explains patterns of racial

[41] Responses to Item 3 were flipped, since disagreement indicates greater belief in disadvantage by power asymmetry.

identification, and whether this consciousness carries broader consequences for political engagement.

Political Identity and Racial Identification

In Chapter 2, I elaborated the theoretical expectation that reclassification toward blackness, and black identification in particular, are functions of racialized political identity – that is, a racialized understanding of power relationships between groups[42] that is shaped by "race." The implication of the hypothesis is simple: individuals that exhibit high levels of political identity ought be more likely to assume nonwhite, and particularly black, identities, above and beyond the physical attributes commonly believed to determine one's racial identification. This reflects the idea that self-classification in the stigmatized black category, in particular, is an articulation of the individual's race-based understanding of power. The political identity index is central to the direct and empirical testing of this proposition. But in keeping with the racial measurement employed by Telles (2014) and colleagues, the survey collected several



Figure 6.1 Distribution of Racialized Political Identity among Respondents

[42] The "groups" and group boundaries are left unspecified, allowing this to be interpreted by survey respondents.

different forms of racial identification and classification, including respondents' self-identifications and interviewer-based classifications of the respondent, and collected less ambiguous measures of physical attributes (based on the interviewer's evaluation): the respondents' hair type, which is known to affect racial identification; and skin tone, based on the 11-point color palette employed in the PERLA survey. This multidimensional approach to measuring race not only allows for richer analyses, but will also help to separate the effects of political identity, per se, by controlling for physical attributes commonly believed to determine one's racial category of membership, even though phenotype is not the sole determinant of racial identification.

Additionally, employing multiple measures of physical attributes also allow for additional tests of the instrumental hypothesis by providing some indication of whose identifications have been in flux in these recent period, that is, what reclassifiers "look like" in this random sample. Are lighter-skinned Brazilians the most likely to opt for darker categories, in the presence of affirmative action benefits? Or are medium- and darker-skinned Brazilians, the traditional candidates for "whitening," the most affected? The analyses that follow further dispel the notion that recent tendencies toward blackness are simply the products of "fraudulent" or opportunistic behavior on the part of lighter-skinned Brazilians, as journalistic accounts and critics might lead one to believe.

I proceed through these analyses in three stages. First, I analyze binary racial identification, distinguishing between white and nonwhite classification in the official census categories. Second, I analyze trichotomous racial identification in white, brown, or black categories, including the close-ended census categories and open-ended racial identifications. Finally, I systematically analyze mismatch in respondents' self-classifications and how they were classified by survey interviewers, and self-reported reclassification. While the analyses presented here are similar to those that have

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Education	-0.10	0.18*	0.19*	0.19+	0.19+	0.18+	0.21+
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Skin Tone		2.68*	2.42*	2.44*	2.44*	2.45*	2.43*
		(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Income				-0.27*	-0.27*	-0.25+	-0.27+
				(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Age				-0.19*	-0.19*	-0.19*	-0.27*
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Female				-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	-0.27
				(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)
Recife					0.01	0.05	0.13
					(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.24)
PT/Lula Partisan						0.10	
						(0.48)	
Other Partisan						-0.11	
						(0.63)	
Ideological Conservatism							-0.22*
							(0.11)
Constant	1.05*	-3.83*	-3.86*	-2.79*	-2.79*	-2.83*	-2.60*
	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.59)
Hair type FX	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	942	942	942	864	864	857	679
AIC	1171.12	790.52	780.65	709.52	711.52	705.62	560.74

Table 6.2 Effects of Education on Nonwhite Identification. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses. DV = 1 (nonwhite) or 0 (white). Skin tone = light (1), medium (2), and dark (3). PT and Other Partisans are estimated relative to the baseline category of nonpartisans (the overwhelming majority of the sample). Ideological conservatism captures self-placement on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 (far left) to 2 (far right).

appeared in previous sociological scholarship,[43] this analysis is the first to include a direct and multidimensional measure of political identity, allowing the study to move beyond estimating purely socioeconomic correlates, and to center political worldviews as determinants of racial identification in Brazil and Latin America.

[43] E.g., (Bailey 2009; Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; Bailey and Telles 2006; Harris et al. 1993; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012; Mitchell-Walthour 2018; Mitchell-Walthour and Darity 2014; N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004, 2014; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998; E. E. Telles and Paschel 2014).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Education x Pol. Ident.						0.35*
						(0.17)
Pol. Ident.	1.29*	1.30*	0.50*	0.52*	0.50*	-0.43
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.47)
Education		0.02	0.21*	0.21*	0.25*	-0.81
		(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.49)
Skin Tone			2.33*	2.34*	2.32*	2.35*
			(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)
Income			-0.24+	-0.21	-0.24+	-0.23+
			(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Age			-0.20*	-0.20*	-0.29*	-0.20*
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Female			-0.09	-0.08	-0.28	-0.10
			(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Recife			-0.04	0.00	0.09	-0.00
			(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.21)
PT/Lula Partisan				0.03		
				(0.49)		
Other Partisan				-0.22		
				(0.62)		
Ideological Conservatism					-0.19+	
					(0.11)	
Constant	-2.98*	-3.08*	-4.09*	-4.21*	-3.91*	-1.42
	(0.41)	(0.50)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.86)	(1.44)
Hair Type FX	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	925.00	925.00	851.00	844.00	672.00	851.00
AIC	1047.82	1049.70	698.26	691.86	552.30	695.78

Table 6.3 Effects of Political Identity on Nonwhite Identification. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses. DV = 1 (black or brown) or 0 (white).

The White-Nonwhite Divide

The Brazilian context is known for the complexity of racial identification beyond the white/nonwhite divide. Nonetheless, analyzing nonwhite identification in dichotomous terms helps to establish the link between political identity and the growing tendency to identify as nonwhite that is apparent in the census data. Table 6.2 presents logistic regression models estimating identification in either black or brown census

categories, relative to white identification, first focusing on the effects of education.

Model 1 is a bivariate analysis estimating the average effect of education on nonwhite ID. The effect is estimated to be negative on average, reflecting racial inequalities in education, but it is not statistically significant. Model 2 includes a control for skin tone, which correlates strongly with nonwhite ID. Once we control for skin tone, education becomes a positive and significant correlate of nonwhite ID. Models 3 to 5 additively include controls for hair type, income, age, gender, and survey-city. Education remains a positive correlate of nonwhite ID and the effect falls just shy of conventional significance ($p = .054$). This remains the case in models 6 and 7, which add controls for partisanship and political ideology, suggesting that education affects racial identification independent of other political attachments or ideational factors that might affect one's political consciousness.

Table 6.3 repeats this analysis and includes the continuous measure of political identity. Bivariate analysis in Model 1 shows that political identity correlates with nonwhite ID, and Model 2 shows this correlation is robust to a control for education. Model 3 includes controls for skin tone, hair texture, and other covariates. The size of the estimated effect of political identity decreases substantially once these controls are added, though the effect remains significant, and is twice the size of the average effect of education. Partisanship does not correlate with nonwhite ID (Model 4), though ideological conservatism is negatively correlated (model 5).

Model 5 estimates on average that a one-unit increase in political identity is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of nonwhite ID ($p < .05$). Model 6 tests for any conditional effects of political identity by level of education by interacting the two variables. The interaction term is statistically significant and positive. Figure 6.2 plots the conditional effects, showing the average marginal effect



Figure 6.2 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Pr(Nonwhite ID) by Level of Education. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals.

of a one-unit increase in political identity at each level of education. The model reveals a monotonic interaction: the effect of political identity increases as education increases. But increases in political identity are statistically distinguishable from 0 only among the high school and university-educated, by 7 and 11 percentage points, respectively (see Appendix Table E3 for difference tests). Analysis of respondents' identifications as either white or nonwhite, therefore, reveals a significant correlation between greater political identity and nonwhite identification, in particular among the highly educated.

White, Brown, and Black Identification

To gain a finer-grained understanding of how education and political identity shape racial identification in each of the three major census categories, I also estimate the effects of education and political identity on self-classification in each of the three census categories using multinomial logistic regression. Full estimates from these models can be found in Appendix Table E4. Substantive findings from this analysis are presented in Figure 6.3.



Figure 6.3 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Pr(Racial ID) by Level of Education. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals.

These models bear out a similar trend. Relative to brown identification and once controlling to skin tone, better educated Brazilians are significantly less likely to self-identify as white, though they are not necessarily more likely to self-identify as black. Political identity, however, is significantly correlated with both white and black identification: individuals with greater levels of political identity are significantly less likely to self-classify as white, and significantly more likely to self-classify as black, even controlling for skin tone, hair type, education, income, age, gender, and survey-city (model 4). On average, a one-unit increase in political identity decreases the probability of white identification by 6 percentage points ($p < .01$) and increases the probability of black identification by 8 percentage points ($p < .001$), with a statistically insignificant negative effect of 2 percentage points on brown identification.

I similarly test for conditional effects by interacting political identity with education (model 5), as well as skin tone (model 6). The conditional effects of political identity vary significantly with education. Estimated marginal effects from this Model 5 are presented in Figure 6.3, which shows the average effect of a one-unit increase of political identity on the probability of identification with each category by level of education. The figure reveals that the effect of political identity on white identification decreases significantly as education increases. Racially and politically conscious Brazilians with high school or university educations are significantly less likely to identify as white, even controlling for physical attributes. Political identity appears to have no discernible effect on brown identification, though there is suggestion of an increase in the effect of political identity with greater education. Finally, there is no conditional effect of political identity on black identification: at all education levels, individuals with greater levels of racialized political consciousness are significantly more likely to self-identify as black (see Appendix Table E5 for difference tests).

One lingering question is whether individuals affected are those that might meet conventional understandings of blackness, or if those whose racial identifications are in



Figure 6.4 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Pr(Racial ID) by Respondent Skin Tone. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals.

flux are instead lighter-skinned respondents who might be strategically manipulating their identifications. Thus model 6 interacts political identity with skin tone to test for heterogeneity that might suggest instrumental manipulations on the part of lighter-skinned respondents. The interaction between political identity and skin tone itself is not significant in model 6, though the marginal effects reveal some heterogeneity. Figure 3 plots the estimated marginal effect of political identity by respondent skin tone. Inconsistent with this hypothesis, however, is that there is no discernible effect among lighter-skinned respondents on the probability of identification. Indeed, the estimated effect on black identification is precise, and estimated to be zero. On the other hand, respondents of medium skin tone are less likely to identity as white, no more or less likely to identify as brown, and more likely to identify as black. Dark-skinned respondents are less likely to identify as brown, and more likely to identify as black. Thus to the extent that there is heterogeneity in these effect by skin tone, light-skinned respondents show little to no fluctuation in their racial identifications; political identity leads medium-toned respondents (the racially ambiguous) to resist white identification, and encourages black identification; and dark-skinned respondents are less likely to identify as brown, and more likely to identify as black.

Open-Ended Identification

Analysis of open-ended racial identifications offers a final robustness check. A common critique of analyses of racial identifications is that everyday forms of racial identification depart from the terminology employed on the census, and thus does not accurately capture individuals' sincere self-understandings (Harris et al. 1993; E. E. Telles 2004). Thus I code and analyze respondents' open-ended racial identifications. Before self-classifying in the official census categories, respondents were asked: "In regard to your color or race, how do you identify?" Appendix Table E6 displays the

full list of responses, as well as how they were recoded for quantitative analysis. In sum, responses were recoded into three categories: 1) a category for respondents who responded "white" or with a similar euphemism (light, blond, etc.); 2) a category for mixed-race or brown, or with similar euphemisms (*moreno*, etc.); 3) and finally, a category for individuals who identify explicitly—and exclusively—as either *negro* or *preto*, both of which are associated with racial consciousness and depart from the euphemisms commonly employed among individuals who might otherwise avoid black identification.

Complete estimates from the multinomial logit analyses are presented in Appendix Table E7. In sum, these models corroborate the findings from analyses of the census categories. Education inconsistently predicts racial identification, but is estimated to have a negative effect on white identification and a positive effect on black identification. Political identity, by contrast, is consistently and significantly correlated with open-ended black identification. In a model with all controls, a one-unit increase in political identity is estimated to decrease identification with a white euphemism by 5 percentage points ($p < .05$); has no discernible effect of identification with mixed-race euphemisms; and increases identification as black by 9 percentage points ($p < .001$).



Figure 6.5 Average Marginal Effects of Political Identity on Pr(Identification) by Level of Education. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 4 presents average marginal effects of political identity by level of education, computed from a model interacting political identity and education, including all controls. These results bear out the same pattern: political identity is estimated to decrease white identification among the higher educated, has no discernible effect on brown identification, and increase the probability of black identification regardless of education level.

Analysis of respondents' racial identifications relying on this original operationalization of political identity thus paints a clear picture of how political identity shapes racial identifications. Individuals who indicate high level of a racialized political consciousness are significantly more likely to claim black identities. Once we control for physical attributes, it becomes clear that better educated respondents, in particular, demonstrate a clear tendency to resist whitening and identify in darker racial categories.

Classification Mismatch

Political identity informs not only self-classification, but also sheds light on the mismatch in individuals' classifications when they classify themselves, compared to how they are classified by survey interviewers. Systematic analysis of category mismatch thus provides an additional opportunity to understand the political nature of racial identifications as well as the nature of the flux in those identifications in Brazil.

In Chapter 2, I presented a cross-tabulation of these classifications to emphasize the tendency for Brazilians to self-whiten. Table 6.4 above presents the same cross-tabulation computed from these survey data. Unlike the previous cross-tabulation, which showed an unmistakable tendency to self-whiten, the mismatch in racial classifications is more balanced in this case, for two reasons. First, these data were collected roughly sixteen years after the earlier survey data, and thus in a context in which significant reclassification toward blackness had already occurred. Second, the

Political Identity Survey was designed to test hypotheses related to reclassification and political identity formation, and thus oversampled darker-skinned Brazilians with higher levels of education. The result is a picture of category mismatch that is more useful for systematically analyzing patterns of classification, rather than for generalizing, in a strict sense, to the overall Brazilian population.

I analyze category mismatch by coding respondents according to whether they self classify in a category lighter than that ascribed to them (1), in the same category ascribed to them (2), or in a darker category than that ascribed to them (3). With reference to Table 6.4, individuals located in cells below the diagonal are coded as "lighter;" individuals in cells on the diagonal are coded as "matched;" and individuals in cells above the diagonal are coded as "darker." Roughly 10 percent of respondents in this sample self-whitened, 69 percent matched, and nearly 21 percent self-darkened. I analyze these patterns using multinomial logistic regression. In these analyses, the measures of respondent skin tone control for potential floor and ceiling effects in the likelihood of mismatch.

Full model estimates can be found in Appendix Table E8. Figure 6 presents predicted probabilities of each outcome by level of political identity. Clear in these analyses is the association between political identity and the tendency to opt for darker racial categories. Moving from the lowest to the highest position of political identity decreases the probability of opting for a lighter category by 24 percentage points, from 27 percent to 3 percent ($p < .01$). The same increase in political identity increases the

		Respondents' Self-Classifications			
		White	Brown	Black	Total
Respondents as	White	26.23	12.79	1.07	40.09
Classified by	Brown	4.80	28.46	6.93	40.19
Interviewer	Black	0.21	4.90	14.61	19.72
	Total	31.24	46.16	22.60	100%

Table 6.4 Comparing Self-Classifications to Ascribed Classifications

probability of opting for a darker category by 34 percentage points ($p < .001$), from 8 percent to 42 percent. The association between political identity and category match is less clear. Imprecise estimates and high and low levels make it difficult to discern a clear trend. There is some suggestion that the likelihood of category mismatch is negatively correlated with political identity, though this is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, this analysis sheds light on patterns of reclassification by providing systematic evidence that racialized political identity can lead individuals to not only avoid opting for lighter identification, but to lead one to opt for darker identification – a practice that suggests that such behavior underlies the apparent and growing tendency to reclassify toward blackness in the census.

Reclassification

Finally, I conclude the analysis of racial identification by considering the effects of political identity on self-reported racial reclassification. Of course, this measure of reclassification is imperfect, as it relies on individuals to be aware of changes in their racial identifications and to reveal any decision to change how they identify in racial terms. This is not always reliably the case: many individuals, for example, are unsure



Figure 6.6 Predicted Probability of (Mis)Match in Classification by Level of Political Identity.

how they are classified on their birth certificates, or how they were classified as children by their parents. This self-reporting, however, can be seen as a conservative measure of reclassification, one that provides an additional opportunity to test the effects of education and political consciousness on shifting patterns of racial identification. Analysis of reported reclassification also provides additional opportunities to probe for evidence of strategic manipulation of racial identification, as well as if and how usage of recently implemented educational programs has effected individuals' identifications.

To capture reclassification, respondents were first asked for their racial identifications using an open-ended question and a close-ended census question. Following the close-ended census question, respondents were then asked: "Have you always classified yourself in this category, or did you previously classify yourself in another?" Respondents who reported always classifying themselves in the same category—stable identifiers—were coded 0, and those who reported previously classifying in a different category were coded 1. Roughly 13 percent of respondents reported themselves to be reclassifiers.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pol. Ident.	0.40*		0.50*	0.42*	0.41*	0.39+
	(0.16)		(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Education		0.23*	0.29*	0.32*	0.31*	0.35*
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Skin tone			0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00
			(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Income				0.07	0.09	0.04
				(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age				0.05	0.05	0.06
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Female				-0.12	-0.12	-0.14
				(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Recife				0.10	0.10	0.18
				(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.25)
PT/Lula Partisan					0.43	
					(0.41)	
Other Partisan					0.15	
					(0.67)	
Ideology						-0.01
						(0.12)
Constant	-3.14*	-2.54*	-4.27*	-4.61*	-4.53*	-4.49*
	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.64)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.88)
Hair type FX	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	966	983	966	885	877	695
AIC	742.21	753.45	735.78	675.40	676.09	552.95

Table 6.5 Effects of Political Identity on Reclassification. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6.5 presents estimates from logit models of reclassification. Political identity is a robust and positive correlate of reclassification, including in a bivariate regression (model 1), as well as after controlling for education and skin tone (model 3), and other basic controls (model 4). Education is also a robust and positive correlate of reclassification (models 2-4). Models 5 and 6 include controls for partisanship and political ideology, respectively, neither of which correlates significantly with reclassification. Average marginal effects computed from model 4 estimate that a one-unit increase in political identity increases the probability of reclassification by 5

percentage points ($p < .05$). Moving from the lowest to highest levels of political identity increases this probability from 6 to 24 percent. Similarly, a one-unit increase in education increases this probability by 3 percentage points ($p < .01$), and moving from less than primary education to university education increases the probability from 8 to 18 percent.

Table 6.6 presents estimates of the association between social program usage—namely, of recently created educational policies designed to expand access to university education—and the likelihood of reclassification. Program usage was captured through self-reporting, asking respondents whether or not they had ever received, used, or taken part in any of the following programs: the civil servant exam for public sector jobs (*concurso público*), a private university entrance exam (*vestibular*), the public university entrance exam (Enem), federally funded financial aid to attend a private university (Fies), or the federally funded scholarship program for private university tuition (ProUni). Models 1 through 5 add one of these at a time to estimate the association between program usage and reclassification. Usage of the three public educational policies correlate positively and significant with reclassification. The civil servant exam, which at times includes racial quotas, and the private university entrance exam, do not correlate with reclassification. Model 6 estimates the usage of at least 1 of these programs on reclassification. This is positively correlated and statistically significant. Usage of at least one educational program is estimated to increase the probability of reclassification by 8 percentage points ($p < .05$), from 9 to 17 percent.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political Identity	0.43*	0.42*	0.41*	0.43*	0.38+	0.42*	0.42*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Education	0.27*	0.26*	0.25*	0.26*	0.27*	0.14	0.15
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Skin tone	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.06	-0.24
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Income	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.04	0.04
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Female	-0.13	-0.10	-0.13	-0.14	-0.10	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Recife	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.09
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Civil Servant Exam	0.37						
	(0.24)						
Vestibular (Private Exam)		0.33					
		(0.28)					
Enem (Public Exam)			0.48*				
			(0.24)				
Fies (Financial Aid)				0.91*			
				(0.39)			
ProUni (Scholarship)					0.81*		
					(0.37)		
Program usage (at least 1)						0.75*	-0.21
						(0.26)	(0.59)
Program usage x skin tone							0.51+
							(0.29)
Constant	-4.54*	-4.53*	-4.66*	-4.51*	-4.44*	-4.59*	-4.02*
	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.84)
Hairy Type FX	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	885	885	885	881	882	885	885
AIC	675.19	675.98	673.57	668.79	672.39	668.82	667.66

Table 6.6 Effects of Educational Program Usage on Reclassification. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses

Because it is through these social programs that many affirmative action policies are implemented, model 7 interacts program usage with skin tone to test for heterogeneity in the effects of usage on reclassification. If "fraud" were indeed the cause of reclassification, then finding that lighter-skinned respondents are most likely to reclassify would provide suggestive evidence for this hypothesis. Model 7 estimates a positive and marginally significant interaction between program usage and darker skin tone. Figure 6.7 plots the average marginal effect of using at least 1 program according to respondent skin tone. The model estimates no discernible effect among light-skinned respondents, but substantively and statistically significant effects among medium and dark-skinned respondents. Program usage increases the probability of reclassification by 9 percentage points for medium-toned respondents and 15 percentage points for dark-skinned respondents. Thus usage of the social programs that include affirmative action does appear to increase the probability of reclassification. But it is among candidates for "whitening" that these policies appear to have this affect, rather than among the allegedly opportunistic or "fraudulent."



Figure 6.7 Average Marginal Effect of Education Program Usage on Reclassification by Respondent Skin Tone

Political Identity and Political Engagement

Clear from these analyses is the robust relationship between political identity and racial identification and reclassification. But what are the broader consequences of these racialized political identities? In this final section, I aim to show that these recent patterns of racial identification indicate not only a growing political meaning that individuals are attributing to their racial identities, but also how these newly formed political identities, in turn, shape forms of political participation and engagement. Not only are the racially and politically conscious more like to confront and challenge racial hierarchies by claiming and articulating black identities. But they are significantly more likely to take participate in and take an interest in politics, seek to remain politically informed, and hold themselves in positive regard as democratic citizens. In sum, the development of racialized political identities has not only altered racial identifications in Brazil; it has enhanced the very exercise of citizenship.

Civic Participation

To first examine the consequences for political engagement, I examine the relationship between political identity and popular forms of civic participation in Brazil. Civic participation is a fruitful avenue to consider the broader political consequences of political identity formation because Brazil has long boasted a vibrant civil society with formal and informal venues where marginal citizens might actively exercise voice, articulate grievances, and pursue or search for representation outside of the formal channels of electoral politics. Indeed, Brazil's electoral arena is notoriously difficult to navigate, even for seasoned and well-informed voters; the party system is fragmented, historically volatile, and clientelistic (Mainwaring 1999); partisanship is notoriously weak (D. Samuels 2006), voting is compulsory and enforced, and electoral institutions are said to promote personalism and charismatic campaigns, rather than clear or

sustained forms of programmatic representation (Ames, Baker, and Rennó 2008); political parties are largely seen as vehicles for self-interested elites, and by and large disarticulate social differences that might otherwise underpin programmatic or constituency-based representation in electoral politics (Hagopian 1996).

Civic participation in Brazil thus constitutes a real and meaningful alternative to electoral forms of political participation. Social movements, in particular, have played important roles in processes of democratization (Alvarez 1990; Keck 1992) and constitution-writing (Garay 2016), and actively confronted durable inequalities in the distribution of land, for example (Wolford 2010). Race-based activism, moreover, appears to be on the rise (Caldwell 2007; Paschel 2016; Perry 2013; Smith 2016). Thus civic participation offers great potential insight for thinking about the ways in which political identity "matters" for politics. What I aim to show in these analyses is that individuals with greater levels of political identity are also more likely to exercise their civic and political citizenship rights by pursuing new forms of representation and new venues in which to voice grievances and pursue interests.

To conduct these analyses, I am relying on survey items that asked respondents whether they participated in the following activities in the year prior to the survey: social movements, in general; the black movement, in particular; unions; NGOs;

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Social Movement	1,000	0.06	0.24	0	1
Union	1,000	0.14	0.35	0	1
NGO	999	0.06	0.24	0	1
Neighborhood Assn.	1,000	0.10	0.29	0	1
Religious Assn.	999	0.25	0.43	0	1
Black Movement	1,000	0.04	0.19	0	1
Women	1,000	0.03	0.16	0	1
PTA	1,000	0.22	0.41	0	1
Political party	1,000	0.04	0.20	0	1
Seniors Assn.	1,000	0.05	0.22	0	1

Table 6.7 Summary Statistics of Civic Participation

neighborhood associations; religious organizations; women's groups and associations; parent-teacher associations; political parties; and senior citizens' groups. Respondents responding affirmatively were coded 1, and otherwise 0. Table 6.7 presents summary rates of participation in each of these civic activities. Overall, rates of participation are low. Religious groups are a clear exception, with a rate of participation at 25 percent. Parent-teacher associations are also high at 22 percent. Unions and neighborhood associations make up the next most common forms, and participation in women's groups is the least common form of civic participation. Similarly, only 4 percent of respondents reported having contact with the black movement.

To begin, I analyze individuals' propensities to participate in each individual activity using logistic regression. Table 6.8 presents estimates from these individual models, which adjust for education, skin tone, and standard controls. Point estimates for the effect of political identity on all forms of civic participation are positive, though not all are statistically significant. Political identity has a discernible positive association with participation in social movements, NGOs, neighborhood associations, religious organizations, and the black movement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, political identity has little to no effect on participation in parent-teacher associations and senior citizens' groups, nor unions, which are perhaps influenced more by one's age, parental status, or occupation. Political identity is not significantly associated with participation in women's groups, though this estimate is imprecise given the low rates of participation overall.

	Social movements (1)	Unions (2)	NGO (3)	Neighbor-hood assn. (4)	Religious org. (5)	Black Movement (6)	Women's Assn. (7)	PTA (8)	Political Party (9)	Senior Cit. Assn. (10)
Political Identity	0.78*	0.27	0.89*	0.44*	0.61*	1.15*	0.64	0.08	0.42	0.05
	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.31)
Education	0.20	0.19+	0.62*	0.02	-0.01	0.24	0.36+	0.10	0.20	0.32+
	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Skin tone	-0.22	0.06	0.03	0.01	-0.28*	0.45	-0.28	0.02	0.27	0.07
	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.14)	(0.31)	(0.27)
Income	0.31*	0.19+	0.30*	0.15	-0.13	0.36*	-0.05	-0.16	0.46*	-0.05
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.21)
Age	-0.20+	0.11+	0.14	-0.00	0.06	-0.12	0.19	0.19*	0.21+	0.71*
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Female	-0.52+	-0.47*	-0.82*	-0.37	-0.18	-0.51	0.99*	0.48*	-0.32	0.38
	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.37)	(0.49)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.34)
Recife	-0.44	-0.48*	-0.79*	0.12	-0.26	-0.08	-0.06	-0.18	0.85*	0.23
	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.18)	(0.44)	(0.36)
Constant	-4.35*	-3.37*	-7.44*	-3.57*	-2.49*	-8.42*	-7.82*	-3.00*	-7.23*	-7.93*
	(1.01)	(0.72)	(1.14)	(0.85)	(0.59)	(1.43)	(1.65)	(0.62)	(1.45)	(1.32)
Hair type FX	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	879	898	878	898	897	879	879	898	898	898
AIC	436.30	738.89	395.72	576.42	1002.85	283.03	235.83	935.83	288.85	333.29

Table 6.8 Effects of Political Identity on Participation in Civic Associations. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 8 plots the average marginal effect of a one-unit change in political identity on the probability of participating in each of these civic groups. Political identity is most strongly associated with religious associations, increasing the likelihood of participation by 11 percentage points. This may seem surprising, but according to John Burdick (1998a), religious groups are important sites for black mobilization and anti-racism in Brazil. Additionally, one-unit increases in political identity increase participation in social movements overall, in the black movement, in NGOs, and in neighborhood associations by roughly 5 percentage points. Of course, not all of these



Figure 6.8 Average Marginal Effect of Political Identity on Forms of Civic Participation (Models 1-10 in Table 6.8). Figure displays 90 percent confidence intervals.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Movement Part.	1,000	0.206	0.405	0	1
Civic Part.	1,000	0.503	0.500	0	1
Civic Part. (excl. relig.)	1,000	0.403	0.491	0	1
Num. Civic Assns.	1,000	0.978	1.393	0	10
Numb. Civic Assns. (excl relig.)	1,000	0.730	1.212	0	9

Table 6.9 Summary Statistics of Civic Participation Variables

estimates are statistically different from zero, but low rates of participation overall and dichotomous variables render estimation inefficient.

To compensate for this statistical inefficiency, I also estimate models of summary measures of civic participation: whether individuals participated in at least one social movement, union, the black movement, or women's group; at least one of any civic group; at least one group excluding religion; and the total number of civic associations, as well as a count measure excluding religion. Summary statistics for these measures are presented in Table 6.9. Roughly 20 percent of the sample reported contact with at least 1 social movement; nearly half takes part in at least one civic group; and on average respondents have at least one association with a civic group.

Table 6.10 presents estimates from these models. Models 1 through 3 are estimated with logistic regression and Models 4 and 5 are estimated as negative binomial models. These models estimate positive and significant correlations between political identity and civic participation overall. Political identity is associated with greater social movement participation in particular, as well as civic participation in general, even excluding religious associations. Models 4 and 5 also estimate positive effects of political identity on the number of associations. That is, individuals with higher levels of political identity are more likely to participate in not only one group, they are more likely to develop a greater number of civic associations.

	Soc. Mvmt. Assn. (At least 1) (1)	Civic Part. (At least 1) (2)	Civic Part. (Excl. Relig.) (3)	Numb. Civic Associations (4)	Numb. Civic Associations (Excl. Relig.) (5)
Political Identity	0.47*	0.47*	0.33*	0.36*	0.32*
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Education	0.17+	0.10	0.16*	0.12*	0.17*
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Skin Tone	0.04	-0.06	0.05	-0.04	0.01
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Income	0.13	0.04	0.10	0.06	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age	0.05	0.15*	0.15*	0.10*	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Female	-0.43*	-0.20	-0.18	-0.10	-0.08
	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Recife	-0.47*	-0.34*	-0.30*	-0.17+	-0.16
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Constant	-3.17*	-2.13*	-2.46*	-1.78*	-2.31*
	(0.62)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.34)	(0.39)
ln(alpha)				-0.22+	0.06
				(0.13)	(0.14)
Hair type FX	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	898	898	898	898	898
AIC	924.00	1227.75	1209.40	2473.58	2129.37

Table 6.10 Effects of Political Identity on Summary Measures of Civic Participation. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-3 are logit; models 4 and 5 are negative binomial models.

Figure 9 puts these estimates in substantive terms, plotting predicted probabilities of these summary measures by the level of political identity. The top-left panel shows the probability of participating in at least one civic activity. Moving from the lowest to highest level of political identity increases the probability of participating in at least one civic activity by 43 percentage points, from 29 percent to 72 percent. This effect remains strong even when excluding religious associations (top-right): the same increase in political identity increases the estimated probability by 30 percentage points, from 27 to 57 percent. The bottom-left panel shows a significant effect specifically on



Figure 6.9 Estimated Probabilities of Civic Participation by Level of Political Identity. Bars show predicted probabilities of each form of participation (models 1-3). The line shows the estimated number of civic associations at each level of political identity (model 4).

social movement participation as well: moving from the lowest to the highest level of political identity increases the probability of participation by 30 percentage points, from 10 to 40 percent. Political identity also significantly increases the number of civic associations, moving from less than 1 to 2 civic associations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Political Identity	0.18^{+} (0.10)		0.24* (0.10)	0.32* (0.11)	0.42* (0.11)
Education		0.12* (0.05)	0.16* (0.05)	0.15* (0.05)	0.21* (0.06)
Skin tone				-0.16^{+} (0.09)	-0.25* (0.10)
Income					0.07 (0.08)
Age					0.15* (0.04)
Female					-0.50* (0.12)
Recife					-0.24^{+} (0.13)
Constant	3.41* (0.30)	3.63* (0.15)	2.82* (0.36)	2.88* (0.36)	2.15* (0.43)
Hair type FX	N	N	N	N	Y
N	974	990	974	974	891
AIC	3912.28	3977.56	3905.31	3903.65	3536.49

Table 6.11 Adjusted Relationship between Political Identity and Political Interest. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Political Interest

Individuals with higher levels of political identity also demonstrate greater levels of political engagement through their interest in politics. In other words, these individuals may not only hold certain political beliefs or worldviews, but they may take additional measures to pay attention to political events and consume media to remain politically informed. To test this, I analyze the correlation between political identity and self-reported consumption of political media. Individuals were asked how often they pay attention to political news either on TV, the radio, newspapers, or on the internet. Respondents reported whether they did so 1) never, 2) rarely, 3) a few times per month, 4) a few times per week, 5) daily, or 6) multiple times per day. I use a summary measure of media consumption, taken as the average of the responses to these four forms of

media, as a proxy for political interest.

Table 6.11 displays OLS estimates from models of political interest. The bivariate analysis in Model 1 estimates a marginally significant and positive correlation between political identity and political interest. Model 2 estimates a positive and significant correlation between education and interest. The bivariate regression in Model 3 includes both variables and estimates a positive and significant effect of political identity. This relationship is estimated to be stronger in Model 4 once a control for skin tone is added. In this model, darker skin tone is negatively correlated with political interest ($p < .1$). Model 5 shows the correlation between political identity and interest is robust to the full set of controls. This model estimates that the effect of political identity is twice as large as that of education. Notably, respondents with darker skin tone and female respondents report significantly lower levels of political interest. Indeed, the coefficient estimated for female respondents is the largest in magnitude in this model.

Nonetheless, there is a consistent and robust correlation between political identity and political interest. Figure 6.10 displays the predicted probabilities of political



Figure 6.10 Predictions of Frequency of Political News Consumption (Political Interest) by Political Identity. Figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Estimates computed from Model 5.

Internal Efficacy
I have a good understanding of the country's most important political issues.
My opinions are valid, or at least as valid as others' opinions.
My political opinions are well informed.
When I talk with someone who has opinions different from mine, I feel capable of defending my opinions.
External Efficacy
People like me don't have an impact on the decisions of the government.
The people who govern the country aren't interested in what people like me think.

Table 6.12 Survey Measures of Political Efficacy

news consumption by level of political identity. The positive relationship is apparent. In substantive terms, moving from the lowest to the highest level of political identity increases one's location on the 6-point political interest scale 1.67 points, from consuming political news a few times per month (3.13) to consuming it almost daily (4.8).

Political Efficacy

Finally, I consider the relationship between political identity and political efficacy, that is, the individual's evaluation of her own political competence or effectiveness. Scholars distinguish between internal and external efficacy: internal efficacy refers to the individual's evaluation of their own competence to form and defend political views and opinions; external efficacy refers to the individual's evaluation of their impact on the decisions of the government and of the extent to which they are heard by political elites. Internal and external political efficacy, then, can be thought of as important consequences of both identity politicization and social policy, if indeed these factors lead individuals to have greater confidence to engage in politics, and to have greater faith in the responsiveness of the political system to their views.

As I detail in Chapter 4, one surprising finding during my fieldwork was the complexity of emotions surrounding the development of racial consciousness and political views that these individuals expressed. While individuals often sought to

challenge the stigma attached to blackness, they also reported the negative feelings that discussing past experiences with racism would drudge up. Moreover, they often expressed a pessimism regarding Brazil's political system – certainly not exclusive to the racially conscious – but one that appeared deepened by the political worldview that folks like them suffered from power asymmetries.

To test these insights, I construct measures of internal and external political efficacy, drawing on a battery of survey questions designed to probe individuals' attitudes toward their political competence and their influence on the government's decisions. Table 6.12 displays these questions. Internal efficacy questions were adapted from a battery of social psychological questions designed to probe self-esteem. External efficacy questions are the same employed on the American National Election Survey. Respondents were read each of these statements and asked to state the extent to which they agreed each statement applied to them using a 5-point Likert scale. Summary measures were constructed using simple averages, producing continuous measures between 1 and 5 of both internal and external efficacy. I analyze these summary measures with OLS.

I first turn to analysis of internal efficacy, models of which are presented in Table 6.13. Models 1 and 2 present univariate regressions of political identity and education on individuals' self-evaluations of their internal efficacy. Both variables are positively and significantly correlated. Model 3 includes a control for skin tone. Both effects are robust, though the substantive effect of political identity more than doubles. Darker skin tone, too, is negatively associated with internal efficacy. Model 4 includes all control variables and estimates positive and significant effects of both education and political identity. The model estimates a substantively small, but significant, average effect of political identity on respondents' internal political efficacy. These findings thus corroborate the insight that education and political identity are associated with greater

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political Identity	0.10*		0.22*	0.25*
	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Education		0.13*	0.14*	0.14*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Skin Tone			-0.12*	-0.13*
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Income				0.13*
				(0.03)
Age				0.05*
				(0.02)
Female				-0.21*
				(0.05)
Recife				-0.01
				(0.05)
Constant	2.92*	2.88*	2.42*	2.15*
	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Hair type FX	N	N	N	Y
N	973	989	973	891
AIC	2263.21	2282.61	2214.27	2007.20

Table 6.13 Effects of Political Identity on Internal Political Efficacy. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses.

levels of confidence in one's own political opinions and competency.

Table 6.14 presents models of external political efficacy. The univariate regression in Model 1 estimates a significant negative association between political identity and external efficacy. Model 2 estimates no effect of education. Model 3 includes the control for skin tone, which has little effect on the size or significance of the association with political identity. Unlike with internal efficacy, this model estimates no association between skin tone and external efficacy. Model 4 includes the full set of controls. The association with political identity, then, is robust and negative.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political Identity	-0.12*		-0.13*	-0.14*
	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.06)
Education		0.00	-0.00	0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Skin Tone			0.03	0.03
			(0.04)	(0.05)
Income				-0.08+
				(0.04)
Age				-0.02
				(0.02)
Female				-0.04
				(0.06)
Recife				0.03
				(0.07)
Constant	2.74*	2.39*	2.74*	2.86*
	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.22)
Hair Type FX	N	N	N	Y
N	982	999	982	898
AIC	2577.76	2640.65	2581.12	2386.75

Table 6.14 Effects of Political Identity on External Political Efficacy. + p < .1, * p < .05. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 6.11 plots predicted probabilities of respondents' average evaluations of internal and external political efficacy by their level of political identity. Moving from the lowest to the highest level of political identity increases internal efficacy by roughly 1 point on the Likert scale, from 2.7 to 3.7 on average. In substantive terms, this is equivalent to changing from a slightly negative evaluation to a near-positive evaluation of one's own political competence. The same substantive change in political identity, by contrast, decreases average external political efficacy by an estimated .58 points on the Likert scale, from 2.69 to 2.11. In substantive terms, this is equivalent to moving from a slightly negative to a decidedly negative evaluation of one's impact on the government's decisions and the ability to be heard by political elites.



Figure 6.11 Linear Predictions of Internal (Left) and External (Right) Political Efficacy by Level of Political Identity. Values of the y-axis correspond to average values on the 5-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates strong disagreement, 3 indicates indifference, and 5 indicates strong agreement.

The analysis of individuals' self-evaluations of their internal and external political efficacy bears out the expectations of the qualitative research, and paints a simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic picture of the effects of political identity on the nature of citizenship for these individuals. While confronting and challenging racial hierarchies appears associated with a greater tendency to hold one's own political competency in higher regard, it also brings about a skepticism regarding citizens' abilities to impact the decision-making and representativeness of the government.

Conclusion

This chapter has utilized original survey data to generate unique measures of racialized political identity and test its relationship to patterns of racial identification, reclassification, and various forms of civic and political engagement. The data paint a clear picture: not only does political identity lead individuals to challenge racial hierarchies and the practice of whitening by choosing blackness, individuals with greater levels of political identity are significantly more likely to engage in civic forms of participation; to participate in social movements; they are more interested in and are

more informed about politics; and they have greater levels of internal self-efficacy, that is, they are more confident in their skills and competencies as *citizens*.

Yet just as these politically conscious individuals are taking greater strides to engage in politics and exercise their citizenship rights, they are becoming increasingly pessimistic about their ability to influence politics and to be heard by the very leaders they elect into office. These data thus paint a complex picture of racial identity and political engagement in contemporary Brazil. On the one hand, Brazilians are being increasingly empowered to confront and challenge social hierarchies, embrace stigmatized social categories, and pursue interests and representation in a variety of political venues. Yet these same citizens—the politically conscious—hold pessimistic views about their ability to effect change and have their voices heard through the formal channels of political representation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

"Census bureaus," writes Melissa Nobles (2000, 2), "are typically overlooked as participants in the creation and perpetuation of race." Race, however, is not always nor uniformly perpetuated as it was initially created. As this dissertation has shown in detail, racial classifications and identities are not only subjectively (and often politically) understood, but subject to reevaluation and transformation over time. Brazil's official classification scheme has long come under fire from black movement activists and their allies, who see the intermediate racial category as the institutionalization of the myth of racial democracy. In their view, this scheme undermines efforts at race-based political mobilization (Hanchard 1994; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000, 2004). Yet even while official ethnoracial classification has remained unchanged in recent decades, Brazilians have demonstrated marked shifts in their racial identifications that suggest they do not simply comply with the "political realities" or "ways of thinking and seeing" imposed by the state (Nobles 2004, 66). Indeed, if recent patterns of reclassification in Brazil suggest anything about the census, it is that an individual's self-classification in an official census category can itself become an act of political resistance.

The recent and growing tendency for Brazilians to reclassify toward blackness highlights the powerful role social citizenship institutions can play in shaping political worldviews. In fact, the era of social inclusion casts Brazil in new racial light: no longer can Brazil be reduced to a puzzling case of extreme socioeconomic and racial disparity paired with the absence of politicized racial identities. This recent era of Brazilian politics – in which the state's posture shifted towards racial recognition and inclusive citizenship – brings into stark relief the complex, if unintentional, ways that the accessibility of social citizenship rights and benefits operate to imbue certain identities

with political meaning. To be sure, state institutions do not shape worldviews in a simple and straightforward manner, nor do they affect all individuals uniformly. Instead, institutions of social citizenship endow citizens with tools, capacities, and experiences, which inform the identities and interests citizens articulate in political arenas.

In this concluding chapter, I offer reflections on the theoretical and normative implications of the novel theoretical account developed and tested in this dissertation. In particular, I pay close attention to the implications that this recent and phenomenal case of identity change suggests for political science theorizing on identity politicization, suggesting that current theories too often overlook the implications of constructivism and the importance of citizenship in exchange for theoretical parsimony. Additionally, I offer reflections on what these patterns tell us about the state of Brazilian racial politics and its implications for the comparative study of race. Finally, I conclude by reflecting on what these patterns tell us about the interplay of race, inequality, and citizenship in one of the world's most starkly unequal democracies.

Implications for Theories of Identity Politicization

The findings of this study carry implications most directly for debates on how, when, and why identities become politicized. In particular, the argument developed and tested in this dissertation marks a departure from dominant explanations of identity politicization in the literature. These highly rationalist accounts have coalesced around the strategic calculations of political elites and, to a lesser extent, voters, who seek to maximize their material payoffs (Chandra 2004; Huber 2017; Posner 2005). This view strips identities of their affect (Posner 2005, 6) and conceives of them as nothing more than a situational means to a material end. Such theoretical and conceptual assumptions may apply in some contexts, but this analysis has provided little support for the idea that top-down mobilization or utility-based electoral calculations play central roles in the

processes of identity politicization; not to mention that the empirical patterns motivating this study seriously complicate the presumptions of stable demographic structures upon which the strategic calculations of voters and elites are supposedly based.

This ought to raise questions about the theoretical assumptions often made in "constructivist" theories of ethnic and identity politics. Indeed, in a recent work theorizing the politicization of ethnic versus class differences, John Huber writes: "[e]thnic and class identities are particularly useful in electoral politics in large part because they often define group boundaries that parties can exploit in efforts to win votes. When a party makes a commitment to a particular class – say the nonrich – and this party wins, a rich voter cannot easily change his or her 'class identity' to obtain policy benefits from the government" (Huber 2017, 4). Not only does this theoretical framework assume that ethnic and class identities are mutually exclusive substitutes rather than potentially intertwined and interactive, but this passage renders explicit what is often an implicit assumption of so-called constructivist theories of identity politics—that these highly rationalist accounts, which often reduce identities to heuristic devices in service of theoretical parsimony, make presumptions about the stability and immutability of demographic structures and social boundaries that contradict the fundamentals of constructivism itself. It bears reminding that, not only class, but even *racial* identities—commonly, if too presumptively, viewed as less fluid—can prove unstable in ways that would complicate, or substantially alter, demographically based calculations. But this dilemma also highlights how *thin* constructivism – lip service commonly paid to the socially constructed and situational nature of social boundaries and identities – can obscure essentializing assumptions embedded within so-called constructivist theorizing. This study, at the very least, ought renew attention to constructivist due diligence in identity politics scholarship. But more importantly, the fact that the current dominant theories are so ill-equipped to even contend with the kind

of identity change analyzed in this study brings into focus how the prevailing rationalist approach to study of ethnic and identity politicization relies on unrealistic simplifications that assume away the very empirical implications of constructivism itself: that identities and social boundaries are subjective, mutable, and reconstructed over time (Barth 1969).

A second point of departure revolves around the role of the state and political elites in the processes of identity politicization. In this account there is little role for the rent-seeking politician who politicizes identities for his own gain, but this is not to ignore the role of political elites altogether or overlook the incentives elites require to find political will. Much to the contrary, political elites, the institutions that they create and reform, and electoral incentives have been central to the institutional reforms and unfolding processes that have shaped the formation of political consciousness and content of racial identities. Suddenly finding themselves in competition for the votes of the poor, elites in newly redemocratized Brazil had strong electoral incentives to create and expand social policies that would benefits the masses (Garay 2016; Hunter and Brill 2016). Additionally, elites were responding to incentives to build modern and developed states in conformity with international norms for what such a state should look like (Loveman 2014). By the end of the twentieth century, western states, transnational social movements, and international and non-governmental organizations increasingly espoused rhetoric that favored racial recognition and efforts at combating inequality (Paschel 2016), just as international norms and rhetoric began to favor democratic institutions (Levitsky and Way 2010). Thus political elites, continuing to respond to domestic and international political incentives, sought to revisit its racial posture and social policies in their efforts to "develop" and "modernize." These incentives generated the political will politicians needed to reform citizenship institutions in ways that would reshape the everyday experiences of the country's mass of citizens living in a state of

socioeconomic precarity on the margins of society. Such sweeping and universalizing reforms unleashed unprecedented waves of upward mobility for these marginal citizens, the very mobility that would lead them to rethink their understandings of race and to cross previously recognized racial boundaries. Political and state elites, then, play central—if indirect and inadvertent—roles in the processes of identity politicization. But rather than the product of crude rent-seeking behavior, these patterns of reclassification and political identity formation are best understood as a kind of policy feedback effect wherein "new policies create a new politics" (Schattschneider 1935, 288).

Finally, the centrality of social policy reforms and the accessibility of citizenship benefits in explaining this political identity formation shines new light on the processes of the identity-to-politics link (Lee 2008). In particular, these findings further highlight that the translation of social categories into political identities is not structurally preordained (Gaventa 1982; Hanchard 1994; Roberts 2002; Yashar 2005). Indeed, for decades Brazil served as a case-in-point: if social structure, or the alignment of racial and class hierarchies, alone could explain identity politicization, then as one of the world's most unequal and racially stratified countries Brazil ought to have seen the politicization of racial (and/or class) identities long ago. What this analysis has made clear is that racialized structural inequalities are often an important component of the grievances that ground and legitimate the racialized political worldviews of reclassifiers and the racially conscious; but coming to such an understanding/interpretation of Brazilian society as *racially* stratified in such a way has been made possible through the mechanisms of exposure and efficacy unfurled by expanded access to education. Importantly, the case highlights that such racialized/structural interpretations of one's surroundings cannot be assumed *ex ante*; individuals must arrive to such conclusions. Processes of consciousness-building have been crucial even in the canonical U.S. case

as well (McAdam 1982), where today racialized political identities among black Americans are often taken for-granted require little explanation. Thus the findings of this analysis go to show that there are no foregone conclusions in the politicization of social categories or identities, no matter how clear this may seem from the point of view of the analyst. What mattered in particular in this case was not only a political worldview that made sense of one's relative social position in racial terms, but also access to the benefits of social citizenship. Central, then, was the interaction between social structure and citizenship institutions in shaping the processes of political identity formation.

Reflections on Racial Politics in Brazil and Beyond

Perhaps the greatest contribution this study has made to the interdisciplinary study of racial identity and politics in Brazil is the finding that upward mobility does not lead inevitably to whitening. This study is not the first to notice a shift in these patterns (Marteleto 2012; Miranda 2015; L. F. Schwartzman 2007; S. Soares 2008), but it is the first to systematically analyze reclassification *toward blackness* in particular and provide a theoretical and historically situated account of such change. To be sure, there is no dearth of scholarship criticizing affirmative action policies and bemoaning the potential "race-making" consequences of such policies, which critics claim will divide Brazil into black and white and creating the racialized politics that many Brazilians believe they escaped (e.g., Fry and Maggie 2004). But there is no indication that affirmative action policies themselves or the broader reforms of educational expansion have led, or will lead, to undesirable political outcomes. In fact, these processes have been underway for quite some time, and Brazil has not been riven with inter-racial conflict. I would argue instead that these findings paint an optimistic picture for the future of racial politics in the country, not least for the black movement, which continues to struggle tirelessly towards its goals of racial equality, as well as for Brazil's

(formerly) marginal citizens who suffer from perpetual inequality and discrimination. Greater access to improved education is leading and empowering citizens to assume and articulate political identities that coincide with the inequality, stigma, and discrimination they have faced for so long and that operate through the informal mechanisms of institutional racism. One can only hope that these effects are not limited to the domain of stigmatized racial categories. Nonetheless, educational expansion and political identity formation may empower individuals to confront stigma and discrimination, thereby leading them to interrupt—rather than participate in—the reproduction of social hierarchies, and demand further policies and action on the part of the state to redress these social ills.

Of course, that my analyses suggest a different relationship between education/upward mobility and the direction of reclassification raises questions of how or if these findings square with previous studies. These differences likely stem from the fact that different class sectors gained access to (different levels of) education and experienced upward mobility at different periods of time. While Getúlio Vargas is widely credited with the creation of a national education plan, his social policies were aimed at educating and controlling labor; and while the military regime was focused on expanding primary schooling as a measure of economic success, by the 1980s this still remained out of reach for large swaths of the population and access to secondary and university education was even more restricted. Because of the ambiguity of racial identification and persistence of reclassification itself, it is difficult (if not impossible) to know for certain the "race" of who exactly had access to education, when they had it, and whether they were plausible candidates for reclassification toward either whiteness or blackness. Yet if recent survey instruments developed by Edward Telles (2014) provide any indication, income is—and likely was—a strong correlate of skin tone,[44]

[44] Plenty has been written on the social construction of race (Barth 1969; Brubaker, Loveman, and

and evidence suggest that lower classes had dismal access to formal education of any kind prior to the 1990s.

It thus stands to reason that unprecedented access to social citizenship for the lower classes has also meant, indirectly or not, that new generations of citizens are not only better educated, but also look different, from the well-educated in previous generations. Findings in my analysis in Chapter 7 show that lighter-skinned individuals are unlikely candidates for reclassification toward blackness. And recent studies conducted with Telles' (2014) color palette show that the relationship between "race" and socioeconomic variables can look different once less subjective racial measures are included as controls in statistical analyses (Telles and Paschel 2014; Telles, Flores, and Urrea-Giraldo 2015). The lack of any such measure, until recently, is a real limitation of studies from decades past (Degler 1971; N. do V. Silva 1994; Wagley 1952). We can thus only infer patterns of identification and reclassification using self and ascribed classifications. Regardless, among the findings from more recent studies is that controlling for physical attributes alters the relationship between status variables and both whiteness and blackness, depending on where one falls on the color spectrum. Whitening effects of status appear limited to those on the lighter end of the color spectrum, and this is predicted by *wealth*, not education; by contrast, status appears to have a darkening effect for those in the middle to darker end of the spectrum, and is predicted by *education*, not wealth (Telles and Paschel 2014). The ultimate take-away, then, is that racial identifications and the political consciousness they generate are informed in part by certain physical attributes that allow for credible claims to blackness, but they are also ultimately shaped by an individual's lived experiences, which are both racialized and classed.

Stamatov 2004; Loveman 1999a; Omi and Winant 1994). Yet while "race" may not be real in that the categories its boundaries demarcate are not natural, commonsense understandings of racial difference in Brazil are largely rooted in physical attributes (Telles 2004).

An important caveat is in order regarding the question of whether or not racial identities are "politically relevant" in the Brazilian case. On the one hand, evidence suggests that now more than ever one might expect race to matter for understanding how individuals come to identify and pursue interests and representation in the political arena, as well as which political arenas they determine are most responsive to their interests and concerns. This is established in part in Chapter 7, which explores the consequences of racialized political identities for understanding various forms of political engagement and efficacy. Yet central to this analysis is the idea that individuals within racial categories vary in the extent to which racial considerations shape their behaviors. In other words, we still ought to avoid groupist (Brubaker 2004) inclinations that might lead us to over-predict the extent to which self-identified members of any racial category cohere in any political sense.

Nonetheless, what is also clear is that there is an identifiable racial consciousness shaping political behavior and engagement. Racially conscious citizens are not only more engaged in civic associations and social movements, outside of the formal electoral channels of political representation, but they are also more interested in politics in general and possess a greater sense of their political competence. Despite all this, however, they are also significantly more pessimistic about the responsiveness of the government to the concerns of folks like them. The potential implications of these findings are varied, and the surface has only been scratched in these analyses. Questions thus remain regarding what kinds of behaviors and forms of engagement are most impacted by the formation of the racial identities, and in what kinds of (in)formal institutions or political arenas individuals choose to articulate these newly formed political identities.

Finally, a word is in order regarding the generalizability and comparability of Brazil as a case of racial politics. This question has generated no shortage of scholarly

debate and criticism (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; J. D. French 2000; Hanchard 1994; Loveman 1999b; Marx 1998; Paschel 2016; Seigel 2005). Rather than wade into these debates, this study has focused on Brazil in part because it has offered a fascinating case of identity change itself worthy of study, but also because the particularities of the Brazil's racial boundaries and ambiguity provide specific conditions that allow for systematic empirical analysis of this sort. By this I mean that the fluidity of racial boundaries and the uncontroversial nature of reclassification—what is sometimes seen as an abhorrent act of "passing" in other contexts—has meant not only that reclassification itself happens on a much larger scale than in places like the United States and South Africa, but also that ordinary census data can be leveraged in ways that allow researchers to study these patterns systematically and, as in this study, as indications of political identity formation. In this view, this analysis has focused on the Brazilian case not because it is necessarily like any other, but because it was capable of generating new insights into the processes of political identity formation.

Having done so, this study also points to other findings that the experiences of upward mobility can deepen political consciousness for individuals in stigmatized racial categories and lead them to pursue voice. This is not unique to the Brazilian case, and is in fact in line with seminal analyses of racial consciousness in the United States, which associate the middle-class status of African Americans with a deepened sense of racial consciousness (Dawson 1995; Hochschild 1995; Tate 1994). In this sense, these findings bring Brazil *closer* to the United States in terms of its racial politics, despite the myriad differences in racial subjectivity and political struggles in the two countries. To be sure, Brazil remains a far cry from American-style politics, in which the racial cleavage appears to permeate countless facets of the country's politics. But such similar findings regarding the racialized class experiences of Brazilians and Americans and the relationship to consciousness raise questions about the extent to which Brazil may

continue to serve as a convenient point of contrast in comparative studies of ethnoracial politics. For while Brazilian society remains heterogeneous in terms of the formation of racialized political identities, what is certain is that the country's recent attempts to modernize, develop, and include have led Brazil's racial politics into a profound state of flux in which competing understandings of what it means to "be black" having only added to the complexity of Brazil's racial subjectivity. Thus the "why not" question that for so long has characterized scholarly views of Brazil's (absent) racial politics may be more appropriately recast as questions of for whom race constitutes a political identity and with what consequences. At the very least, scholars can no longer take for-granted Brazil's exceptional status as the perennial paradox in the comparative study of racial politics.

Voice and Citizenship

Decades ago, Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) bemoaned the state of citizenship in Latin America. As the third wave of democratization swept the region, it was impossible to overlook the restoration of civil and political rights as institutional pillars of democracy. Yet even while Latin American states formally enshrined these rights in their constitutions, the question of whether they would carry real-world consequences generated skepticism. Rampant poverty, inequality and discrimination; little or no access to justice; pervasive informality/illegality; and the inability of the state to guarantee freedom from police and other violence all raised (and continue to raise) questions about whether Latin American democracies could address the most pressing issues shaping the everyday lives of their so-called citizens. In O'Donnell's (1993, 1361) words, "a state that is unable to enforce its legality supports a democracy of low-intensity citizenship."

Racialized stigma and discrimination have been central components of the social and political forces that coexist with democratic institutions and that have weakened citizenship. By disempowering citizens, lowering their internal efficacy, and diminishing their levels of political engagement, stigma and discrimination undermine citizens' capacities to exercise their rights to demand and strive for greater fairness and equality. It is not difficult to understand why: individuals have myriad incentives to comply with racial (and other) social hierarchies in exchange for social, economic, and psychological payoffs. But in return, individuals must endure and cope with the hefty costs that come with internalizing these hierarchies. Remarkable, then, is that individuals have been able to overcome these nefarious social forces and are increasingly attempting to interrupt this vicious cycle by choosing not to comply with social hierarchies. That is, rather than *exiting* the stigmatized category, individuals are increasingly exercising *voice* and contesting these hierarchies. In so doing, these citizens are not only challenging racial commonsense and racism in their everyday lives, but also engaging in politics in new ways to attempt to interrupt the social forces that for so long have prevented them from enjoying their full democratic citizenship.

That educational expansion could empower citizens to pursue voice and exercise citizenship rights suggests we consider a reformulation of the sequence of the expansion of citizenship rights envisioned by T.H. Marshall (1950), in which it is through the exercise of civic and political citizenship that citizens gain social rights. Clearly, Marshall's focus on *de jure* citizenship did not anticipate the dilemmas of low-intensity citizenship in Latin America, which originate in the state's inability to *guarantee* these rights for all of its citizens. On paper, Marshall's sequence holds some water: it is only after the expansion of the franchise that elites began to respond to the interests and desires of the masses and expand access to social citizenship (Garay 2016). But that social and political forces within democracy could so weaken citizenship to a state of

low-intensity raises additional questions about the evolution of *de facto* citizenship rights. From this view, recent advances in social policies and protection in Latin America suggest an inversion of Marshall's sequence (Hunter and Brill 2016). I would further submit that patterns of racial reclassification, political identity formation, and the resulting political engagement suggest that it may not only be the case that the social precedes the civic and political, but that *it can be precisely through access to the benefits of social citizenship* that individuals might come to *exercise* their civic and political rights "on terms of equality with others" (Marshall 1950, 10-11).

"How can the weaker and the poorer," then, "be empowered in terms consistent with democratic legality and, thus, gain their full, democratic and liberal, citizenship?" (O'Donnell 1993, 1361). Part of the answer, this research suggests, lies in the creation of universal and expansionary social policy—policies that target and seek to redress those very social forces responsible for weakened citizenship in the first place. Insofar as social policy expansion has empowered citizens to assume and articulate political identities that coincide with the discrimination and disadvantage they face in society, and insofar as they pursue interests and representation on these bases in diverse political arenas, then this recent era of social inclusion and racial recognition may well constitute what O'Donnell deemed "the social conditions necessary for the exercise of citizenship" (1993, 1361).

Only time will tell if Latin America's democracies can consolidate the gains made in this remarkable era of inclusion and recognition and move closer to fulfilling the promises of democratic citizenship for all its citizens. But if recent political developments in Brazil are any indication, then one cannot expect that progress will march on unimpeded. No doubt, the growing tendency for formerly marginalized citizens to articulate stigmatized identities in civic arenas of political participation inspires optimism. But just as social policies designed to reduce inequalities have

deepened political engagement, so also have they introduced a politics of backlash (McAdam and Kloos 2014), in which many who sit atop the social and political order have challenged and resisted the progress made since redemocratization. Of course, there is no single cause of the turmoil that has upended Brazil's national politics, from the crisis of representation evident in the 2013 protests, to the massive bribery scheme revealed in 2014, to the impeachment of Brazil's first female president in 2016. It was a perfect storm, then, of opposition and disillusionment that paved the way for the election of a right-wing populist leader in 2018 – a leader openly hostile to not only the state's racially inclusive posture and rights for Afro-descendants, but also for women, LGBT minorities, and the indigenous – raising fears that the remarkable progress that earned Brazil global attention as a rising political and economic star might be dismantled. In light of this, it is difficult to ignore the role that this great and rapid social progress has likely played in motivating the public sentiments that have fueled this turmoil, at least in part.

To be sure, it is far from clear where Brazil's political crisis ends or what effect the election of a president so hostile to racial inclusion will ultimately have on the country's racial politics. What is clear, however, is that insofar as this study ought to inspire optimism, it must be a cautionary optimism; for the inclusive and expansionary social policies responsible for the reshaping of racial identities and empowering of citizens may also have planted the seeds of a political backlash that threatens the future of that very progress. As Brazil's values and institutions continue to be tested, one can only hope that the beneficiaries of this remarkable era of social inclusion will resist in return and defend the rights and benefits finally and duly allocated to them in Brazil's new era of racialized democracy.

APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER TWO

Census Enumeration Practices and Classification Schemes

In the Brazilian context, where racial boundaries are fluid and there are no rigid rules that govern racial group membership, questions of which classification schemes the census bureau employs and how "race" is measured could affect estimates of group size. Several studies have shown that individuals' racial identifications are sensitive to the classification scheme employed, namely whether official census categories (black, white, brown) or more colloquial labels (e.g., *moreno*, *negro*) are used (Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2013; Bailey and Telles 2006; Loveman, Muniz, and Bailey 2012). Others have further noted the inconsistency between respondents' self-classifications and the categories assigned to respondents by enumerators (N. do V. Silva 1994; E. E. Telles 2004; E. E. Telles and Lim 1998). One potential explanation, then, is that these shifts in population estimates reflect changes in classification schemes or enumeration practices in the census.

Year	White/ Branca	Black/ Preta	Brown/ Parda	Yellow/ Amarela	Indigenous/ Indígena	Mixed/ Mestiça	Cabocla
1872	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
1890	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
1900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1920	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1940	Y	Y	N*	Y	N	N	N
1950	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
1960	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
1970	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1980	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
1991	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
2000	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
2010	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y**	N	N

Table A1 Census Classification Schemes, 1872-2010. Source: Características étnico-raciais da população: um estudo das categorias de classificação de cor ou raça : 2008 / IBGE, Coordenação de População de Indicadores Sociais (IBGE 2011). *Responses of "other" re-coded as "pardo". **Census includes indigenous subgroup and language spoken in addition to this color category. Y = Yes, N = No.

Table A1 presents the racial classification schemes employed by the Brazilian census bureau since the first census in 1872. While there are notable differences in these schemes over the course of the twentieth century, over the period relevant to the patterns under examination (1991 to 2010) the scheme has remained unchanged (IBGE 2011; Paixão 2009). Moreover, between 1950 and 2010, the only change in this scheme has been the inclusion of the indigenous category, which comprises 0.4 percent of the total population. Additionally, concerns regarding the reliability of census data as a reflection of self-identification can be allayed by the fact that the census bureau reports a commitment to individuals' self-declarations as the mode of measuring race in the population (IBGE 2003, 2016). Census classification schemes and enumeration practices have remained constant and therefore cannot explain such short-term shifts in patterns of racial identification.

Demographic Trends

Differences in demographic trends are a second potential explanation for these patterns since intergroup differences in migration, mortality, or fertility could easily produce structural change. To be sure, Brazil owes the vast majority of its population to the forced migration of Africans in the slave trade, to Portuguese colonization, and to the state's twentieth century efforts to encourage European immigration with the goal of whitening the predominantly Afro-descendant population. (Levy 1974; Skidmore 1974). In particular, Thomas Skidmore points out in his prominent study of immigration policy in Brazil that the *Estado Novo* constitution of 1937 included nationality-based immigration quotas to restrict immigration to white Europeans. Getulio Vargas vocally espoused this policy. Shortly before his ouster in 1945, Vargas issued a decree in which he stipulated that immigration policy conform with "the necessity to preserve and

develop, in the ethnic composition of the population, the more desirable characteristics of its European ancestry," quoted in (Skidmore 1974, 199).

Census	Nationality	Population	Percentage
1991	Native Brazilians	146,048,028	99.48%
	Naturalized Brazilians	161,151	0.11%
	Foreign Resident	606,624	0.41%
	Total	146,815,803	100%
2000	Native Brazilians	169,189,026	99.60%
	Naturalized Brazilians	173,763	0.10%
	Foreign Resident	510,067	0.30%
	Total	169,872,856	100%
2010	Native Brazilians	190,163,229	99.69%
	Naturalized Brazilians	161,250	0.08%
	Foreign Resident	431,319	0.23%
	Total	190,755,799	100%

Table A2 International Immigration to Brazil, 1991-2010. Source: Census, IBGE

Yet international immigration is no longer of major consequence. According to census data from 1991 to 2010 (Table A2), native-born Brazilians have comprised more than 99 percent of Brazil's resident population. Moreover, the minute population of foreign residents has been decreasing over time, foreclosing international migration as a potential explanatory factor (Andrews 2004; Levy 1974).

	2000					2010				
Age	Total	White	Black	Brown	Ratio	Total	White	Black	Brown	Ratio
0 - 4	4.85	3.63	3.10	3.26	0.89	3.40	2.89	1.93	3.26	1.08
5 - 9	0.32	0.27	0.32	0.26	0.98	0.28	0.25	0.22	0.26	1.02
10 - 14	0.36	0.31	0.35	0.29	0.96	0.33	0.29	0.31	0.33	1.11
15 - 19	1.07	0.87	1.32	1.02	1.21	1.12	0.85	1.11	1.24	1.44
20 - 29	1.74	1.38	2.14	1.66	1.25	1.65	1.24	1.60	1.91	1.50
30 - 39	2.44	1.96	3.30	2.15	1.19	2.09	1.68	2.38	2.25	1.35
40 - 49	4.45	3.75	5.82	3.59	1.06	3.76	3.29	4.36	3.74	1.17
50 - 59	8.82	7.90	9.93	6.40	0.89	7.69	7.30	8.76	6.94	1.00
60 - 69	18.76	17.67	18.93	12.43	0.77	15.89	15.80	16.54	13.69	0.90

Table A3 Mortality Rates in 2000 and 2010, by Race and Age. Measured as deaths per 1,000. Source: Ministerio de Saude, DataSUS. The ratio is computed as mortalities of *negros* (blacks and browns) relative to whites.

Mortality and fertility statistics also provide little explanation for the observed patterns. Statistics from the Ministry of Health show that, depending on age, the



Figure A1 Fertility Rates of Women Aged 15-44, 1992-2014. Source: PNAD, IBGE.

mortality rate of Afro-descendants is similar to or greatly exceeds that of whites (Table A3). Moreover, in comparison to the year 2000, mortality rates of Afro-Brazilians appear to have increased relative to whites'.

As for fertility, it is true that Afro-Brazilians have more children on average than white Brazilians, but the intergroup fertility ratio has been steadily declining since the early 1990s. Whereas in 1992 the average number of children of Afro-descendent women was 23 percent higher than that of white women, by 2002 this figure was 17 percent, and by 2012 it was 15 percent. In other words, relative to white Brazilians, Afro-Brazilian fertility rates are slowing through time, not increasing (Figure A1). While demography undoubtedly plays some role in the changing composition of the population, both mortality and fertility trends do not provide compelling explanations for such drastic and short-term change. Only fertility statistics offer prima facie evidence in favor of a demographic explanation, but the longitudinal pattern belies demography as a logical explanation.

Cohort Component Analysis

While intergroup differences in demographic trends offer little prima facie evidence for the observed longitudinal patterns, demography must play some role in shaping the racial composition of the population. Figure 2.2 in the main text displays a simple cohort analysis to emphasize the Brazilians are in fact reclassifying and to produce crude estimates of rates of reclassification. Another technique commonly employed by demographers[45] is cohort component analysis, which uses demographic trends at *t-1* to make projections about the size of demographic groups at time *t*, assuming little or no change in demographic patterns.

	2000	2010 (aged 10+)		Difference due to	
Category	Enumerated	Projected	Enumerated	Reclassification	% Difference
White	92.0	88.1	77.8	-10.3	-12
Brown	65.8	62.6	68.8	6.2	10
Black	10.6	9.9	13.0	3.1	31

Table A4 Estimates of Inter-Census Racial Reclassification, 2000-10. Source: Miranda (2015).

Table A4 presents estimates from this more rigorous demographic analysis, as reported in Miranda (2015). These estimates confirm the pattern that is readily observable in the aggregate statistics presented in Figure 1 of the main text, as well as in the simple cohort analysis in Figure 2: between 2000 and 2010 Brazilians demonstrated a tendency to move away from whiteness and toward blackness. These trends mark a departure from findings of cohort component analyses of racial reclassification conducted using earlier census rounds (Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade 2004; Wood 1991; Wood and Carvalho 1994). Ultimately, then, these patterns cannot be dismissed as artifacts of either enumeration practices or demographic trends.

[45] For examples of cohort component analyses employed for the purpose of estimating racial reclassification, see Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade (2004), Wood and Carvalho (1994), Loveman and Muniz (2007), and Lovell and Wood (1998).

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER THREE

Policy Reform/Creation	Year	Description
Federal Constitution	1988	Codified education as a basic social right for all citizens.
Municipal spending	1990s	Federal program to supplement municipal spending on primary and secondary education
Municipal transfer of cash	1990s	Changed how federal funds were sent to localities for education spending
Lei de Diretrizes Básicas (LDB)	1996	Reformed the national educational plan
Fundo de manutenção e desenvolvimento do Ensino fundamental e de valorização do Magistério (FUNDEF)	1996	▪ Created federal and state spending floors ▪ Altered local incentives by allocating funds to localities based on student enrollments ▪ Earmarked federal and state resources for teachers' salaries, teacher training, and ▪ Incentivized administration by municipalities (by deducting funds for schools administered by states) to circumvent political bargaining between state and local governments
Exame nacional do ensino médio (ENEM)	1998, 2009	Initially created to assess the quality of high school education in Brazil (1998). Later reformed into a centralized university entrance exam (2009).
Fundo de financiamento ao estudante ao ensinso superior (FIES)	1999	Federal financial aid program for students to attend private universities
Fiscal Responsibility Law	2000	Imposed a host of requirements for transparency, monitoring, and reporting for subnational governments in Brazil, including spending by FUNDEF/FUNDEB
Afro-history Law	2003	Mandated teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture in schools
Programa universidade para todos (ProUni)	2004	Federal program to awarded full and partial scholarships for students to attend private universities
Bolsa Família	2004	Included children's educational attendance as a condition for receiving cash payments

Sistema nacional de avaliação da Educação Superior (SINAES)	2004	Created a system for the assessment of the quality of public universities.
Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (FUNDEB)	2006	▪ Provides federal top-up for under-resourced localities ▪ Expanded coverage to high school ▪ Mandated nationwide spending floors
Programa de apoio de reestruturação e expansão das universidades federais (REUNI)	2007	Expanded the number of federal university campuses and the number of slots offered at existing federal universities.
Sistema de seleção unificada (SISU)	2010	System operating jointly with the Enem to facilitate application and admission to multiple public universities
Programa nacional de assistência estudantil (PNAES)	2010	Program to improve retention of university students; Minimize effects of inequalities on completion rates; reduce dropout rates;
Federal Affirmative Action Law	2012	Reserved slots in free public universities for low-income, public school, and ethnoracially disadvantaged students

Table B1 National Education Policy and Program Reforms, 1988-2012

APPENDIX C

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER FOUR

Reflections on Methods Sequencing and Generating the Political Identity Hypothesis

The data and analyses presented in this dissertation reflect a multi-stage research design in which initial hypotheses derived from the literature were preliminarily tested using both observational qualitative methods (participant observation and interviews) and rigorous quantitative methods (regression and difference-in-difference analysis of municipal-level census data). With little support found for these hypotheses, I embarked on hypothesis-generating qualitative field research. The main goal of this fieldwork was to identify reclassifiers who were willing to participate in relatively open-ended interviews, with the intention of allowing these discussions to generate new ideas and insights, and to allow individuals to provide their own reflections on the processes of reclassification and consciousness formation. After preliminary field trips to establish institutional affiliations and secure grant funding, I began field research in São Paulo in July 2016. According to apparent subnational variation in patterns of reclassification, São Paulo was a strong positive case, and would likely serve as a useful starting point for identifying and exploring the phenomenon of interest. In Seawright and Gerring's (2008) terms, São Paulo is an "extreme value on Y."

In São Paulo, I began by embedding myself in sites where I thought I would be most likely to find reclassifiers: black movement spaces and events; local NGOs and other civil society organizations; political campaigns and events of local politicians campaigning on "the racial question; and university associations. My goal was to collect data through participant observation, aiming to understand the discourse and rhetoric employed toward race, and to meet individuals who might reveal themselves to be

reclassifiers and who, through personal contact with me, might agree to be interviewed about this process. After identifying initial interviewees, I allowed additional interview subjects to "snowball" and continued to interview subjects until I felt I had reached saturation (Morse 2000).

Regarding the specific goals of the qualitative research, I used participant observation and open-ended, in-depth interviews with reclassifiers and non-reclassifiers to inductively generate new ideas and hypotheses about the causes of these apparent patterns of reclassification (Lynch 2013). These data were invaluable for illustrating causal pathways and giving me a sense of what these processes looked like "on the ground." Before beginning this fieldwork, I hypothesized that racial consciousness was an important part of the observed patterns, but my initial hypothesis that racial and class cleavage structures were the cause of such consciousness proved to hold little water. As a result, the overly structural hypothesis fell away, but it remained clear to me that consciousness was an important part of this story.

It was in São Paulo, my first prolonged research site, where the centrality of education as a driving forced in these patterns had come to the fore. Yet while this crystallized for me in São Paulo after completing a number of illuminating interviews, this was not something that came through explicitly or brightly in every single conversation. In fact, if ever I asked reclassifiers in my interviews what factor they would point to as the determinants of their racial identity change, almost none mentioned "education" by name. Instead, they often pointed to their personal experiences that were direct or indirect consequences of acquiring greater education (what they learned about history, how they got involved in a particular social movement or association, or what they experienced at their job). An important part of the generation of this hypothesis was allowing the diversity of personal experiences of my interview subjects to accumulate before it could become clear to me how exactly

education could operate in ways that would alter their understandings of racial boundaries and shape their political consciousness.

Having narrowed in on education as the hypothesized driving force of these patterns, I moved to Recife, the capital city of the northeastern state of Pernambuco, in February 2017 to continue exploring these ideas in an ostensibly "weak" site for reclassification. There, I pursued similar sites for recruiting interview subjects and also employed snowball sampling. To gain greater leverage on the effects of greater education, I also sought to include lower-educated individuals in my interview sample, since these subjects were entirely absent among my São Paulo interviewees. To get access to and build relationships with less-educated Brazilians, I specifically set out to observe courses on adult literacy with local organizations (which in many ways were similar educational sites to those where I made contact with other interview subjects).

Once I felt I had a firmer grasp of the argument from my qualitative research, I then sought to further specify and refine the hypothesis and mechanisms through inductive iteration (Yom 2015), moving repeatedly between the data I was collecting on the ground, specific empirical findings in the literature, and testing my hunches using systematic quantitative data. After finding that the political identity hypothesis held some water, I continued to develop this argument and sought to test it more rigorously, to a greater extent, and up against the alternative hypotheses presented in Chapters 2 and 5. Overall, I employed a multi-method and multi-staged research design in this project which enabled me to mine for insights into causal processes and later test these insights systematically.

Interview Sample

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Recife	0.47	0.51	0	1	34
Age	31.62	14.01	18	70	34
Female	0.59	0.50	0	1	34
Per capita household income	1307	1419.72	0	7666.67	34
Household residents	3.32	1.53	1	7	34
Residents with income	1.65	0.95	0	4	34
Household Income	3637.26	4001.69	0	23000	34
Reclassifier	0.56	0.50	0	1	34
Education	3.15	1.02	1	4	34
(1) < Primary	0.15	0.36	0	1	34
(3) High School	0.41	0.50	0	1	34
(4) University	0.44	0.50	0	1	34
Racial ID	2.58	0.61	1	3	33
(1) White	0.06	0.24	0	1	33
(2) Brown	0.30	0.47	0	1	33
(3) Black	0.64	0.49	0	1	33
Political Identity Index	0.80	0.25	0.14	1	30
Question 10	0.94	0.24	0	1	33
Question 11	0.67	0.48	0	1	33
Question 12	0.56	0.50	0	1	34
Question 13	0.82	0.39	0	1	33
Question 14	0.94	0.24	0	1	34
Question 15	0.76	0.43	0	1	34
Question 16	0.81	0.40	0	1	32

Table B1 Descriptive Statistics of Interview Sample. Means for education, racial ID, and the political identity index reflect the means of single categorical or composite measures of individual values or items. Numbers in parentheses reflect codings of these single variables. Responses to question 12 were measured on a 5-category Likert scale, discretized such that responses of uncomfortable or very uncomfortable were coded as 1. The political identity index is the mean of questions 10 through 16 of the structured interview questionnaire.

Questionnaire Applied to Interviewees During Structured Portion of Interview

At the start of each interview, interviewees were asked to respond to the following questions after being read a consent script and consenting to voluntarily participate in the interview.

1. Gender (classified by interviewer)
    a. Man
    b. Woman

2. What year were you born?
    a. _____
    b. Confirm present-day age: _____

3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
    a. None
    b. Primary incomplete
    c. Primary complete
    d. High school incomplete
    e. High school complete
    f. Technical/vocational incomplete
    g. Technical/vocational complete
    h. University incomplete
    i. University complete

4. What is the total income of your household?
    a. _____

5. Including yourself, how many people live in your household?
    a. _____

6. Including yourself, how many people earn income in your household?
    a. _____

7. In terms of your race or color, how do you identify?
    a. _____

8. The Brazilian census uses six categories for people to classify themselves according to race or color: White, black, brown, yellow, indigenous, or other. In which of these categories would you classify yourself?
    a. White
    b. Black
    c. Brown
    d. Yellow
    e. Indigenous

f. Other
g. NA

9. Have you, or another member of your family, always classified your in that category, or did you classify yourself in another category in the past?
    a. Always in this category
    b. In another category in the past → which? _____
    c. Don't know

Political Identity Pilot Questions

10. Do you think your color or race is an important part of who you are?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Don't know
    d. NA

11. Do you think your color or race affects your ability to get a good job?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Don't know
    d. NA

12. In situations where you are the only [census category] person, do you feel…?
    a. Very comfortable
    b. Comfortable
    c. Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
    d. Uncomfortable
    e. Very uncomfortable

13. Do you think that what happens with [RACE] people in general in Brazil affects your life?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Don't know
    d. NA

14. Do you think that [RACE] people in Brazil should be more conscious of their race/color?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Don't know
    d. NA

15. Would you say your race/color influences your political opinions or associations?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Don't know
    d. NA

16. Do you think that [RACE] people should organize politically on the basis of race/color?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Don't know
    d. NA

End of structured component of interview.

Semi-Structured Interview Guide

After the structured portion, I transitioned the interview to a semi-structured format where I allowed questions and answers to flow in a conversational tone, making sure to cover the ground outlined below.

Education

To begin, can you tell me a little bit more about where you were born and grew up, and what your education was like growing up?

Do your parents have a similar educational background to yours?

What do/did your parents do for work?

Do you have siblings? Do/did they go to school?

What did your parents incentivize education for you when you were young?

[If they have university education] When did you start to consider going to university?

Did you assume you would go?

Did you feel prepared?

Did you know how to apply?

How many times did you apply?

How did you choose your course of study?

Did you use any social program during the admissions process (Enem, Prouni, Fies, quotas, etc)

[If university] When you compare yourself to your peers in high school, would you say that most went to university?

[If no] Why do you think you made it there and they didn't?

How would you describe the quality of your education growing up?

Were your schools public or private?

Growing up what did you learn about slavery?

Did you learn about "racial democracy" (or the myth of the three races)?

[If yes] What did you learn exactly?

[If yes] What do you think of this today?

Racial Identity/Race general

[Referring back to questionnaire] Would you say that your race/color is an important part of who you are in Brazilian society? Por example, there are other ways you could describe yourself, like with class, religion, occupation, etc.

[Referring back to open-ended race question] When I asked you openly how you identify racially, you used the word [open-ended ID]. Why did you choose that word, and not [negro, preto/pardo/branco, moreno]?

Did you always use that word? [If no] When did you start and why?

Did you think a lot about race, generally, when you were growing up?

Did your parents talk about race or racism at home?

Can you remember the first time you were asked to classify yourself racially? Or was this second nature to you?

Do your parents consider you the same race/color that you consider yourself?

[If no] Why not?

[If no] Do they know that you disagree? What do they think about how you identify?

How would you classify your parents? And how would they classify themselves? Generally speaking, would you say that you suffer from racism in Brazil?

[If yes] Is this more diffuse, or are there specific instances that you think of as examples of racism?

[If no] Is there another kind of prejudice that you have experienced? [If needed, suggest class or region]

Reclassification [Applies mostly to reclassifiers]

Do you know how you are classified on your birth certificate?

Do you who chose that category for you?

When did the way you identify racially change for you?

> Was it a particular moment or instant that tipped the scale? Or was it a slower process?

Would you consider yourself to be someone who has "racial consciousness"?

What does the word "consciousness" mean to you?

Would you consider other members of your family racially conscious?

> [If no] Do you try to speak with them about racial questions/issues? How do they respond?

If I asked you to point to a particular cause, or something that provoked/awakened, this consciousness, what would you say?

<u>Affirmative Action/Quotas</u> [save for last if interviewee does not bring it up herself]

Do you support affirmative action for *negros*? Why or why not?

Some people say that affirmative action violates ideas of meritocracy. What do you think?

Other say that affirmative action is un-Brazilian, in part because Brazil is a "racial democracy" and does have racism, and others because Brazilians are too racially mixed to determine who is/not black. What do you think?

[Depending on timing of reclassification] When you were in high school, did you ever consider changing how you identified to be able to use a quota for university?

Do you think "fraud" in affirmative action is a problem in Brazil?

> [If yes] How widespread do you think it is?
>
> [If no] So when you see cases in the news, for example of very light-skinned students with blond hair using quotas to get into university, what do you think about that?

APPENDIX D

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER FIVE

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
1998 x Primary	0.001	(0.052)	-0.033	(0.056)	-0.033	(0.056)
1998 x High School	-0.020	(0.064)	-0.077	(0.075)	-0.081	(0.075)
1998 x University	0.024	(0.117)	-0.010	(0.130)	-0.016	(0.130)
2003 x Primary	0.067	(0.051)	0.014	(0.054)	0.015	(0.054)
2003 x High School	0.154	(0.062)*	0.067	(0.072)	0.062	(0.072)
2003 x University	0.232	(0.110)*	0.188	(0.122)	0.179	(0.122)
2008 x Primary	0.177	(0.052)*	0.089	(0.055)	0.090	(0.055)
2008 x High School	0.302	(0.061)*	0.118	(0.070)+	0.111	(0.070)
2008 x University	0.527	(0.105)*	0.336	(0.116)*	0.322	(0.116)*
2013 x Primary	0.155	(0.055)*	0.056	(0.058)	0.058	(0.058)
2013 x High School	0.348	(0.063)*	0.103	(0.072)	0.096	(0.072)
2013 x University	0.607	(0.106)*	0.343	(0.117)*	0.331	(0.117)*
2015 x Primary	0.203	(0.055)*	0.123	(0.058)*	0.124	(0.058)*
2015 x High School	0.359	(0.063)*	0.126	(0.072)+	0.118	(0.072)
2015 x University	0.686	(0.105)*	0.458	(0.116)*	0.443	(0.116)*
1998 x Income			0.008	(0.009)	0.008	(0.009)
2003 x Income			0.008	(0.009)	0.009	(0.009)
2008 x Income			0.012	(0.009)	0.013	(0.009)
2013 x Income			0.012	(0.009)	0.012	(0.009)
2015 x Income			0.009	(0.009)	0.010	(0.009)
1998 x Female			0.067	(0.064)	0.068	(0.064)
2003 x Female			-0.008	(0.060)	-0.007	(0.060)
2008 x Female			0.010	(0.058)	0.010	(0.058)
2013 x Female			-0.083	(0.059)	-0.083	(0.059)
2015 x Female			-0.040	(0.058)	-0.040	(0.058)
1998 x Municip. Native			0.026	(0.044)	0.025	(0.044)
2003 x Municip. Native			-0.017	(0.043)	-0.016	(0.043)
2008 x Municip. Native			-0.111	(0.042)*	-0.110	(0.042)*
2013 x Municip. Native			-0.041	(0.044)	-0.040	(0.044)
2015 x Municip. Native			-0.038	(0.043)	-0.037	(0.043)
1998 x State migrant			-0.025	(0.064)	-0.025	(0.064)
2003 x State migrant			0.010	(0.064)	0.012	(0.064)
2008 x State migrant			-0.112	(0.070)	-0.110	(0.070)
2013 x State migrant			-0.070	(0.079)	-0.068	(0.079)
2015 x State migrant			-0.189	(0.083)*	-0.187	(0.083)*
1998 x Cohort Lag					0.786	(1.665)
2003 x Cohort Lag					0.425	(1.942)
2008 x Cohort Lag					1.580	(2.030)

2013 x Cohort Lag					0.016	(1.721)
2015 x Cohort Lag					0.378	(1.580)
1998	0.039	(0.043)	-0.014	(0.062)	-0.380	(0.780)
2003	0.155	(0.043)*	0.126	(0.060)*	-0.125	(0.943)
2008	0.250	(0.043)*	0.296	(0.062)*	-0.695	(1.066)
2013	0.299	(0.046)*	0.409	(0.066)*	0.242	(0.909)
2015	0.369	(0.046)*	0.466	(0.066)*	0.079	(0.833)
Primary	-0.804	(0.038)*	-0.506	(0.041)*	-0.510	(0.041)*
High School	-1.282	(0.048)*	-0.628	(0.056)*	-0.627	(0.056)*
University	-2.203	(0.093)*	-1.316	(0.102)*	-1.309	(0.102)*
Income			-0.163	(0.007)*	-0.163	(0.007)*
Female			0.123	(0.051)*	0.124	(0.051)*
Municip. native			0.014	(0.033)	0.012	(0.033)
State migrant			0.158	(0.046)*	0.154	(0.046)*
Cohort Lag					1.741	(1.042)+
Constant	0.644	(0.032)*	1.202	(0.046)*	0.388	(0.489)
Interactive State FX	N		N		N	
Observations	140718		137410		137410	
AIC	185758.188		176818.204		176813.411	

Table D1 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among Cohorts 3 and 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$.

	(4)	
1998 x Primary	-0.033	(0.061)
1998 x High School	-0.106	(0.082)
1998 x University	-0.094	(0.137)
2003 x Primary	0.028	(0.060)
2003 x High School	0.172	(0.078)*
2003 x University	0.198	(0.129)
2008 x Primary	0.077	(0.061)
2008 x High School	0.252	(0.076)*
2008 x University	0.424	(0.122)*
2013 x Primary	0.048	(0.064)
2013 x High School	0.271	(0.078)*
2013 x University	0.422	(0.123)*
2015 x Primary	0.110	(0.064)+
2015 x High School	0.301	(0.078)*
2015 x University	0.527	(0.122)*
1998 x Income	0.017	(0.010)+
2003 x Income	0.014	(0.010)
2008 x Income	0.008	(0.010)
2013 x Income	0.013	(0.010)
2015 x Income	0.017	(0.010)+
1998 x Female	0.122	(0.071)+
2003 x Female	0.064	(0.066)
2008 x Female	0.080	(0.064)
2013 x Female	0.023	(0.065)
2015 x Female	0.029	(0.064)
1998 x Municip. Native	0.067	(0.049)
2003 x Municip. Native	0.040	(0.047)
2008 x Municip. Native	-0.058	(0.047)
2013 x Municip. Native	0.029	(0.048)
2015 x Municip. Native	0.014	(0.048)
1998 x State migrant	0.008	(0.071)
2003 x State migrant	0.006	(0.070)
2008 x State migrant	-0.129	(0.076)+
2013 x State migrant	0.021	(0.087)
2015 x State migrant	-0.083	(0.093)
1998 x Cohort Lag	1.361	(1.813)
2003 x Cohort Lag	0.730	(2.111)
2008 x Cohort Lag	3.347	(2.194)
2013 x Cohort Lag	0.247	(1.865)
2015 x Cohort Lag	2.196	(1.717)
1998	-0.918	(0.878)
2003	-0.279	(1.043)
2008	-1.812	(1.167)
2013	-0.057	(1.002)

2015	-1.152	(0.923)
Primary	-0.321	(0.046)*
High School	-0.777	(0.061)*
University	-1.460	(0.107)*
Income	-0.104	(0.007)*
Female	0.026	(0.056)
Municip. native	-0.091	(0.037)*
State migrant	-0.035	(0.051)
Cohort Lag	0.806	(1.141)
Constant	1.003	(0.557)+
Interactive State FX	Y	
Observations	137410	
AIC	156984.253	

Table D2 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among Cohorts 3 and 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + $p < .1$, * $p < .05$.

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.566	0.592	0.587	0.586	0.628	0.617
	(0.0136)	(0.0155)	(0.0116)	(0.0114)	(0.0132)	(0.0139)
Primary	0.504	0.523	0.529	0.538	0.574	0.575
	(0.0120)	(0.0149)	(0.0103)	(0.0104)	(0.0128)	(0.0132)
High School	0.414	0.417	0.466	0.480	0.526	0.522
	(0.0140)	(0.0160)	(0.0114)	(0.0110)	(0.0139)	(0.0142)
University	0.287	0.291	0.336	0.377	0.415	0.428
	(0.0196)	(0.0184)	(0.0146)	(0.0126)	(0.0157)	(0.0155)

Table D3 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID. Computed from Model 4.

	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.0257	0.0206	0.0202	0.0613***	0.0505***
	(0.0207)	(0.0179)	(0.0177)	(0.0190)	(0.0195)
Primary	0.0191	0.0252	0.0340**	0.0699***	0.0716***
	(0.0191)	(0.0158)	(0.0159)	(0.0175)	(0.0178)
High School	0.00329	0.0520***	0.0664***	0.112***	0.108***
	(0.0213)	(0.0180)	(0.0178)	(0.0197)	(0.0199)
University	0.00377	0.0486**	0.0899***	0.128***	0.140***
	(0.0269)	(0.0245)	(0.0233)	(0.0251)	(0.0250)

Table D4 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993. Computed from Model 4. + $p < .1$, * $p < .05$.

	(1) Excl. Top Decile		(2) Bottom 5 Deciles		(3) Top Decile	
1998 x Primary	-0.043	(0.062)	-0.090	(0.073)	0.634	(0.591)
1998 x High School	-0.108	(0.085)	0.098	(0.133)	0.385	(0.578)
1998 x University	0.117	(0.196)	0.205	(0.599)	0.279	(0.586)
2003 x Primary	0.020	(0.060)	0.044	(0.072)	0.242	(0.561)
2003 x High School	0.146	(0.080)$^{+}$	0.298	(0.125)*	0.523	(0.545)
2003 x University	0.282	(0.184)	0.836	(0.529)	0.458	(0.551)
2008 x Primary	0.066	(0.061)	0.087	(0.074)	0.642	(0.522)
2008 x High School	0.201	(0.079)*	0.423	(0.121)*	0.857	(0.507)$^{+}$
2008 x University	0.570	(0.172)*	1.075	(0.467)*	0.669	(0.513)
2013 x Primary	0.029	(0.064)	0.074	(0.080)	0.630	(0.492)
2013 x High School	0.244	(0.081)*	0.475	(0.125)*	0.631	(0.478)
2013 x University	0.554	(0.173)*	1.108	(0.467)*	0.552	(0.484)
2015 x Primary	0.086	(0.065)	0.028	(0.081)	1.197	(0.497)*
2015 x High School	0.256	(0.081)*	0.495	(0.125)*	1.320	(0.483)*
2015 x University	0.573	(0.171)*	0.963	(0.465)*	1.333	(0.488)*
1998 x Income	0.020	(0.011)$^{+}$	0.013	(0.025)		
2003 x Income	0.019	(0.011)$^{+}$	0.011	(0.024)		
2008 x Income	0.014	(0.010)	0.016	(0.024)		
2013 x Income	0.022	(0.011)*	0.017	(0.026)		
2015 x Income	0.026	(0.011)*	0.046	(0.026)$^{+}$		
1998 x Female	0.107	(0.075)	0.082	(0.098)	0.156	(0.223)
2003 x Female	0.040	(0.070)	0.043	(0.092)	0.161	(0.208)
2008 x Female	0.064	(0.068)	0.126	(0.090)	0.113	(0.196)
2013 x Female	0.012	(0.069)	0.029	(0.093)	-0.040	(0.195)
2015 x Female	0.028	(0.068)	0.034	(0.092)	-0.053	(0.191)
1998 x Municip. native	0.063	(0.051)	0.053	(0.069)	0.134	(0.181)
2003 x Municip. native	0.069	(0.049)	0.089	(0.067)	-0.276	(0.171)
2008 x Municip. native	-0.093	(0.049)$^{+}$	-0.016	(0.068)	0.197	(0.163)
2013 x Municip. native	0.023	(0.051)	0.010	(0.073)	0.101	(0.164)
2015 x Municip. native	-0.004	(0.051)	0.054	(0.072)	0.143	(0.160)
1998 x State migrant	0.025	(0.076)	0.117	(0.104)	-0.059	(0.226)
2003 x State migrant	0.063	(0.076)	0.231	(0.105)*	-0.347	(0.212)
2008 x State migrant	-0.152	(0.083)$^{+}$	-0.270	(0.117)*	0.127	(0.209)
2013 x State migrant	0.072	(0.096)	0.052	(0.144)	-0.037	(0.232)
2015 x State migrant	-0.077	(0.103)	-0.209	(0.153)	-0.005	(0.239)
1998 x Cohort Lag	0.585	(1.890)	-0.984	(2.558)	10.904	(6.541)$^{+}$
2003 x Cohort Lag	1.921	(2.212)	0.356	(3.018)	-9.201	(7.315)
2008 x Cohort Lag	2.985	(2.319)	3.253	(3.287)	3.922	(7.096)
2013 x Cohort Lag	-0.256	(1.981)	-2.637	(2.892)	1.077	(5.917)
2015 x Cohort Lag	1.280	(1.829)	-0.977	(2.664)	6.323	(5.433)
1998	-0.453	(0.917)	-0.082	(1.247)	-6.511	(3.143)*
2003	-0.862	(1.092)	-0.034	(1.495)	4.307	(3.609)
2008	-1.624	(1.234)	-2.021	(1.755)	-2.613	(3.730)

2013	0.202	(1.065)	1.327	(1.566)	-0.911	(3.104)
2015	-0.665	(0.987)	0.245	(1.453)	-4.281	(2.822)
Primary	-0.325	(0.046)*	-0.306	(0.055)*	-0.928	(0.409)*
High School	-0.750	(0.064)*	-0.887	(0.102)*	-1.318	(0.401)*
University	-1.387	(0.157)*	-1.591	(0.447)*	-1.827	(0.407)*
Income	-0.092	(0.008)*	-0.066	(0.019)*		
Female	0.035	(0.060)	0.079	(0.078)	0.024	(0.172)
Municip. native	-0.092	(0.038)*	-0.112	(0.052)*	-0.060	(0.136)
State migrant	-0.021	(0.054)	-0.053	(0.074)	-0.142	(0.161)
Cohort Lag	0.862	(1.188)	1.811	(1.623)	-0.108	(4.200)
Constant	0.865	(0.581)	0.374	(0.799)	1.205	(2.020)
Interactive State FX	Y		Y		Y	
Observations	120468		61464		16942	
AIC	139551.998		70295.603		17285.052	

Table D5 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among Cohorts 3 and 4 and by Income Group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$.

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.590	0.607	0.617	0.611	0.655	0.649
	(0.0138)	(0.0159)	(0.0114)	(0.0119)	(0.0138)	(0.0146)
Primary	0.526	0.535	0.557	0.560	0.597	0.603
	(0.0125)	(0.0155)	(0.0105)	(0.0113)	(0.0138)	(0.0143)
High School	0.441	0.435	0.496	0.500	0.553	0.551
	(0.0153)	(0.0171)	(0.0121)	(0.0122)	(0.0153)	(0.0158)
University	0.318	0.354	0.393	0.445	0.484	0.484
	(0.0298)	(0.0257)	(0.0203)	(0.0163)	(0.0193)	(0.0189)

Table D6 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Excluding Top Decile)

	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.0172	0.0272	0.0217	0.0650***	0.0594***
	(0.0210)	(0.0180)	(0.0183)	(0.0195)	(0.0201)
Primary	0.00862	0.0309*	0.0338**	0.0707***	0.0768***
	(0.0199)	(0.0163)	(0.0168)	(0.0186)	(0.0190)
High School	-0.00541	0.0552***	0.0595***	0.113***	0.110***
	(0.0230)	(0.0195)	(0.0196)	(0.0217)	(0.0220)
University	0.0359	0.0756**	0.127***	0.167***	0.167***
	(0.0394)	(0.0361)	(0.0340)	(0.0355)	(0.0353)

Table D7 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Excluding Top Decile)

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.682	0.680	0.690	0.689	0.716	0.709
	(0.00825)	(0.00754)	(0.00497)	(0.00463)	(0.00657)	(0.00720)
Primary	0.627	0.614	0.632	0.648	0.660	0.662
	(0.00812)	(0.00704)	(0.00410)	(0.00452)	(0.00727)	(0.00780)
High School	0.499	0.538	0.570	0.603	0.620	0.612
	(0.0158)	(0.0131)	(0.00836)	(0.00739)	(0.00966)	(0.0102)
University	0.375	0.362	0.469	0.535	0.548	0.553
	(0.0583)	(0.0512)	(0.0405)	(0.0221)	(0.0203)	(0.0182)

Table D8 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Bottom 5 Deciles)

	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	-0.00173	0.00821	0.00747	0.0341***	0.0277**
	(0.0112)	(0.00963)	(0.00946)	(0.0105)	(0.0109)
Primary	-0.0137	0.00508	0.0201**	0.0330***	0.0347***
	(0.0107)	(0.00910)	(0.00929)	(0.0109)	(0.0113)
High School	0.0388*	0.0712***	0.104***	0.121***	0.113***
	(0.0205)	(0.0179)	(0.0174)	(0.0185)	(0.0188)
University	-0.0136	0.0941	0.159**	0.173***	0.178***
	(0.0776)	(0.0710)	(0.0624)	(0.0618)	(0.0611)

Table D9 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Bottom 5 Deciles)

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.433	0.450	0.446	0.418	0.466	0.350
	(0.0502)	(0.0476)	(0.0405)	(0.0350)	(0.0289)	(0.0293)
Primary	0.305	0.325	0.369	0.384	0.413	0.396
	(0.0237)	(0.0217)	(0.0145)	(0.0123)	(0.0144)	(0.0148)
High School	0.247	0.244	0.303	0.327	0.333	0.328
	(0.0205)	(0.0169)	(0.00954)	(0.00768)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)
University	0.167	0.157	0.211	0.216	0.232	0.245
	(0.0180)	(0.0142)	(0.00879)	(0.00609)	(0.00863)	(0.00924)

Table D10 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Top Decile)

	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.0174	0.0132	-0.0145	0.0336	-0.0829
	(0.0692)	(0.0645)	(0.0612)	(0.0579)	(0.0581)
Primary	0.0206	0.0644**	0.0790***	0.109***	0.0911***
	(0.0321)	(0.0277)	(0.0267)	(0.0277)	(0.0279)
High School	-0.00320	0.0560**	0.0800***	0.0862***	0.0815***
	(0.0265)	(0.0226)	(0.0219)	(0.0232)	(0.0233)
University	-0.00908	0.0444**	0.0498***	0.0652***	0.0784***
	(0.0229)	(0.0200)	(0.0190)	(0.0199)	(0.0202)

Table D11 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Top Decile)

	(1) Full Sample	
1998 x Primary	-0.007	(0.039)
1998 x High School	0.009	(0.053)
1998 x University	-0.043	(0.084)
2003 x Primary	0.018	(0.037)
2003 x High School	0.181	(0.049)*
2003 x University	0.123	(0.078)
2008 x Primary	0.096	(0.037)*
2008 x High School	0.327	(0.049)*
2008 x University	0.382	(0.075)*
2013 x Primary	0.019	(0.039)
2013 x High School	0.250	(0.050)*
2013 x University	0.315	(0.075)*
2015 x Primary	0.094	(0.039)*
2015 x High School	0.293	(0.049)*
2015 x University	0.412	(0.074)*
1998 x Income	-0.004	(0.007)
2003 x Income	0.004	(0.006)
2008 x Income	0.003	(0.006)
2013 x Income	0.016	(0.006)*
2015 x Income	0.015	(0.006)*
1998 x Female	0.038	(0.042)
2003 x Female	0.049	(0.040)
2008 x Female	0.041	(0.038)
2013 x Female	0.000	(0.039)
2015 x Female	0.034	(0.038)
1998 x Municip. native	0.050	(0.032)
2003 x Municip. native	0.049	(0.031)
2008 x Municip. native	-0.020	(0.030)
2013 x Municip. native	0.036	(0.031)
2015 x Municip. native	0.024	(0.031)
1998 x State migrant	0.023	(0.048)
2003 x State migrant	0.028	(0.046)
2008 x State migrant	-0.090	(0.048)+
2013 x State migrant	0.050	(0.053)
2015 x State migrant	-0.020	(0.055)
1998 x Cohort Lag	-0.323	(0.599)
2003 x Cohort Lag	0.687	(0.564)
2008 x Cohort Lag	1.288	(0.557)*
2013 x Cohort Lag	2.151	(0.630)*
2015 x Cohort Lag	3.123	(0.588)*
1998	0.149	(0.321)
2003	-0.074	(0.305)
2008	-0.596	(0.309)+

2013	-1.118	(0.353)*
2015	-1.529	(0.333)*
Primary	-0.319	(0.029)*
High School	-0.822	(0.040)*
University	-1.477	(0.065)*
Income	-0.092	(0.005)*
Female	0.044	(0.034)
Municip. native	-0.100	(0.024)*
State migrant	-0.082	(0.035)*
Cohort Lag	1.373	(0.437)*
Constant	0.553	(0.234)*
Interactive State FX	Y	
Observations	363,968	
AIC	414725.317	

Table D12 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among All Cohorts, Full Sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$.

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.574	0.577	0.596	0.596	0.623	0.608
	(0.00697)	(0.00631)	(0.00455)	(0.00406)	(0.00498)	(0.00522)
Primary	0.512	0.513	0.536	0.551	0.564	0.564
	(0.00584)	(0.00505)	(0.00312)	(0.00294)	(0.00447)	(0.00470)
High School	0.413	0.416	0.468	0.495	0.508	0.502
	(0.00774)	(0.00640)	(0.00407)	(0.00384)	(0.00540)	(0.00558)
University	0.291	0.284	0.327	0.373	0.386	0.393
	(0.0113)	(0.00920)	(0.00721)	(0.00603)	(0.00686)	(0.00676)

Table D13 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Full Sample)

	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.00333	0.0216***	0.0220***	0.0491***	0.0336***
	(0.00941)	(0.00833)	(0.00807)	(0.00857)	(0.00871)
Primary	0.00102	0.0243***	0.0393***	0.0517***	0.0515***
	(0.00772)	(0.00662)	(0.00654)	(0.00736)	(0.00749)
High School	0.00291	0.0547***	0.0825***	0.0949***	0.0889***
	(0.0100)	(0.00875)	(0.00864)	(0.00944)	(0.00954)
University	-0.00720	0.0361***	0.0819***	0.0951***	0.102***
	(0.0146)	(0.0134)	(0.0128)	(0.0132)	(0.0131)

Table D14 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Full Sample)

	(2) Excl. Top Decile		(3) Bottom 5 Deciles		(4) Top Decile	
1998 x Primary	-0.014	(0.039)	-0.048	(0.048)	0.046	(0.333)
1998 x High School	0.023	(0.055)	0.217	(0.092)*	-0.085	(0.325)
1998 x University	0.139	(0.121)	-0.013	(0.378)	-0.136	(0.328)
2003 x Primary	0.010	(0.037)	-0.008	(0.046)	0.291	(0.324)
2003 x High School	0.189	(0.052)*	0.318	(0.084)*	0.270	(0.317)
2003 x University	0.249	(0.113)*	0.446	(0.340)	0.259	(0.320)
2008 x Primary	0.084	(0.038)*	0.074	(0.047)	0.520	(0.306)+
2008 x High School	0.314	(0.051)*	0.483	(0.081)*	0.569	(0.298)+
2008 x University	0.556	(0.106)*	0.757	(0.303)*	0.480	(0.301)
2013 x Primary	0.004	(0.040)	-0.004	(0.050)	0.432	(0.287)
2013 x High School	0.247	(0.052)*	0.423	(0.083)*	0.367	(0.279)
2013 x University	0.455	(0.105)*	0.679	(0.299)*	0.351	(0.281)
2015 x Primary	0.075	(0.040)+	0.036	(0.051)	0.939	(0.294)*
2015 x High School	0.278	(0.052)*	0.412	(0.082)*	0.930	(0.286)*
2015 x University	0.449	(0.104)*	0.727	(0.296)*	1.013	(0.288)*
1998 x Income	-0.001	(0.007)	-0.004	(0.016)		
2003 x Income	0.008	(0.007)	-0.001	(0.016)		
2008 x Income	0.010	(0.007)	0.017	(0.016)		
2013 x Income	0.024	(0.007)*	0.032	(0.016)*		
2015 x Income	0.023	(0.007)*	0.039	(0.016)*		
1998 x Female	0.054	(0.045)	0.045	(0.061)	-0.159	(0.138)
2003 x Female	0.040	(0.042)	0.009	(0.057)	0.057	(0.126)
2008 x Female	0.034	(0.040)	0.064	(0.055)	0.044	(0.119)
2013 x Female	0.001	(0.041)	0.012	(0.056)	-0.066	(0.119)
2015 x Female	0.033	(0.041)	0.036	(0.056)	-0.025	(0.118)
1998 x Municip. native	0.052	(0.034)	0.052	(0.046)	0.034	(0.115)
2003 x Municip. native	0.054	(0.032)+	0.072	(0.044)+	0.013	(0.105)
2008 x Municip. native	-0.038	(0.031)	0.003	(0.044)	0.121	(0.101)
2013 x Municip. native	0.031	(0.033)	0.044	(0.046)	0.091	(0.101)
2015 x Municip. native	0.017	(0.032)	0.070	(0.046)	0.097	(0.100)
1998 x State migrant	0.034	(0.051)	0.098	(0.070)	-0.024	(0.146)
2003 x State migrant	0.068	(0.049)	0.146	(0.068)*	-0.239	(0.136)+
2008 x State migrant	-0.081	(0.052)	-0.153	(0.072)*	-0.037	(0.133)
2013 x State migrant	0.116	(0.059)+	0.124	(0.084)	-0.096	(0.139)
2015 x State migrant	0.025	(0.061)	0.053	(0.087)	-0.155	(0.147)
1998 x Cohort Lag	-0.429	(0.616)	-0.742	(0.834)	1.736	(2.574)
2003 x Cohort Lag	0.289	(0.585)	-0.128	(0.797)	5.457	(2.283)*
2008 x Cohort Lag	1.078	(0.583)+	0.738	(0.809)	3.404	(2.188)
2013 x Cohort Lag	1.795	(0.665)*	0.412	(0.947)	4.891	(2.305)*
2015 x Cohort Lag	2.790	(0.618)*	1.466	(0.876)+	6.124	(2.225)*
1998	0.229	(0.332)	0.387	(0.465)	-1.270	(1.302)
2003	0.102	(0.317)	0.428	(0.438)	-2.515	(1.176)*
2008	-0.502	(0.323)	-0.397	(0.452)	-1.950	(1.144)+

2013	-0.966	(0.373)*	-0.266	(0.535)	-2.548	(1.219)*
2015	-1.364	(0.352)*	-0.687	(0.504)	-3.719	(1.172)*
Primary	-0.321	(0.029)*	-0.288	(0.036)*	-0.695	(0.242)*
High School	-0.809	(0.042)*	-0.915	(0.070)*	-1.046	(0.237)*
University	-1.410	(0.095)*	-1.506	(0.285)*	-1.623	(0.239)*
Income	-0.081	(0.005)*	-0.067	(0.013)*		
Female	0.045	(0.035)	0.104	(0.048)*	0.061	(0.106)
Municip. native	-0.096	(0.025)*	-0.095	(0.035)*	-0.112	(0.086)
State migrant	-0.077	(0.037)*	-0.114	(0.051)*	-0.123	(0.105)
Cohort Lag	1.439	(0.449)*	1.500	(0.609)*	-0.350	(1.950)
Constant	0.441	(0.242)+	0.251	(0.333)	0.838	(0.982)
Interactive State FX	Y		Y		Y	
Observations	317,595		160,967		46,373	
AIC	367159.037		183383.226		46868.049	

Table D15 Pseudo-Panel Estimates of Nonwhite Identification among All Cohorts and by Income Group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + $p < .1$, * $p < .05$.

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.597	0.601	0.618	0.620	0.648	0.634
	(0.00696)	(0.00628)	(0.00448)	(0.00399)	(0.00506)	(0.00536)
Primary	0.535	0.535	0.556	0.573	0.585	0.586
	(0.00603)	(0.00519)	(0.00317)	(0.00307)	(0.00481)	(0.00507)
High School	0.437	0.443	0.493	0.519	0.534	0.528
	(0.00859)	(0.00704)	(0.00452)	(0.00431)	(0.00605)	(0.00626)
University	0.321	0.347	0.382	0.444	0.452	0.438
	(0.0175)	(0.0144)	(0.0116)	(0.00882)	(0.00932)	(0.00879)

Table D16 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Excluding Top Decile)

	1998	**2003**	**2008**	**2013**	**2015**
< Primary	0.00377	0.0203**	0.0231***	0.0504***	0.0366***
	(0.00938)	(0.00828)	(0.00803)	(0.00861)	(0.00879)
Primary	-3.12e-06	0.0214***	0.0382***	0.0504***	0.0511***
	(0.00795)	(0.00681)	(0.00676)	(0.00771)	(0.00788)
High School	0.00606	0.0557***	0.0821***	0.0973***	0.0905***
	(0.0111)	(0.00971)	(0.00961)	(0.0105)	(0.0106)
University	0.0262	0.0608***	0.123***	0.130***	0.117***
	(0.0227)	(0.0210)	(0.0196)	(0.0199)	(0.0196)

Table D17 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Excluding Top Decile)

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.682	0.680	0.690	0.689	0.716	0.709
	(0.00825)	(0.00754)	(0.00497)	(0.00463)	(0.00657)	(0.00720)
Primary	0.627	0.614	0.632	0.648	0.660	0.662
	(0.00812)	(0.00704)	(0.00410)	(0.00452)	(0.00727)	(0.00780)
High School	0.499	0.538	0.570	0.603	0.620	0.612
	(0.0158)	(0.0131)	(0.00836)	(0.00739)	(0.00966)	(0.0102)
University	0.375	0.362	0.469	0.535	0.548	0.553
	(0.0583)	(0.0512)	(0.0405)	(0.0221)	(0.0203)	(0.0182)

Table D18 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID (Bottom 5 Deciles)

	1998	**2003**	**2008**	**2013**	**2015**
< Primary	-0.00173	0.00821	0.00747	0.0341***	0.0277**
	(0.0112)	(0.00963)	(0.00946)	(0.0105)	(0.0109)
Primary	-0.0137	0.00508	0.0201**	0.0330***	0.0347***
	(0.0107)	(0.00910)	(0.00929)	(0.0109)	(0.0113)
High School	0.0388*	0.0712***	0.104***	0.121***	0.113***
	(0.0205)	(0.0179)	(0.0174)	(0.0185)	(0.0188)
University	-0.0136	0.0941	0.159**	0.173***	0.178***
	(0.0776)	(0.0710)	(0.0624)	(0.0618)	(0.0611)

Table D19 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993 (Bottom 5 Deciles)

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.433	0.450	0.446	0.418	0.466	0.350
	(0.0502)	(0.0476)	(0.0405)	(0.0350)	(0.0289)	(0.0293)
Primary	0.305	0.325	0.369	0.384	0.413	0.396
	(0.0237)	(0.0217)	(0.0145)	(0.0123)	(0.0144)	(0.0148)
High School	0.247	0.244	0.303	0.327	0.333	0.328
	(0.0205)	(0.0169)	(0.00954)	(0.00768)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)
University	0.167	0.157	0.211	0.216	0.232	0.245
	(0.0180)	(0.0142)	(0.00879)	(0.00609)	(0.00863)	(0.00924)

Table D20 Predicted Probabilities of Nonwhite ID

	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
< Primary	0.0174	0.0132	-0.0145	0.0336	-0.0829
	(0.0692)	(0.0645)	(0.0612)	(0.0579)	(0.0581)
Primary	0.0206	0.0644**	0.0790***	0.109***	0.0911***
	(0.0321)	(0.0277)	(0.0267)	(0.0277)	(0.0279)
High School	-0.00320	0.0560**	0.0800***	0.0862***	0.0815***
	(0.0265)	(0.0226)	(0.0219)	(0.0232)	(0.0233)
University	-0.00908	0.0444**	0.0498***	0.0652***	0.0784***
	(0.0229)	(0.0200)	(0.0190)	(0.0199)	(0.0202)

Table D21 Change in Predicted Probability of Nonwhite ID Relative to 1993

	Brown ID vs. White ID		Black ID vs. White ID	
1998 x Primary	-0.048	(0.063)	0.007	(0.114)
1998 x High School	-0.114	(0.087)	0.013	(0.184)
1998 x University	0.099	(0.205)	0.349	(0.539)
2003 x Primary	-0.002	(0.061)	0.174	(0.110)
2003 x High School	0.093	(0.083)	0.561	(0.169)*
2003 x University	0.201	(0.193)	0.882	(0.502)+
2008 x Primary	0.052	(0.062)	0.175	(0.108)
2008 x High School	0.134	(0.081)+	0.663	(0.163)*
2008 x University	0.525	(0.180)*	0.985	(0.483)*
2013 x Primary	0.027	(0.066)	0.088	(0.110)
2013 x High School	0.193	(0.084)*	0.628	(0.164)*
2013 x University	0.518	(0.181)*	0.927	(0.481)+
2015 x Primary	0.079	(0.066)	0.167	(0.109)
2015 x High School	0.189	(0.084)*	0.698	(0.162)*
2015 x University	0.504	(0.180)*	1.073	(0.478)*
1998 x Income Decile	0.018	(0.011)	0.035	(0.022)
2003 x Income Decile	0.014	(0.011)	0.044	(0.020)*
2008 x Income Decile	0.010	(0.011)	0.038	(0.020)+
2013 x Income Decile	0.017	(0.011)	0.047	(0.020)*
2015 x Income Decile	0.026	(0.011)*	0.034	(0.020)+
1998 x Female	0.097	(0.076)	0.104	(0.136)
2003 x Female	0.040	(0.071)	-0.020	(0.126)
2008 x Female	0.075	(0.069)	-0.060	(0.122)
2013 x Female	0.028	(0.070)	-0.141	(0.122)
2015 x Female	0.032	(0.070)	-0.092	(0.121)
1998 x Municip. native	0.054	(0.053)	0.077	(0.101)
2003 x Municip. native	0.079	(0.051)	-0.033	(0.095)
2008 x Municip. native	-0.078	(0.051)	-0.224	(0.093)*
2013 x Municip. native	0.027	(0.053)	-0.071	(0.094)
2015 x Municip. native	0.026	(0.053)	-0.200	(0.093)*
1998 x State migrant	0.025	(0.076)	0.091	(0.168)
2003 x State migrant	0.056	(0.076)	0.186	(0.161)
2008 x State migrant	-0.140	(0.083)+	-0.108	(0.169)
2013 x State migrant	0.059	(0.096)	0.272	(0.178)
2015 x State migrant	-0.064	(0.101)	0.003	(0.186)
1998 x Cohort Lag	0.117	(1.957)	3.537	(3.697)
2003 x Cohort Lag	2.036	(2.295)	1.697	(4.122)
2008 x Cohort Lag	2.422	(2.407)	5.886	(4.084)
2013 x Cohort Lag	0.033	(2.057)	-0.934	(3.488)
2015 x Cohort Lag	2.070	(1.899)	-1.200	(3.223)
1998	-0.215	(0.949)	-1.898	(1.865)
2003	-0.869	(1.135)	-0.987	(2.082)
2008	-1.412	(1.282)	-2.215	(2.185)
2013	-0.029	(1.109)	1.440	(1.882)

2015	-1.251	(1.026)	1.943	(1.738)
Primary	-0.309	(0.047)*	-0.440	(0.087)*
High School	-0.707	(0.066)*	-1.105	(0.145)*
University	-1.338	(0.164)*	-1.816	(0.465)*
Income Decile	-0.090	(0.008)*	-0.106	(0.017)*
Female	-0.000	(0.060)	0.271	(0.111)*
Municip. native	-0.119	(0.040)*	0.096	(0.078)
State migrant	0.006	(0.053)	-0.287	(0.125)*
Cohort Lag	1.026	(1.225)	-0.278	(2.448)
Constant	0.705	(0.601)	-1.373	(1.255)
Interactive State FX	Y		Y	

Table D22 Multinomial Logit Pseudo-Panel Estimates (Excluding Top Income Decile). $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 120,468, AIC = 195143.493.

		1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
White ID	< Primary	0.410	0.392	0.383	0.388	0.345	0.350
		(0.0137)	(0.0160)	(0.0114)	(0.0119)	(0.0139)	(0.0146)
	Primary	0.474	0.465	0.443	0.440	0.403	0.397
		(0.0125)	(0.0155)	(0.0105)	(0.0113)	(0.0138)	(0.0144)
	High School	0.559	0.565	0.504	0.500	0.446	0.447
		(0.0154)	(0.0172)	(0.0121)	(0.0123)	(0.0155)	(0.0159)
	University	0.682	0.647	0.607	0.555	0.516	0.514
		(0.0303)	(0.0259)	(0.0206)	(0.0167)	(0.0194)	(0.0192)
Brown ID	< Primary	0.521	0.512	0.532	0.514	0.521	0.500
		(0.0142)	(0.0170)	(0.0121)	(0.0120)	(0.0151)	(0.0155)
	Primary	0.472	0.457	0.479	0.471	0.482	0.469
		(0.0126)	(0.0157)	(0.0109)	(0.0112)	(0.0143)	(0.0146)
	High School	0.406	0.383	0.426	0.412	0.438	0.415
		(0.0152)	(0.0167)	(0.0121)	(0.0119)	(0.0154)	(0.0153)
	University	0.296	0.311	0.333	0.376	0.391	0.367
		(0.0300)	(0.0252)	(0.0203)	(0.0164)	(0.0189)	(0.0180)
Black ID	< Primary	0.0695	0.0960	0.0850	0.0980	0.134	0.150
		(0.00850)	(0.0131)	(0.00771)	(0.00633)	(0.0116)	(0.0128)
	Primary	0.0543	0.0776	0.0784	0.0888	0.115	0.134
		(0.00625)	(0.0104)	(0.00644)	(0.00531)	(0.00996)	(0.0114)
	High School	0.0349	0.0520	0.0702	0.0882	0.116	0.137
		(0.00556)	(0.00821)	(0.00658)	(0.00595)	(0.0108)	(0.0123)
	University	0.0226	0.0429	0.0609	0.0694	0.0929	0.119
		(0.0103)	(0.0120)	(0.0108)	(0.00798)	(0.0118)	(0.0135)

Table D23 Predicted Probabilities of White, Brown, and Black ID

		1998	2003	2008	2013	2015
White ID	< Primary	-0.0182	-0.0266	-0.0215	-0.0649***	-0.0600***
		(0.0211)	(0.0178)	(0.0182)	(0.0195)	(0.0200)
	Primary	-0.00909	-0.0310*	-0.0342**	-0.0707***	-0.0774***
		(0.0199)	(0.0163)	(0.0168)	(0.0186)	(0.0190)
	High School	0.00574	-0.0553***	-0.0594***	-0.113***	-0.112***
		(0.0230)	(0.0196)	(0.0197)	(0.0218)	(0.0221)
	University	-0.0353	-0.0753**	-0.127***	-0.166***	-0.167***
		(0.0398)	(0.0366)	(0.0346)	(0.0360)	(0.0359)
Brown ID	< Primary	-0.00819	0.0111	-0.00695	0.000596	-0.0201
		(0.0221)	(0.0186)	(0.0185)	(0.0207)	(0.0210)
	Primary	-0.0143	0.00686	-0.000307	0.00996	-0.00251
		(0.0201)	(0.0166)	(0.0168)	(0.0190)	(0.0193)
	High School	-0.0229	0.0199	0.00611	0.0320	0.00942
		(0.0226)	(0.0195)	(0.0193)	(0.0217)	(0.0216)
	University	0.0150	0.0370	0.0804**	0.0960***	0.0715**
		(0.0391)	(0.0362)	(0.0342)	(0.0354)	(0.0350)
Black ID	< Primary	0.0264*	0.0155	0.0285***	0.0643***	0.0801***
		(0.0156)	(0.0115)	(0.0106)	(0.0144)	(0.0154)
	Primary	0.0234*	0.0241***	0.0345***	0.0608***	0.0799***
		(0.0121)	(0.00897)	(0.00820)	(0.0118)	(0.0130)
	High School	0.0171*	0.0353***	0.0533***	0.0808***	0.102***
		(0.00992)	(0.00862)	(0.00814)	(0.0121)	(0.0135)
	University	0.0203	0.0383**	0.0468***	0.0703***	0.0959***
		(0.0158)	(0.0149)	(0.0130)	(0.0157)	(0.0170)

Table D24 Change in Predicted Probability of Racial ID Relative to 1993

Priming Experiment

	(1) White ID	(2) White ID	(3) Brown ID	(4) Brown ID	(5) Black ID	(6) Black ID
Recognition x Primary	-0.034	-0.135	0.057	0.083	-0.023	0.052
	(0.123)	(0.104)	(0.132)	(0.137)	(0.110)	(0.094)
Recognition x High School	-0.004	-0.168	0.037	0.090	-0.033	0.077
	(0.125)	(0.106)	(0.134)	(0.139)	(0.112)	(0.096)
Recognition x University	0.071	-0.083	-0.061	0.034	-0.010	0.049
	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.127)	(0.132)	(0.106)	(0.091)
Quotas x Primary	-0.025	-0.123	0.194	0.266	-0.168	-0.142
	(0.123)	(0.103)	(0.132)	(0.135)$^{+}$	(0.110)	(0.093)
Quotas x High School	0.029	-0.100	0.178	0.280	-0.207	-0.180
	(0.121)	(0.102)	(0.130)	(0.134)*	(0.109)$^{+}$	(0.092)$^{+}$
Quotas x University	0.040	-0.019	-0.045	0.073	0.005	-0.054
	(0.120)	(0.101)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.108)	(0.091)
Both x Primary	0.144	-0.138	0.197	0.296	-0.340	-0.158
	(0.125)	(0.106)	(0.134)	(0.139)*	(0.112)*	(0.095)$^{+}$
Both x High School	0.058	-0.106	0.245	0.311	-0.303	-0.205
	(0.124)	(0.106)	(0.133)$^{+}$	(0.139)*	(0.112)*	(0.096)*
Both x University	0.033	-0.037	0.104	0.183	-0.137	-0.146
	(0.123)	(0.105)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.111)	(0.095)
Recognition	0.008	0.100	0.009	-0.025	-0.017	-0.075
	(0.088)	(0.075)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.079)	(0.068)
Quotas	-0.012	0.035	-0.054	-0.124	0.066	0.089
	(0.087)	(0.073)	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.078)	(0.066)
Both	-0.072	0.069	-0.130	-0.207	0.203	0.138
	(0.090)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.102)*	(0.081)*	(0.070)*
Primary	-0.056	0.015	0.015	-0.026	0.041	0.011
	(0.086)	(0.074)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.078)	(0.066)
High School	-0.102	-0.065	0.053	0.007	0.049	0.058
	(0.086)	(0.073)	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.066)
University	0.040	-0.021	0.035	0.001	-0.075	0.021
	(0.082)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.073)	(0.066)
Income		0.037		-0.049		0.012
		(0.017)*		(0.022)*		(0.015)
Age		0.026		-0.011		-0.015
		(0.009)*		(0.012)		(0.008)$^{+}$

Female		0.028		-0.054		0.027
		(0.027)		(0.035)		(0.024)
Recife		-0.025		0.025		0.000
		(0.028)		(0.037)		(0.025)
Skin tone		-0.326		0.035		0.291
		(0.022)*		(0.028)		(0.019)*
Constant	0.339	0.865	0.419	0.442	0.242	-0.307
	(0.059)*	(0.077)*	(0.063)*	(0.101)*	(0.053)*	(0.070)*
Hair type FX	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	942	864	942	864	942	864
R^2	0.023	0.381	0.027	0.072	0.029	0.375

Table D25 Testing for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Level of Education. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(1) White ID	(2) White ID	(3) Brown ID	(4) Brown ID	(5) Black ID	(6) Black ID
Recognition x Medium	0.110	0.141	-0.055	-0.087	-0.055	-0.055
	(0.076)	(0.079)$^{+}$	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.067)	(0.070)
Recognition x Dark	0.068	0.065	-0.137	-0.138	0.069	0.073
	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.081)	(0.083)
Quotas x Medium	-0.002	0.007	0.044	0.038	-0.041	-0.045
	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.067)	(0.069)
Quotas x Dark	0.031	0.038	-0.058	-0.092	0.028	0.054
	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.082)	(0.084)
Both x Medium	0.027	0.023	0.036	0.019	-0.063	-0.041
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Both x Dark	0.060	0.065	-0.031	-0.068	-0.029	0.003
	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.082)	(0.085)
Recognition	-0.045	-0.057	0.046	0.064	-0.000	-0.007
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Quotas	-0.031	-0.031	0.011	0.022	0.019	0.009
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Both	-0.037	-0.017	-0.010	-0.012	0.047	0.029
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Medium	-0.566	-0.514	0.381	0.381	0.185	0.133
	(0.055)*	(0.059)*	(0.068)*	(0.074)*	(0.048)*	(0.052)*
Dark	-0.681	-0.630	-0.018	0.012	0.698	0.619
	(0.063)*	(0.069)*	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.055)*	(0.061)*
Income		0.039		-0.046		0.007
		(0.016)*		(0.021)*		(0.014)
Age		0.024		-0.005		-0.019
		(0.009)*		(0.011)		(0.008)*
Female		0.009		-0.024		0.014
		(0.026)		(0.032)		(0.023)
Recife		-0.001		-0.025		0.026
		(0.027)		(0.034)		(0.024)
educ2		-0.023		0.025		-0.002
		(0.013)$^{+}$		(0.016)		(0.011)
Constant	0.681	0.642	0.309	0.294	0.011	0.064
	(0.038)*	(0.070)*	(0.047)*	(0.087)*	(0.034)	(0.061)
Observations	942	864	942	864	942	864
R^2	0.371	0.401	0.169	0.189	0.399	0.427

Table D26 Testing for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Skin Tone. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses

List Experiment

		Item Counts					
Row		0	1	2	3	4	Sum
1	Treatment	0.600	0.312	0.059	0.019	0.011	1.000
2	Treatment "at least"	1.000	0.400	0.088	0.030	0.011	
3	Control	0.581	0.316	0.082	0.021	0.000	1.000
4	Control "at least"	1.000	0.419	0.103	0.021	0.000	
5	2-4 Joint	0.000	-0.019	-0.015	0.008	0.011	-0.014
6	2-4 Conditional	0.000	-0.061	-0.250	0.450	n/a	
	Row 5 p-value	0.55	0.89	0.16	0.82	n/a	

Table D27 Evaluating Design Effects Assumption. Row 5 values for counts 1 and 2 are negative, suggesting a possible design effect. However difference-in-proportion tests do not reveal significant differences (p-values of 0.89 and 0.16, respectively).

	Treatment (T_i=1)		Control (T_i =0)	
Response (Y_i)	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
3	0.0101	0.0045	0.0120	0.0080
2	0.0062	0.0099	0.0781	0.0157
1	-0.0216	0.0187	0.3308	0.0254
0	-0.0177	0.0312	0.6020	0.0220

Table D28 Blair and Imai's Statistical Test for Design Effects. Bonferroni-corrected p-value = 0.43.

	Full Sample		"At Least 1"	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
Control	0.543 (0.033)	475	1.296 (0.040)	199
Treatment	0.528 (0.035)	475	1.321 (0.032)	190
Difference	-0.014 (0.049)	-	0.02 (0.063)	-
T-Statistic	-0.48	-	0.01	-

Table D29 Mean reported list items by treatment group. "At Least 1" reports means and difference among respondents claiming to have completed at least 1 activity listed.

	(1) Full Sample	(2) Full Sample	(3) Full Sample	(4) At Least 1	(5) At Least 1	(6) At Least 1
Treatment	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Education		0.00	0.00		-0.04	-0.04
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Age		-0.31*	-0.30*		-0.02	-0.02
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Female		-0.39*	-0.40*		-0.09	-0.10
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Income		0.18*	0.15*		0.03	0.03
		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Brown ID		0.15	0.12		0.05	0.05
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)
Black ID		-0.01	0.02		0.03	0.07
		(0.18)	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Skin tone		-0.10	-0.06		-0.01	0.01
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Recife			-0.37*			-0.05
			(0.10)			(0.10)
Constant	-0.61*	0.66*	0.66*	0.26*	0.41+	0.42+
	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.25)
ln(alpha)	-2.11*	-15.18	-15.32	-51.23	-26.30	-26.30
	(0.77)	(642.85)	(490.02)			
Hair type FX	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
N	950	857	857	389	354	354

Table D30 Negative Binomial Models of List Item Counts. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment x Primary		-0.12		-0.06	
		(0.14)		(0.14)	
Treatment x High School		-0.07		0.05	
		(0.14)		(0.15)	
Treatment x University		-0.19		0.01	
		(0.14)		(0.14)	
Treatment x Medium			-0.03		-0.09
			(0.11)		(0.11)
Treatment x Dark			-0.03		-0.13
			(0.14)		(0.14)
Treatment	-0.01	0.08	0.01	-0.02	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Primary		0.31		0.09	0.05
		(0.10)*		(0.10)	(0.07)
High School		0.23		-0.03	-0.00
		(0.10)*		(0.11)	(0.08)
University		0.36		0.00	0.00
		(0.10)*		(0.11)	(0.08)
Medium			0.00	-0.05	-0.00
			(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Dark			-0.09	-0.06	0.01
			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Recife				-0.20	-0.20
				(0.05)*	(0.05)*
Age				-0.14	-0.14
				(0.02)*	(0.02)*
Female				-0.21	-0.21
				(0.05)*	(0.05)*
Income				0.10	0.10
				(0.03)*	(0.03)*
Brown				0.08	0.08
				(0.07)	(0.07)
Black				0.03	0.02
				(0.10)	(0.10)
Constant	0.54	0.31	0.56	1.17	1.14
	(0.03)*	(0.07)*	(0.05)*	(0.13)*	(0.12)*
Observations	950	950	950	857	857
R^2	0.000	0.020	0.003	0.150	0.150

Table D31 Regression-Adjusted Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on the Full Sample. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment x Primary		-0.19		-0.20	
		(0.21)		(0.22)	
Treatment x High School		-0.02		0.03	
		(0.21)		(0.23)	
Treatment x University		-0.17		-0.12	
		(0.20)		(0.22)	
Treatment x Medium			-0.27		-0.35
			(0.14)$^{+}$		(0.15)*
Treatment x Dark			0.07		-0.03
			(0.18)		(0.20)
Treatment	0.02	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.20
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.10)$^{+}$
Primary		0.18		0.12	0.02
		(0.15)		(0.16)	(0.11)
High School		0.04		-0.05	-0.03
		(0.15)		(0.16)	(0.12)
University		0.05		-0.08	-0.13
		(0.14)		(0.16)	(0.12)
Medium			0.13	-0.03	0.14
			(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Dark			-0.04	0.05	0.05
			(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Recife				-0.06	-0.06
				(0.08)	(0.08)
Age				-0.02	-0.02
				(0.03)	(0.03)
Female				-0.14	-0.14
				(0.07)$^{+}$	(0.07)$^{+}$
Income				0.05	0.04
				(0.04)	(0.04)
Brown				0.06	0.08
				(0.10)	(0.10)
Black				0.06	0.10
				(0.14)	(0.13)
Constant	1.30	1.22	1.25	1.38	1.35
	(0.04)*	(0.12)*	(0.07)*	(0.20)*	(0.18)*
Observations	389	389	389	354	354
R^2	0.000	0.010	0.014	0.047	0.059

Table D32 Regression-Adjusted Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects among "At Least 1" Respondents. $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Full model results from Imai and Blair's multivariate list analysis

	Least Squares Estimator				Maximum Likelihood Estimator					
	Linear		Nonlinear		Constrained		Unconstrained			
Variables	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95% CI
Sensitive Item										
Age	1.00	(0.99, 1.00)	0.92	(0.79, 1.07)	0.93*	(0.88, 0.98)	1.02	(0.99, 1.06)		
Female	1.04	(0.87, 1.25)	4.29	(0.04, 455.7)	2.56	(0.58, 11.2)	0.49	(0.15, 1.56)		
Education	0.99	(0.91, 1.07)	0.29	(0.03, 2.80)	0.48*	(0.24, 0.97)	1.25	(0.76, 2.07)		
Skin tone	0.96	(0.85, 1.09)	0.08	(0.00, 15.48)	0.41+	(0.15, 1.16)	1.44	(0.73, 2.85)		
Control Item							*h0(y;x,psi0)*		*h1(y;x,psi1)*	
Age	0.99*	(0.98, 0.99)	0.97*	(0.96, 0.98)	0.97*	(0.96, 0.98)	0.96*	(0.95, 0.97)	0.90*	(0.83, 0.97)
Female	0.77*	(0.68, 0.88)	0.55*	(0.40, 0.74)	0.51*	(0.40, 0.64)	0.60*	(0.47, 0.76)	0.60	(0.10, 3.46)
Education	1.03	(0.97, 1.10)	1.1	(0.95, 1.28)	1.15*	(1.03, 1.28)	1.05	(0.94, 1.18)	0.80	(0.39, 1.63)
Skin tone	0.97	(0.90, 1.05)	0.94	(0.76, 1.15)	0.94	(0.81, 1.10)	0.84*	(0.71, 0.99)	0.52	(0.20, 1.38)

Table D33 Multivariate Item Count Models of Racial ID Manipulation

		Is there a state AA Law?	Is the AA law race-targeted?	Year the law was passed	Year the law was implemented	Is there a Uni. Decree for AA?	Is the decree race-targeted?	Year the decree was passed	Year the decree was implemented
code	state	aalaw1	aalaw2	aalaw3	aalaw4	decree1	decree2	decree3	decree4
12	Acre	no	no			no			
27	Alagoas	yes	no	2004	2005	yes	yes	2003	2004
16	Amapá	yes	yes	2008	2009	no			
13	Amazonas	yes	no	2004	2005	no			
29	Bahia	yes	no	2014	2015	yes	yes	2004	2005
23	Ceará	yes	yes	2017	2018	yes	yes	2014	2015
53	Distrito Federal	no	no			yes	yes	2004	2005
32	Espírito Santo	no	no			yes	no	2007	2008
52	Goiás	yes	yes	2004	2005	yes	yes	2008	2009
21	Maranhão	yes	yes	2010	2011	yes	yes	2006	2007
50	Mato Grosso	no	no			yes	yes	2004	2005
51	Mato Grosso do Sul	yes	yes	2003	2004	no			
31	Minas Gerais	yes	yes	2004	2005	yes	yes	2008	2009
15	Pará	no	no			yes	yes	2005	2006
25	Paraíba	no	no			yes	no	2009	2010
41	Paraná	yes	no			yes	yes	2005	2006
26	Pernambuco	no	no			no			
22	Piauí	no	no			yes	no	2008	2009
33	Rio de Janeiro	yes	yes	2001	2002	no			
24	Rio Grande do Norte	yes	no	2002	2003	yes	yes	2005	2006
43	Rio Grande do Sul	yes	yes	2014	2015	yes	yes	2007	2008
11	Rondônia	no	no			no			
14	Roraima	no	no			yes	no	2012	2013
42	Santa Catarina	no	no			yes	yes	2007	2008
35	São Paulo	no	no			yes	yes	2004	2005
28	Sergipe	no	no			yes	yes	2008	2009
17	Tocantins	no	no			no			

Table D34 State-Level Affirmative Action Laws and University Decrees

	(1) Random FX	(2) Fixed FX	(3) Random FX	(4) Fixed FX
Post-AA x Exam	-0.054*	-0.054*		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Post-AA x University			0.030*	0.030*
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Post-AA	0.012*		0.012*	
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Exam	0.217*	0.217*		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
University			0.039*	0.039*
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.463*	0.472*	0.463*	0.472*
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
N	273,150	273,150	273,150	273,150

Table D35 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Affirmative Action on Racial Identification (Conservative Coding). $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are computed relative to the baseline probability of nonwhite identification in high school. Post-AA is the treatment variable, capturing whether individuals enrolled in university after the implementation of affirmative action policies. Exam and University indicate the time when racial identification was measured. The dependent variable in these models is coded as white (0) if the respondent identified as white at any point during high school, any registration for the university exam, or at any point in university.

	(A) High School	(B) Exam	(C) University	(B) – (A)	(C) – (A)
	0.475	0.637	0.544		
Post-AA	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	0.163 (0.002)	0.069 (0.001)
	0.462	0.679	0.502		
Pre-AA	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	0.217 (0.003)	0.039 (0.002)
	0.012	-0.042	0.041	DiD = -0.054	DiD = 0.030
Difference	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)

Table D36 Predicted Probabilites, Marginal Effects, and Difference-in-Difference Estimates Computed from Models 1 and 3 of Table D35

	(1) Random FX	(2) Fixed FX	(3) Random FX	(4) Fixed FX
Post-AA x Exam	-0.054*	-0.054*		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Post-AA x University			0.034*	0.034*
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Post-AA	0.012*		0.012*	
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Exam	0.217*	0.217*		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
University			0.004	0.004
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.463*	0.472*	0.463*	0.472*
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
N	273,150	273,150	273,150	273,150

Table D37 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Affirmative Action on Racial Identification (Liberal Coding). $^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are computed relative to the baseline probability of nonwhite identification in high school. Post-AA is the treatment variable, capturing whether individuals enrolled in university after the implementation of affirmative action policies. Exam and University indicate the time when racial identification was measured. The dependent variable in these models is coded as nonwhite (1) if the respondent identified as nonwhite at any point during high school, any registration for the university exam, or at any point in university.

APPENDIX E

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO CHAPTER SIX

Survey Sample and Information

This original survey was designed to compare Brazilians of varied skin tones within levels of education, and therefore stratified the sample by levels of education (less than primary, completed primary, completed high school, and some university or higher). Because nonwhite Brazilians are underrepresented in secondary and higher education, we oversampled darker skinned Brazilians in higher education groups, producing a sample that is, on average, slightly darker than the overall Brazilian population according to the 2010 census. Comparisons with the census data nonetheless show the sample is broadly representative of the national population in its racial composition, with whites undersampled and blacks oversampled.

		White	Nonwhite	Brown	Black
	Brazil	**47.7**	**50.8**	**43.0**	**7.8**
Regions (IBGE)	Northeast	29.1	69.3	59.5	9.9
	Southeast	55.0	43.7	35.6	8.1
States (IBGE)	Pernambuco	36.2	62.2	55.5	6.7
	São Paulo	63.7	34.8	29.1	5.7
Capital Cities (IBGE)	Recife/PE	37.2	61.5	52.8	8.8
	São Paulo/SP	58.6	39.4	32.8	6.6
Stratified Random Sample	**Full Sample**	**39.6**	**59.6**	**40.3**	**19.3**
	Recife/PE	26.6	72.6	48.8	23.8
	São Paulo/SP	52.6	46.6	31.8	14.8

Table E1 Racial Representativeness of Stratified Random Survey Sample compared to 2010 Census (IBGE). Nonwhite is the sum of black and brown identifiers. IBGE data comes from Table 1379, which can be consulted at sidra.ibge.gov.br.

This survey was conducted in two major cities in Brazil: São Paulo, the capital city of the state of São Paulo, which is located in Brazil's southeastern region; and Recife, the capital city of the state of Pernambuco, located in the northeastern region. These two cities were selected for several reasons. First, because this survey employs

skin tone measurement techniques to mirror those used in the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA), in-person interviews are required for the application of the questionnaire in order for interviewers to observe skin tone as well as their evaluations of the respondents' racial classifications. In-person interviews made the costs of nationally representative random sample prohibitive, and I thus selected two cities in regions of Brazil widely considered to capture subnational variation in historical conditions, socioeconomics, demographics etc. São Paulo is Brazil's largest city and is, in a general sense, representative of the southeast region. Recife is the ninth largest city in Brazil, and is generally representative of the northeast.

Second, these cities also mirror the qualitative fieldwork carried out and elaborated in Appendix B. Under the cost constraints of implementing a survey with in-person interviews, survey questions were intended to test hypotheses generated from fieldwork without potentially introducing other unforeseen factors in other locations that might affect results.

And third, many studies of race relations and politics in Brazil are carried out in Salvador (Bahia), which is seen as a site of black activism and culture. However Salvador underwent a process of re-africanization in an effort to attract greater tourism in the 1980s and 1990s, introducing a particular element into that city's racial dynamics. Recife, by contrast, maintains a similar historical and sociodemographic profile to Salvador, but did not experience such cultural activism in recent decades. The selection of Recife/PE moreover allows us to expand beyond Salvador/BA in the study of racial politics in the Brazilian northeast.

Racial Identification Question Wording

This survey was designed to analyze racial identifications in a multidimensional way. This entailed measuring physical attributes commonly understood to inform (if not determine) one's racial identification, like skin tone and hair texture, as well as capturing racial identity and identifications in multiple formats. In conformity with emerging standards in the study of race and ethnicity in Latin America (E. E. Telles 2014), this survey asks the interviewers to collect information about the respondents, including the respondents' rough positions on an 11-point color palette and a description of the respondent's hair. Additionally, interviewers are asked to racially classify the respondents using the official census categories. Interviewers were instructed to collect this information using their own judgment and without informing respondents that such information was being collected. In the sequence of the questionnaire, these ascriptive measures were collected before any other racial information or attitudes were collected to avoid any influence from the respondents on the interpretations of the interviewers.

In addition to ascriptive measures, respondents were also prompted to provide several forms of racial self-declaration. First, respondents are asked to self-identify in racial terms in an open-ended format. For comparison to the interviewers' classifications, respondents were then asked to self-classify using the official census categories. The close-ended census question reads: "The IBGE – the institute that does the census – classifies people in the categories white, black, brown, yellow, and indigenous. Which of these categories best describes how you identify?"[46] The analyses presented in Chapter 6 make use of these three racial identification/classification questions to analyze patterns of identification and whitening/darkening, as well as the specific language choices individuals make when the identify. Including measures of

180[46] In Portuguese, this reads: "O IBGE – instituto que faz o censo – classifica as pessoas nas categorias branca, preta, parda, amarela e indígena. Entre estas categorias, qual melhor descreve como você se identifica?"

physical attributes in these analyses as controls helps to separate racial identification from factors that may constrain individuals' choice sets, and allow for more precise estimation of how socioeconomic factors shape patterns of identification and reclassification.

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Education	2.56	1.10	1	4	1000
Skin tone	1.79	0.74	1	3	1000
Hair type	3.51	2.04	1	6	1000
Income	0.81	0.83	0	9.5	912
Age	4.04	1.56	1.8	8.4	1000
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1	1000
Political Identity	3.02	0.59	1	4.9	982
City	0.50	0.50	0	1	1000
Ideology	-0.02	1.00	-2	2	775
Civil Servant Exam	0.21	0.41	0	1	1000
Vestibular	0.19	0.40	0	1	999
Enem	0.25	0.43	0	1	1000
Fies	0.05	0.21	0	1	996
ProUni	0.05	0.21	0	1	997
> 1 Program	0.43	0.50	0	1	1000

Table E2 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables. Age is measured in decades. Income measures total household income per capita. Political identity is a composite variables computed as the mean of 5-category Likert responses to a battery of racial consciousness questions.

Education Comparisons	Est. difference	Delta-method Std. Err.	Unadjusted 95% Conf.	Interval
Primary vs. < Primary	0.04	0.02	.0000393	.0897947
High School vs. < Primary	0.09	0.04	.0025826	.1690800
University vs. < Primary	0.12	0.06	.0068797	.2386561
High School vs. Primary	0.04	0.02	.0025329	.0792957
University vs. Primary	0.08	0.04	.0067914	.1489103
University vs. High School	0.04	0.02	.0042248	.0696484

Table E3 Comparing Marginal Effect of Political Identity across Levels of Education. Computed from Model 6 in Table 6.3.

	White ID vs. Brown ID						Black ID vs. Brown ID					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Education	0.05	-0.18*	-0.20*	-0.21*	0.86+	-0.22*	-0.16*	0.04	0.10	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.49)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.62)	(0.12)
Skin tone		-2.40*	-2.25*	-2.10*	-2.13*	-0.53		2.14*	1.99*	1.87*	1.87*	1.48
		(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(1.07)		(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(1.25)
Political Identity			-0.48*	-0.42*	0.58	0.34			0.92*	0.80*	0.79	0.49
			(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.48)	(0.55)			(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.52)	(0.90)
Income				0.26*	0.25+	0.27*				0.23	0.23	0.23
				(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)				(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Age				0.19*	0.18*	0.19*				-0.15+	-0.15+	-0.15+
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)				(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Female				0.12	0.13	0.13				0.19	0.19	0.19
				(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)				(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Recife				0.04	-0.00	0.03				0.23	0.22	0.23
				(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)				(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Political Identity x Education					-0.37*						0.01	
					(0.17)						(0.18)	
Political Identity x Skin tone						-0.54						0.12
						(0.37)						(0.38)
Constant	-0.52*	3.56*	4.77*	3.65*	0.82	1.48	-0.32	-5.62*	-8.42*	-7.74*	-7.67*	-6.75*
	(0.20)	(0.38)	(0.63)	(0.76)	(1.46)	(1.64)	(0.21)	(0.52)	(0.86)	(0.95)	(1.84)	(2.96)
Hair type FX	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
N	942	942	925	851	851	851	942	942	925	851	851	851
AIC	1989.94	1412.26	1363.10	1239.61	1238.64	1241.30	1989.94	1412.26	1363.10	1239.61	1238.64	1241.30

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$

Table E4 Full Multinomial Logit Estimates for Section 3.2 Estimating Self-Identification as White, Black or Brown.

	Comparison	Estimated Difference	SE	95% CI	
Black ID	Primary vs. < Primary	0.007	0.017	-0.026	0.040
	High School vs. < Primary	0.011	0.034	-0.055	0.077
	University vs. < Primary	0.014	0.050	-0.085	0.113
	High School vs. Primary	0.004	0.017	-0.029	0.037
	University vs. Primary	0.007	0.034	-0.059	0.073
	University vs. High School	0.003	0.017	-0.030	0.036
Brown ID	Primary vs. < Primary	0.039	0.025	-0.010	0.089
	High School vs. < Primary	0.078	0.050	-0.021	0.176
	University vs. < Primary	0.114	0.074	-0.031	0.258
	High School vs. Primary	0.038	0.025	-0.011	0.087
	University vs. Primary	0.074	0.049	-0.021	0.170
	University vs. High School	0.036	0.024	-0.011	0.083
White ID	Primary vs. < Primary	-0.046	0.023	-0.091	-0.002
	High School vs. < Primary	-0.089	0.043	-0.172	-0.005
	University vs. < Primary	-0.128	0.060	-0.245	-0.011
	High School vs. Primary	-0.043	0.020	-0.082	-0.004
	University vs. Primary	-0.082	0.037	-0.154	-0.009
	University vs. High School	-0.039	0.017	-0.073	-0.005

Table E5 Pairwise Tests Marginal Effects of Political Identity on Pr(Racial ID) across Education Levels (Figure 6.3)

Coding	Response	Frequency
White or euphemism	Branca/o	261
	Caucaziano	2
	Clara	1
	Loiro	1
	Normal branca	1
	Subtotal	*266 obs.*
Mixed or euphemism	Morena/a	83
	Parda/o	286
	Moreno clara/o	7
	Moreno pardo	1
	Morena clara e brasileira	1
	Normal parda	1
	Parda morena	1
	Pardo café com leite	1
	Mais ou menos parda	1
	Brasileiro pardo	1
	Subtotal	*383 obs.*
Black, *negro* or *preto*	Negra/o	140
	Preta/o	58
	Negro pretão	1
	Normal negra	1
	Subtotal	*200 obs.*
Excluded	Missing values	78
	Normal	54
	Amarela	11
	Brasileiro	4
	Indígena	1
	Mulata	1
	Pálida	1
	Afrodescendente	1
	Subtotal	*151 obs.*
	Total	1,000 obs.

Table E6 Tabulation and Coding of Open-Ended Racial ID Responses

	White ID (or euphemism) vs. Brown ID (or euphemism)					Black ID (*negro* or *preto*) vs. Brown ID (or euphemism)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Political	-0.91*		-0.40*	-0.33	0.48	1.33*		0.87*	0.82*	0.65
Identity	(0.16)		(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.51)	(0.18)		(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.54)
Education		0.13+	-0.07	-0.04	0.83		-0.05	0.24*	0.07	-0.15
		(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.53)		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.63)
Skin tone			-2.25*	-1.94*	-1.96*			1.98*	1.73*	1.73*
			(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)			(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Income				0.30*	0.29+				0.54*	0.54*
				(0.15)	(0.15)				(0.21)	(0.21)
Age				0.23*	0.23*				-0.08	-0.08
				(0.07)	(0.08)				(0.08)	(0.08)
Female				-0.04	-0.02				0.44+	0.43+
				(0.21)	(0.21)				(0.25)	(0.25)
Recife				-0.22	-0.25				0.09	0.09
				(0.22)	(0.22)				(0.25)	(0.25)
Political Identity x Education					-0.30+					0.06
					(0.18)					(0.19)
Constant	2.27*	-0.72*	4.23*	2.80*	0.51	-4.95*	-0.53*	-8.46*	-8.48*	-7.89*
	(0.45)	(0.21)	(0.66)	(0.80)	(1.57)	(0.60)	(0.22)	(0.89)	(1.01)	(1.93)
Hair type FX	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
N	835	849	835	772	772	835	849	835	772	772
AIC	1632.46	1808.16	1243.20	1139.71	1140.61	1632.46	1808.16	1243.20	1139.71	1140.61

Table E7 Multinomial Logit Estimates of Open-Ended Racial Identifications.
Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$

	Lighter ID vs. Match					Darker ID vs. Match				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pol. Iden.	0.31		-0.68*		-0.67*	-0.00		0.75*		0.62*
	(0.19)		(0.23)		(0.24)	(0.14)		(0.17)		(0.19)
Education		-0.43*	-0.38*	-0.12	-0.16		0.11	0.04	0.01	0.03
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Skin Tone			1.56*	1.54*	1.74*			-1.53*	-1.64*	-1.85*
			(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.26)			(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Income				-0.42+	-0.55*				-0.34*	-0.30*
				(0.24)	(0.27)				(0.14)	(0.14)
Age				0.19*	0.19*				-0.20*	-0.20*
				(0.09)	(0.09)				(0.07)	(0.07)
Female				-0.60*	-0.61*				-0.28	-0.28
				(0.26)	(0.27)				(0.19)	(0.19)
Recife				-0.25	-0.23				0.06	-0.01
				(0.27)	(0.27)				(0.20)	(0.21)
Constant	-2.87*	-0.95*	-2.39*	-4.67*	-2.90*	-1.19*	-1.50*	-1.18*	2.09*	0.56
	(0.60)	(0.25)	(0.76)	(0.74)	(0.95)	(0.42)	(0.22)	(0.56)	(0.51)	(0.71)
Hair type FX	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
N	921	938	921	862	849	921	938	921	862	849
AIC	1500.94	1505.25	1293.51	1217.14	1183.07	1500.94	1505.25	1293.51	1217.14	1183.07

Table E8 Multinomial Logit Estimates of Classification Mismatch.

+ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$. Standard errors in parentheses

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